[=Credentials=] are integral to our daily lives: driver's licenses confirm our capability to operate motor vehicles; university degrees assert our level of education; and government-issued passports attest to our citizenship when traveling between countries. This specification provides a mechanism for expressing these sorts of [=credentials=] on the Web in a way that is cryptographically secure, privacy respecting, and machine verifiable. These [=credentials=] provide benefits to us when used in the physical world, but their use on the Web continues to be elusive.
The Working Group is actively seeking implementation feedback for this specification. In order to exit the Candidate Recommendation phase, the Working Group has set the requirement of at least two independent implementations for each mandatory feature in the specification. Please see the implementation report for more details.
Comments regarding this specification are welcome at any time. Please file issues directly on GitHub, or send them to public-vc-comments@w3.org if that is not possible. (subscribe, archives).
[=Credentials=] are integral to our daily lives: driver's licenses confirm our capability to operate motor vehicles; university degrees assert our level of education; and government-issued passports attest to our citizenship when traveling between countries. This specification provides a mechanism for expressing these sorts of [=credentials=] on the Web in a way that is cryptographically secure, privacy respecting, and machine verifiable. These [=credentials=] provide benefits to us when used in the physical world, but their use on the Web continues to be elusive.
It is currently difficult to express educational qualifications, healthcare data, financial account details, and other third-party-[=verified=] personal information in a machine readable way on the Web. The challenge of expressing digital [=credentials=] on the Web hinders our ability to receive the same benefits from them that physical [=credentials=] provide in the real world.
For those unfamiliar with the concepts related to [=verifiable credentials=], the following sections provide an overview of:
The use cases and requirements that informed this specification can be found in [[[VC-USE-CASES]]] [[?VC-USE-CASES]].
In the physical world, a [=credential=] might consist of:
A [=verifiable credential=] can represent all the same information that a physical [=credential=] represents. Adding technologies such as digital signatures can make [=verifiable credentials=] more tamper-evident and trustworthy than their physical counterparts.
[=Holders=] of [=verifiable credentials=] can generate [=verifiable presentations=] and then share these [=verifiable presentations=] with [=verifiers=] to prove they possess [=verifiable credentials=] with specific characteristics.
Both [=verifiable credentials=] and [=verifiable presentations=] can be transmitted rapidly, making them more convenient than their physical counterparts when establishing trust at a distance.
While this specification attempts to improve the ease of expressing digital [=credentials=], it also aims to balance this goal with several privacy-preserving goals. The persistence of digital information, and the ease with which disparate sources of digital data can be collected and correlated, comprise a privacy concern that the use of [=verifiable=] and easily machine-readable [=credentials=] threatens to make worse. This document outlines and attempts to address several of these issues in Section [[[#privacy-considerations]]]. Examples of how to use this data model using privacy-enhancing technologies, such as zero-knowledge proofs, are also provided throughout this document.
The word "verifiable" in the terms [=verifiable credential=] and [=verifiable presentation=] refers to the characteristic of a [=credential=] or [=presentation=] as being able to be [=verified=] by a [=verifier=], as defined in this document. Verifiability of a credential does not imply the truth of [=claims=] encoded therein. Instead, upon establishing the authenticity and currency of a [=verifiable credential=] or [=verifiable presentation=], a [=verifier=] validates the included [=claims=] using their own business rules before relying on them. Such reliance only occurs after evaluating the issuer, the proof, the subject, and the claims against one or more verifier policies.
This section describes the roles of the core actors and the relationships between them in an ecosystem where one expects [=verifiable credentials=] to be useful. A role is an abstraction that might be implemented in many different ways. The separation of roles suggests likely interfaces and protocols for standardization. This specification introduces the following roles:
[[[#roles]]] above provides an example ecosystem to ground the rest of the concepts in this specification. Other ecosystems exist, such as protected environments or proprietary systems, where [=verifiable credentials=] also provide benefits.
This ecosystem contrasts with the typical two-party or federated identity provider models. An identity provider, sometimes abbreviated as IdP, is a system for creating, maintaining, and managing identity information for [=holders=] while providing authentication services to [=relying party=] applications within a federation or distributed network. In a federated identity model, the [=holder=] is tightly bound to the identity provider. This specification avoids using "identity provider," "federated identity," or "relying party" terminology, except when comparing or mapping these concepts to other specifications. This specification decouples the identity provider concept into two distinct concepts: the [=issuer=] and the [=holder=].
In many cases, the [=holder=] of a [=verifiable credential=] is the subject, but in some instances it is not. For example, a parent (the [=holder=]) might hold the [=verifiable credentials=] of a child (the [=subject=]), or a pet owner (the [=holder=]) might hold the [=verifiable credentials=] of their pet (the [=subject=]). For more information about these exceptional cases, see the Subject-Holder Relationships section in the [[[VC-IMP-GUIDE]]].
For a deeper exploration of the [=verifiable credentials=] ecosystem and a concrete lifecycle example, please refer to [[[VC-USE-CASES]]] [[?VC-USE-CASES]].
A conforming document is a compacted JSON-LD document that complies with all of the relevant "MUST" statements in this specification. Specifically, the relevant normative "MUST" statements in Sections [[[#basic-concepts]]], [[[#advanced-concepts]]], and [[[#syntaxes]]] of this document MUST be enforced. A conforming document MUST be either a [=verifiable credential=] with a media type of `application/vc` or a [=verifiable presentation=] with a media type of `application/vp`. A conforming document MUST be secured by at least one securing mechanism as described in Section [[[#securing-mechanisms]]].
A conforming issuer implementation produces [=conforming documents=], MUST include all required properties in the [=conforming documents=] it produces, and MUST secure the [=conforming documents=] it produces using a securing mechanism described in Section [[[#securing-mechanisms]]].
A conforming verifier implementation consumes [=conforming documents=], MUST perform [=verification=] on a [=conforming document=] as described in Section [[[#securing-mechanisms]]], MUST check that each required property satisfies the normative requirements for that property, and MUST produce errors when non-[=conforming documents=] are detected.
This specification includes both required and optional properties. Optional properties MAY be ignored by [=conforming issuer implementations=] and [=conforming verifier implementations=].
This document also contains examples that contain characters that are invalid JSON, such as inline comments (`//`) and the use of ellipsis (`...`) to denote information that adds little value to the example. Implementers are cautioned to remove this content if they desire to use the information as a valid document.
Examples provided throughout this document include descriptive properties, such as `name` and `description`, with values in English to simplify the concepts in each example of the specification. These examples do not necessarily reflect the data structures needed for international use, described in more detail in Section [[[#internationalization-considerations]]].
The following terms are used to describe concepts in this specification.
The following sections outline core data model concepts, such as [=claims=], [=credentials=], [=presentations=], [=verifiable credentials=], and [=verifiable presentations=], which form the foundation of this specification.
Readers might note that some concepts described in this section, such as [=credentials=] and [=presentations=], do not have media types defined by this specification. However, the concepts of a [=verifiable credential=] or a [=verifiable presentation=] are defined as [=conforming documents=] and have associated media types. The concrete difference between these concepts — between [=credential=] and [=presentation=] vs. [=verifiable credential=] and [=verifiable presentation=] — is simply the fact that the "verifiable" objects are secured in a cryptographic way, and the others are not. For more details, see Section [[[#securing-mechanisms]]].
A [=claim=] is a statement about a [=subject=]. A [=subject=] is a thing about which [=claims=] can be made. [=Claims=] are expressed using subject- property-value relationships.
The data model for [=claims=], illustrated in [[[#basic-structure]]] above, is powerful and can be used to express a large variety of statements. For example, whether someone graduated from a particular university can be expressed as shown in [[[#basic-example]]] below.
Individual [=claims=] can be merged together to express a [=graph=] of information about a [=subject=]. The example shown in [[[#multiple-claims]]] below extends the previous [=claim=] by adding the [=claims=] that Pat knows Sam and that Sam is employed as a professor.
To this point, the concepts of a [=claim=] and a [=graph=] of information are introduced. More information is expected to be added to the graph in order to be able to trust [=claims=], more information is expected to be added to the graph.
A [=credential=] is a set of one or more [=claims=] made by the same [=entity=]. [=Credentials=] might also include an identifier and metadata to describe properties of the [=credential=], such as the [=issuer=], the validity date and time period, a representative image, [=verification material=], status information, and so on. A [=verifiable credential=] is a set of tamper-evident [=claims=] and metadata that cryptographically prove who issued it. Examples of [=verifiable credentials=] include, but are not limited to, digital employee identification cards, digital driver's licenses, and digital educational certificates.
[[[#basic-vc]]] above shows the basic components of a [=verifiable credential=], but abstracts the details about how [=claims=] are organized into information [=graphs=], which are then organized into [=verifiable credentials=].
[[[#info-graph-vc]]] below shows a more complete depiction of a [=verifiable credential=] using an [=embedded proof=] based on [[[?VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]]]. It is composed of at least two information [=graphs=]. The first of these information [=graphs=], the [=verifiable credential graph=] (the [=default graph=]), expresses the [=verifiable credential=] itself through [=credential=] metadata and other [=claims=]. The second information [=graph=], referred to by the `proof` property, is the proof graph of the [=verifiable credential=] and is a separate [=named graph=]. The [=proof graph=] expresses the digital proof, which, in this case, is a digital signature. Readers who are interested in the need for multiple information graphs can refer to Section [[[#verifiable-credential-graphs]]].
[[[#info-graph-vc-jwt]]] below shows the same [=verifiable credential=] as [[[#info-graph-vc]]], but secured using JOSE [[?VC-JOSE-COSE]]. The payload contains a single information graph, which is the [=verifiable credential graph=] containing [=credential=] metadata and other [=claims=].
Enhancing privacy is a key design feature of this specification. Therefore, it is crucial for [=entities=] using this technology to express only the portions of their personas that are appropriate for given situations. The expression of a subset of one's persona is called a [=verifiable presentation=]. Examples of different personas include a person's professional persona, online gaming persona, family persona, or incognito persona.
A [=verifiable presentation=] is created by a [=holder=], can express data from multiple [=verifiable credentials=], and can contain arbitrary additional data. They are used to present [=claims=] to a [=verifier=]. It is also possible to present [=verifiable credentials=] directly.
The data in a [=presentation=] is often about the same [=subject=] but might have been issued by multiple [=issuers=]. The aggregation of this information expresses an aspect of a person, organization, or [=entity=].
[[[#basic-vp]]] above shows the components of a [=verifiable presentation=] but abstracts the details about how [=verifiable credentials=] are organized into information [=graphs=], which are then organized into [=verifiable presentations=].
[[[#info-graph-vp]]] below shows a more complete depiction of a [=verifiable presentation=] using an [=embedded proof=] based on [[[?VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]]]. It is composed of at least four information [=graphs=]. The first of these information [=graphs=], the [=verifiable presentation graph=] (the [=default graph=]), expresses the [=verifiable presentation=] itself through [=presentation=] metadata. The [=verifiable presentation=] refers, via the `verifiableCredential` property, to a [=verifiable credential=]. This [=credential=] is a self-contained [=verifiable credential graph=] containing [=credential=] metadata and other [=claims=]. This [=credential=] refers to a [=verifiable credential=] [=proof graph=] via a `proof` property, expressing the proof (usually a digital signature) of the [=credential=]. This [=verifiable credential graph=] and its linked [=proof graph=] constitute the second and third information [=graphs=], respectively, and each is a separate [=named graph=]. The [=presentation=] also refers, via the `proof` property, to the [=presentation=]'s [=proof graph=], the fourth information [=graph=] (another [=named graph=]). This [=presentation=] [=proof graph=] represents the digital signature of the [=verifiable presentation graph=], the [=verifiable credential graph=], and the [=proof graph=] linked from the [=verifiable credential graph=].
[[[#info-graph-vp-jwt]]] below shows the same [=verifiable presentation=] as [[[#info-graph-vp]]], but using an [=enveloping proof=] based on [[?VC-JOSE-COSE]]. The payload contains only two information graphs: the [=verifiable presentation graph=] expressing the [=verifiable presentation=] through presentation metadata and the corresponding [=verifiable credential graph=], referred to by the `verifiableCredential` property. The [=verifiable credential graph=] contains a single `EnvelopedVerifiableCredential` instance referring, via a `data:` URL [[RFC2397]], to the verifiable credential secured via an [=enveloping proof=] shown in [[[#info-graph-vc-jwt]]].
It is possible to have a [=presentation=], such as a collection of university credentials, which draws on multiple [=credentials=] about different [=subjects=] that are often, but not required to be, related. This is achieved by using the `verifiableCredential` property to refer to multiple [=verifiable credentials=]. See Appendix [[[#additional-diagrams-for-verifiable-presentations]]] for more details.
As described in Section [[[#ecosystem-overview]]], an [=entity=] can take on one or more roles as they enter a particular credential exchange. While a [=holder=] is typically expected to generate [=presentations=], an [=issuer=] or [=verifier=] might generate a presentation to identify itself to a [=holder=]. This might occur if the [=holder=] needs higher assurance from the [=issuer=] or [=verifier=] before handing over sensitive information as part of a [=verifiable presentation=].
This section introduces some basic concepts for the specification in preparation for Section [[[#advanced-concepts]]] later in the document.
This specification is designed to ease the prototyping of new types of [=verifiable credentials=]. Developers can copy the template below and paste it into common [=verifiable credential=] tooling to start issuing, holding, and verifying prototype credentials.
A developer will change `MyPrototypeCredential` below to the type of credential they would like to create. Since [=verifiable credentials=] talk about subjects, each property-value pair in the `credentialSubject` object expresses a particular property of the credential subject. Once a developer has added a number of these property-value combinations, the modified object can be sent to a [=conforming issuer implementation=], and a [=verifiable credential=] will be created for the developer. From a prototyping standpoint, that is all a developer needs to do.
{ "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2", "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2" ], "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "MyPrototypeCredential"], "credentialSubject": { "mySubjectProperty": "mySubjectValue" } }
After stabilizing all credential properties, developers are advised to generate and publish vocabulary and context files at stable URLs to facilitate interoperability with other developers. The `https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2` URL above would then be replaced with the URL of a use-case-specific context. This process is covered in Section [[[#extensibility]]]. Alternatively, developers can reuse existing vocabulary and context files that happen to fit their use case. They can explore the [[[VC-EXTENSIONS]]] for reusable resources.
[=Verifiable credentials=] are used to express properties of one or more [=subjects=] as well as properties of the [=credential=] itself. The following properties are defined in this specification for a [=verifiable credential=]:
A [=verifiable credential=] can be extended to have additional properties through the extension mechanism defined in Section [[[#extensibility]]].
When two software systems need to exchange data, they need to use terminology that both systems understand. Consider how two people communicate effectively by using the same language, where the words they use, such as "name" and "website," mean the same thing to each individual. This is sometimes referred to as the context of a conversation. This specification uses a similar concept to achieve similar results for software systems by establishing a context in which to communicate.
Software systems that process [=verifiable credentials=] and [=verifiable presentations=] identify terminology by using [=URLs=] for each term. However, those [=URLs=] can be long and not very human-friendly, while short-form, human-friendly aliases can be more helpful. This specification uses the `@context` [=property=] to map short-form aliases to the [=URLs=].
[=Verifiable credentials=] and [=verifiable presentations=] MUST include a `@context` [=property=]. Application developers MUST understand every JSON-LD context used by their application, at least to the extent that it affects the meaning of the terms used by their application. One mechanism for doing so is described in the Section on Validating Contexts in the [[[VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]]] specification. Other specifications that build upon this specification MAY require that JSON-LD contexts be integrity protected by using the `relatedResource` feature described in Section [[[#integrity-of-related-resources]]] or any effectively equivalent mechanism.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"id": "http://university.example/credentials/58473",
"type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleAlumniCredential"],
"issuer": "did:example:2g55q912ec3476eba2l9812ecbfe",
"validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"credentialSubject": {
"id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
"alumniOf": {
"id": "did:example:c276e12ec21ebfeb1f712ebc6f1",
"name": "Example University"
}
}
}
The example above uses the base context [=URL=] (`https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2`) to establish that the data exchange is about a [=verifiable credential=]. This concept is further detailed in Section [[[#extensibility]]]. The data available at `https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2` is a permanently cacheable static document with instructions for processing it provided in Appendix [[[#base-context]]]. The associated human-readable vocabulary document for the Verifiable Credentials Data Model is available at https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/.
The second [=URL=] (`https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2`) is used to demonstrate examples. Implementations are expected to not use this [=URL=] for any other purpose, such as in pilot or production systems.
The `@context` [=property=] is further elaborated upon in Section 3.1: The Context of the [[[JSON-LD11]]] specification.
When expressing statements about a specific thing, such as a person, product, or organization, using a globally unique identifier for that thing can be useful. Globally unique identifiers enable others to express statements about the same thing. This specification defines the optional `id` [=property=] for such identifiers. The `id` [=property=] allows for expressing statements about specific things in the [=verifiable credential=] and is set by an [=issuer=] when expressing objects in a [=verifiable credential=] or a [=holder=] when expressing objects in a [=verifiable presentation=]. The `id` [=property=] expresses an identifier that others are expected to use when expressing statements about the specific thing identified by that identifier. Example `id` values include UUIDs (`urn:uuid:0c07c1ce-57cb-41af-bef2-1b932b986873`), HTTP URLs (`https://id.example/things#123`), and DIDs (`did:example:1234abcd`).
Developers are reminded that identifiers might be harmful when pseudonymity is required. When considering such scenarios, developers are encouraged to read Section [[[#identifier-based-correlation]]] carefully There are also other types of access and correlation mechanisms documented in Section [[[#privacy-considerations]]] that create privacy concerns. Where privacy is a vital consideration, it is permissible to omit the `id` [=property=]. Some use cases do not need or explicitly need to omit, the `id` [=property=]. Similarly, special attention is to be given to the choice between publicly resolvable URLs and other forms of identifiers. Publicly resolvable URLs can facilitate ease of verification and interoperability, yet they might also inadvertently grant access to potentially sensitive information if not used judiciously.
{ "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2", "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2" ], "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732", "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"], "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049", "validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z", "credentialSubject": { "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21", "degree": { "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree", "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts" } } }
The example above uses two types of identifiers. The first identifier is for the [=verifiable credential=] and uses an HTTP-based URL. The second identifier is for the [=subject=] of the [=verifiable credential=] (the thing the [=claims=] are about) and uses a [=decentralized identifier=], also known as a [=DID=].
[=DIDs=] are a type of identifier which are not necessary for [=verifiable credentials=] to be useful. Specifically, [=verifiable credentials=] do not depend on [=DIDs=] and [=DIDs=] do not depend on [=verifiable credentials=]. However, many [=verifiable credentials=] will use [=DIDs=], and software libraries implementing this specification will need to resolve [=DIDs=]. [=DID=]-based URLs are used to express identifiers associated with [=subjects=], [=issuers=], [=holders=], credential status lists, cryptographic keys, and other machine-readable information associated with a [=verifiable credential=].
Software systems that process the kinds of objects specified in this document use type information to determine whether or not a provided [=verifiable credential=] or [=verifiable presentation=] is appropriate for the intended use-case. This specification defines a `type` [=property=] for expressing object type information. This type information can be used during [=validation=] processes, as described in Appendix [[[#validation]]].
[=Verifiable credentials=] and [=verifiable presentations=] MUST contain a `type` [=property=] with an associated value.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
"type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"],
"issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
"validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"credentialSubject": {
"id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
"degree": {
"type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
"name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
}
}
}
Concerning this specification, the following table lists the objects that MUST have a [=type=] specified.
Object | Type |
---|---|
[=Verifiable credential=] object |
`VerifiableCredential` and, optionally, a more specific
[=verifiable credential=] [=type=]. For example, `"type": ["VerifiableCredential", "OpenBadgeCredential"]` |
[=Verifiable presentation=] object |
`VerifiablePresentation` and, optionally, a more specific
[=verifiable presentation=] [=type=]. For example, `"type": "VerifiablePresentation"` |
credentialStatus object |
A valid [=credential=] status [=type=]. For example, `"type": "BitstringStatusListEntry"` |
termsOfUse object |
A valid terms of use [=type=]. For example, `"type": "TrustFrameworkPolicy"` |
evidence object |
A valid evidence [=type=]. For example, `"type": "Evidence"` |
refreshService object |
A valid refreshService [=type=]. For example, `"type": "VerifiableCredentialRefreshService2021"` |
credentialSchema object |
A valid credentialSchema [=type=]. For example, `"type": "JsonSchema"` |
The [=type=] system for the Verifiable Credentials Data Model is the same as for [[[JSON-LD11]]] and is detailed in Section 3.5: Specifying the Type and Section 9: JSON-LD Grammar. When using a JSON-LD context (see Section [[[#extensibility]]]), this specification aliases the `@type` keyword to `type` to make the JSON-LD documents more easily understood. While application developers and document authors do not need to understand the specifics of the JSON-LD type system, implementers of this specification who want to support interoperable extensibility do.
All [=credentials=], [=presentations=], and encapsulated objects SHOULD specify, or be associated with, additional, more narrow [=types=] (like `ExampleDegreeCredential`, for example) so software systems can more easily detect and process this additional information.
When processing encapsulated objects defined in this specification, such as objects associated with the `credentialSubject` object or deeply nested therein, software systems SHOULD use the [=type=] information specified in encapsulating objects higher in the hierarchy. Specifically, an encapsulating object, such as a [=credential=], SHOULD convey the associated object [=types=] so that [=verifiers=] can quickly determine the contents of an associated object based on the encapsulating object [=type=].
For example, a [=credential=] object with the `type` of `ExampleDegreeCredential`, signals to a [=verifier=] that the object associated with the `credentialSubject` property contains the identifier for the:
This enables implementers to rely on values associated with the `type` property for [=verification=]. Object types and their associated values are expected to be documented in at least a human-readable specification that can be found at the [=URL=] for the type. For example, the human-readable definition for the `BitstringStatusList` type can be found at https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/status/#BitstringStatusList. It is also suggested that a machine-readable version be provided through HTTP content negotiation at the same URL.
Explaining how to create a new type of [=verifiable credential=] is beyond the scope of this specification. Readers interested in doing so are advised to read the Creating New Credential Types section in the [[[?VC-IMP-GUIDE]]].
When displaying a [=credential=], it can be helpful to have text provided by the [=issuer=] that furnishes the [=credential=] with a name and a short description of its purpose. The `name` and `description` [=properties=] serve these purposes.
{ "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2", "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2" ], "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732", "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"], "issuer": { "id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049", "name": "Example University", "description": "A public university focusing on teaching examples." }, "validFrom": "2015-05-10T12:30:00Z", "name": "Example University Degree", "description": "2015 Bachelor of Science and Arts Degree", "credentialSubject": { "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21", "degree": { "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree", "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts" } } }
Names and descriptions also support expressing content in different languages. To express a string with language and [=base direction=] information, one can use an object that contains the `@value`, `@language`, and `@direction` properties to express the text value, language tag, and base direction, respectively. See [[[#language-and-base-direction]]] for further information.
The `@direction` property in the examples below is not required for the associated single-language strings, as their default directions are the same as those set by the `@direction` value. We include the `@direction` property here for clarity of demonstration and to make copy+paste+edit deliver functional results. Implementers are encouraged to read the section on String Internationalization in the [[[JSON-LD11]]] specification.
{ "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2", "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2" ], "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732", "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"], "issuer": { "id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049", "name": [{ "@value": "Example University", "@language": "en" }, { "@value": "Université Exemple", "@language": "fr" }, { "@value": "جامعة المثال", "@language": "ar", "@direction": "rtl" }], "description": [{ "@value": "A public university focusing on teaching examples.", "@language": "en" }, { "@value": "Une université publique axée sur l'enseignement d'exemples.", "@language": "fr" }, { "@value": ".جامعة عامة تركز على أمثلة التدريس", "@language": "ar", "@direction": "rtl" }] }, "validFrom": "2015-05-10T12:30:00Z", "name": [{ "@value": "Example University Degree", "@language": "en" }, { "@value": "Exemple de Diplôme Universitaire", "@language": "fr" }, { "@value": "مثال الشهادة الجامعية", "@language": "ar", "@direction": "rtl" }], "description": [{ "@value": "2015 Bachelor of Science and Arts Degree", "@language": "en" }, { "@value": "2015 Licence de Sciences et d'Arts", "@language": "fr" }, { "@value": "2015 بكالوريوس العلوم والآداب", "@language": "ar", "@direction": "rtl" }], "credentialSubject": { "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21", "degree": { "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree", "name": [{ "@value": "Bachelor of Science and Arts Degree", "@language": "en" }, { "@value": "Licence de Sciences et d'Arts", "@language": "fr" }, { "@value": "بكالوريوس العلوم والآداب", "@language": "ar", "@direction": "rtl" }] } } }
This specification defines a property for expressing the [=issuer=] of a [=verifiable credential=].
A [=verifiable credential=] MUST have an `issuer` [=property=].
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
"type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"],
"issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
"validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
"credentialSubject": {
"id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
"degree": {
"type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
"name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
}
}
}
It is also possible to express additional information about the issuer by associating an object with the issuer property:
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
"type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"],
"issuer": {
"id": "did:example:76e12ec712ebc6f1c221ebfeb1f",
"name": "Example University"
},
"validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
"credentialSubject": {
"id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
"degree": {
"type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
"name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
}
}
}
The value of the `issuer` [=property=] can also be a JWK (for example, `"https://jwk.example/keys/foo.jwk"`) or a [=DID=] (for example, `"did:example:abfe13f712120431c276e12ecab"`).
A [=verifiable credential=] contains [=claims=] about one or more [=subjects=]. This specification defines a `credentialSubject` [=property=] for the expression of [=claims=] about one or more [=subjects=].
A [=verifiable credential=] MUST contain a `credentialSubject` [=property=].
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
"type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"],
"issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
"validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"credentialSubject": {
"id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
"degree": {
"type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
"name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
}
}
}
Expressing information related to multiple [=subjects=] in a [=verifiable credential=] is possible. The example below specifies two [=subjects=] who are spouses. Note the use of array notation to associate multiple [=subjects=] with the `credentialSubject` property.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
"type": ["VerifiableCredential", "RelationshipCredential"],
"issuer": "https://issuer.example/issuer/123",
"validFrom": "2010-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"credentialSubject": [{
"id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
"name": "Jayden Doe",
"spouse": "did:example:c276e12ec21ebfeb1f712ebc6f1"
}, {
"id": "https://subject.example/subject/8675",
"name": "Morgan Doe",
"spouse": "https://subject.example/subject/7421"
}]
}
This specification defines the `validFrom` [=property=] to help an issuer to express the date and time when a [=credential=] becomes valid and the `validUntil` [=property=] to express the date and time when a [=credential=] ceases to be valid.
When comparing dates and times, the calculation is done "temporally", meaning that the string value is converted to a "temporal value" which exists as a point on a timeline. Temporal comparisons are then performed by checking to see where the date and time being compared are in relation to a particular point on the timeline.
{ "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2", "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2" ], "id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732", "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"], "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14", "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z", "validUntil": "2020-01-01T19:23:24Z", "credentialSubject": { "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21", "degree": { "type": "ExampleBachelorDegree", "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts" } } }
If `validFrom` and `validUntil` are not present, the [=verifiable credential=] validity period is considered valid indefinitely. In such cases, the [=verifiable credential=] is assumed to be valid from the time the `verifiable credential` was created.
This specification defines the credentialStatus [=property=] for discovering information related to the status of a [=verifiable credential=], such as whether it is suspended or revoked.
If present, the value associated with the `credentialStatus` [=property=] is a single object or a set of one or more objects. The following [=properties=] are defined for every object:
The precise content of the [=credential=] status information is determined by the specific `credentialStatus` [=type=] definition and varies depending on factors such as whether it is simple to implement or if it is privacy-enhancing. The value will provide enough information to determine the current status of the [=credential=] and whether machine-readable information will be retrievable from the URL. For example, the object could contain a link to an external document that notes whether the [=credential=] is suspended or revoked.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
"type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"],
"issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
"validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
"credentialSubject": {
"id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
"degree": {
"type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
"name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
}
},
"credentialStatus": {
"id": "https://university.example/credentials/status/3#94567",
"type": "BitstringStatusListEntry",
"statusPurpose": "revocation",
"statusListIndex": "94567",
"statusListCredential": "https://university.example/credentials/status/3"
}
}
A [=credential=] can have more than one status associated with it, such as whether it has been revoked or suspended.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"id": "http://license.example/credentials/9837",
"type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDrivingLicenseCredential"],
"issuer": "https://license.example/issuers/48",
"validFrom": "2020-03-14T12:10:42Z",
"credentialSubject": {
"id": "did:example:f1c276e12ec21ebfeb1f712ebc6",
"license": {
"type": "ExampleDrivingLicense",
"name": "License to Drive a Car"
}
},
"credentialStatus": [{
"id": "https://license.example/credentials/status/84#14278",
"type": "BitstringStatusListEntry",
"statusPurpose": "revocation",
"statusListIndex": "14278",
"statusListCredential": "https://license.example/credentials/status/84"
}, {
"id": "https://license.example/credentials/status/84#82938",
"type": "BitstringStatusListEntry",
"statusPurpose": "suspension",
"statusListIndex": "82938",
"statusListCredential": "https://license.example/credentials/status/84"
}]
}
Implementers are cautioned that [=credentials=] with multiple status entries might contain conflicting information. Reconciling such conflicts is a part of the [=validation=] process, hence part of the verifier's business logic, and therefore out of scope for this specification.
Defining the data model, formats, and protocols for status schemes is out of the scope of this specification. The [[[?VC-EXTENSIONS]]] document contains available status schemes for implementers who want to implement [=verifiable credential=] status checking.
Credential status specifications MUST NOT enable tracking of individuals, such as an [=issuer=] being notified (either directly or indirectly) when a [=verifier=] is interested in a specific [=holder=] or [=subject=]. Unacceptable approaches include "phoning home," such that every use of a credential contacts the [=issuer=] of the credential to check the status for a specific individual, or "pseudonymity reduction," such that every use of the credential causes a request for information from the [=issuer=] that the [=issuer=] can use to deduce [=verifier=] interest in a specific individual.
Data schemas are useful when enforcing a specific structure on a given data collection. There are at least two types of data schemas that this specification considers:
It is important to understand that data schemas serve a different purpose from the `@context` property, which neither enforces data structure or data syntax nor enables the definition of arbitrary encodings to alternate representation formats.
This specification defines the following [=property=] for expressing a data schema, which an [=issuer=] can include in the [=verifiable credentials=] that it issues:
The value of the `credentialSchema` [=property=] MUST be one or more data schemas that provide [=verifiers=] with enough information to determine whether the provided data conforms to the provided schema(s). Each `credentialSchema` MUST specify its `type` (for example, `JsonSchema`) and an `id` [=property=] that MUST be a [=URL=] identifying the schema file. The specific type definition determines the precise contents of each data schema.
If multiple schemas are present, validity is determined according to the processing rules outlined by each associated `type` property.
The `credentialSchema` [=property=] allows one to annotate type definitions or lock them to specific versions of the vocabulary. Authors of [=verifiable credentials=] can include a static version of their vocabulary using `credentialSchema` that is secured by some content integrity protection mechanism. The `credentialSchema` [=property=] also makes it possible to perform syntactic checking on the [=credential=] and to use [=verification=] mechanisms such as JSON Schema [[?VC-JSON-SCHEMA]] validation.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"id": "http://university.example/credentials/3732",
"type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential", "ExamplePersonCredential"],
"issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
"validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
"credentialSubject": {
"id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
"degree": {
"type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
"name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
},
"alumniOf": {
"name": "Example University"
}
},
"credentialSchema": [{
"id": "https://example.org/examples/degree.json",
"type": "JsonSchema"
},
{
"id": "https://example.org/examples/alumni.json",
"type": "JsonSchema"
}]
}
In the example above, the [=issuer=] is specifying two `credentialSchema` objects, each of which point to a JSON Schema [[?VC-JSON-SCHEMA]] file that a [=verifier=] can use to determine whether the [=verifiable credential=] is well-formed.
This specification recognizes two classes of securing mechanisms: those that use enveloping proofs and those that use embedded proofs.
An enveloping proof wraps a serialization of this data model. One such RECOMMENDED enveloping proof mechanism is defined in [[[VC-JOSE-COSE]]] [[VC-JOSE-COSE]].
An embedded proof is a mechanism where the proof is included in the serialization of the data model. One such RECOMMENDED embedded proof mechanism is defined in [[[VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]]] [[VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]].
These two classes of securing mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. Additional securing mechanism specifications might also be defined according to the rules in Section [[[#securing-mechanism-specifications]]].
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"id": "http://example.gov/credentials/3732",
"type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"],
"issuer": "did:example:6fb1f712ebe12c27cc26eebfe11",
"validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
"credentialSubject": {
"id": "https://subject.example/subject/3921",
"degree": {
"type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
"name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
}
},
"proof": {
"type": "DataIntegrityProof",
"cryptosuite": "eddsa-rdfc-2022",
"created": "2021-11-13T18:19:39Z",
"verificationMethod": "https://university.example/issuers/14#key-1",
"proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
"proofValue": "z58DAdFfa9SkqZMVPxAQp...jQCrfFPP2oumHKtz"
}
}
The [=embedded proof=] above secures the original [=credential=] by decorating the original data with a digital signature via the `proof` property. This results in a [=verifiable credential=] that is easy to manage in modern programming environments and database systems.
eyJhbGciOiJFUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6IkdOV2FBTDJQVlVVMkpJVDg5bTZxMGM3U3ZjNDBTLWJ2UjFTT0 Q3REZCb1UiLCJ0eXAiOiJ2YytsZCtqc29uK3NkLWp3dCIsImN0eSI6InZjK2xkK2pzb24ifQ . eyJAY29udGV4dCI6WyJodHRwczovL3d3dy53My5vcmcvbnMvY3JlZGVudGlhbHMvdjIiLCJodHRwcz ovL3d3dy53My5vcmcvbnMvY3JlZGVudGlhbHMvZXhhbXBsZXMvdjIiXSwiaXNzdWVyIjoiaHR0cHM6 Ly91bml2ZXJzaXR5LmV4YW1wbGUvaXNzdWVycy81NjUwNDkiLCJ2YWxpZEZyb20iOiIyMDEwLTAxLT AxVDE5OjIzOjI0WiIsImNyZWRlbnRpYWxTY2hlbWEiOnsiX3NkIjpbIlNFOHp4bmduZTNNbWEwLUNm S2dlYW1rNUVqU1NfOXRaNlN5NDdBdTdxRWMiLCJjT3lySEVrSlZwdEtSdURtNkNZVTREajJvRkExd0 JQRjFHcTJnWEo1NXpzIl19LCJjcmVkZW50aWFsU3ViamVjdCI6eyJkZWdyZWUiOnsibmFtZSI6IkJh Y2hlbG9yIG9mIFNjaWVuY2UgYW5kIEFydHMiLCJfc2QiOlsibVNfSVBMa0JHcTIxbVA3Z0VRaHhOck E0ZXNMc1ZKQ1E5QUpZNDFLLVRQSSJdfSwiX3NkIjpbIlhTSG9iU05Md01PVl9QNkhQMHNvMnZ1clNy VXZ3UURYREJHQWtyTXk3TjgiXX0sIl9zZCI6WyJQNE5qWHFXa2JOc1NfRzdvdmlLdm1NOG0yckhDTm 5XVVV2SXZBbW9jb2RZIiwieFNvSHBKUXlCNGV1dmg4SkFJdDFCd1pjNFVEOHY5S3ZOTmVLMk9OSjFC QSJdLCJfc2RfYWxnIjoic2hhLTI1NiIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vdW5pdmVyc2l0eS5leGFtcGxlL2 lzc3VlcnMvNTY1MDQ5IiwiaWF0IjoxNzAzNjI1OTAxLCJleHAiOjE3MzUyNDgzMDEsImNuZiI6eyJq d2siOnsia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTM4NCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMzg0IiwieCI6Inl1Zlo1SFUzcU NfOTRMbkI3Zklzd0hmT0swQlJra0Z5bzVhd1QyX21ld0tJWUpLMVNfR0QySVB3UjRYUTZpdFEiLCJ5 IjoiRmEtV2pOd2NLQ1RWWHVDU2tCY3RkdHJOYzh6bXdBTTZWOWxudmxxd1QyQnRlQ0ZHNmR6ZDJoMF VjeXluTDg0dCJ9fX0 . M7BFJB9LEV_xEylSJpP00fd_4WjrOlXshh0dUv3QgOzw2MEGIfSfi9PoCkHJH7TI0InsqkD6XZVz38 MpeDKekgBW-RoDdJmxnifYOEJhKpJ5EN9PvA007UPi9QCaiEzX ~ WyJFX3F2V09NWVQ1Z3JNTkprOHNXN3BBIiwgImlkIiwgImh0dHA6Ly91bml2ZXJzaXR5LmV4YW1wbG UvY3JlZGVudGlhbHMvMTg3MiJd ~ WyJTSEc4WnpfRDVRbFMwU0ZrZFUzNXlRIiwgInR5cGUiLCBbIlZlcmlmaWFibGVDcmVkZW50aWFsIi wgIkV4YW1wbGVBbHVtbmlDcmVkZW50aWFsIl1d ~ WyJqZzJLRno5bTFVaGFiUGtIaHV4cXRRIiwgImlkIiwgImh0dHBzOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5vcmcvZXhhbX BsZXMvZGVncmVlLmpzb24iXQ ~ WyItQmhzaE10UnlNNUVFbGt4WGVXVm5nIiwgInR5cGUiLCAiSnNvblNjaGVtYSJd~WyJ0SEFxMEUwN nY2ckRuUlNtSjlSUWRBIiwgImlkIiwgImRpZDpleGFtcGxlOjEyMyJd ~ WyJ1Ynd6bi1kS19tMzRSMGI0SG84QTBBIiwgInR5cGUiLCAiQmFjaGVsb3JEZWdyZWUiXQ
The [=enveloping proof=] above secures the original [=credential=] by encapsulating the original data in a digital signature envelope, resulting in a [=verifiable credential=] that can be processed using tooling that understands the SD-JWT format.
[=Verifiable presentations=] MAY be used to aggregate information from multiple [=verifiable credentials=].
[=Verifiable presentations=] SHOULD be extremely short-lived and bound to a challenge provided by a [=verifier=]. Details for accomplishing this depend on the securing mechanism, the transport protocol, and [=verifier=] policies. Unless additional requirements are defined by the particular securing mechanism or embedding protocol, a [=verifier=] cannot generally assume that the [=verifiable presentation=] correlates with the presented [=verifiable credentials=].
The [=default graph=] of a [=verifiable presentation=] is also referred to as the verifiable presentation graph.
The following properties are defined for a [=verifiable presentation=]:
The example below shows a [=verifiable presentation=]:
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"id": "urn:uuid:3978344f-8596-4c3a-a978-8fcaba3903c5",
"type": ["VerifiablePresentation", "ExamplePresentation"],
"verifiableCredential": [{ ... }]
}
The contents of the `verifiableCredential` [=property=] shown above are verifiable credential graphs, as described by this specification.
It is possible for a [=verifiable presentation=] to include one or more [=verifiable credentials=] that have been secured using a securing mechanism that "envelopes" the payload, such as [[[?VC-JOSE-COSE]]] [[?VC-JOSE-COSE]]. This can be accomplished by associating the `verifiableCredential` property with an object that has a `type` of `EnvelopedVerifiableCredential`.
The example below shows a [=verifiable presentation=] that contains an enveloped [=verifiable credential=]:
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"type": ["VerifiablePresentation", "ExamplePresentation"],
"verifiableCredential": [{
"@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"id": "data:application/vc+sd-jwt,QzVjV...RMjU",
"type": "EnvelopedVerifiableCredential"
}]
}
It is possible that an implementer might want to process the object described in this section and the enveloped presentation expressed by the `id` value in an RDF environment and create linkages between the objects that are relevant to RDF. The desire and mechanisms for doing so are use case dependent and will, thus, be implementation dependent.
It is possible to express a [=verifiable presentation=] that has been secured using a mechanism that "envelops" the payload, such as [[[?VC-JOSE-COSE]]] [[?VC-JOSE-COSE]]. This can be accomplished by using an object that has a `type` of `EnvelopedVerifiablePresentation`.
The example below shows an enveloped [=verifiable presentation=]:
{
"@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"id": "data:application/vp+jwt,eyJraWQiO...zhwGfQ",
"type": "EnvelopedVerifiablePresentation"
}
Some zero-knowledge cryptography schemes might enable [=holders=] to indirectly prove they hold [=claims=] from a [=verifiable credential=] without revealing all claims in that [=verifiable credential=]. In these schemes, a [=verifiable credential=] might be used to derive presentable data, which is cryptographically asserted such that a [=verifier=] can trust the value if they trust the [=issuer=].
Some selective disclosure schemes can share a subset of [=claims=] derived from a [=verifiable credential=].
For an example of a ZKP-style [=verifiable presentation=] containing derived data instead of directly embedded [=verifiable credentials=], see Section [[[#zero-knowledge-proofs]]].
A [=holder=] MAY use the `verifiableCredential` [=property=] in a [=verifiable presentation=] to include [=verifiable credentials=] from any [=issuer=], including themselves. When the [=issuer=] of a [=verifiable credential=] is the [=holder=], the [=claims=] in that [=verifiable credential=] are considered self-asserted. Such self-asserted claims can be secured by the same mechanism that secures the [=verifiable presentation=] in which they are included or by any mechanism usable for other [=verifiable credentials=].
The subject(s) of these self-asserted [=claims=] are not limited, so these [=claims=] can include statements about the [=holder=], one of the other included [=verifiable credentials=] or even the [=verifiable presentation=] in which the self-asserted [=verifiable credential=] is included. In each case, the `id` [=property=] is used to identify the specific [=subject=], in the object where the [=claims=] about it are made, just as it is done in [=verifiable credentials=] that are not self-asserted.
A [=verifiable presentation=] that includes a self-asserted [=verifiable credential=], which is secured only using the same mechanism as the [=verifiable presentation=], MUST include a `holder` [=property=].
All of the normative requirements defined for [=verifiable credentials=] apply to self-asserted [=verifiable credentials=].
When a self-asserted [=verifiable credential=] is secured using the same mechanism as the [=verifiable presentation=], the value of the `issuer` [=property=] of the [=verifiable credential=] MUST be identical to the `holder` [=property=] of the [=verifiable presentation=].
The example below shows a [=verifiable presentation=] that embeds a self-asserted [=verifiable credential=] that is secured using the same mechanism as the [=verifiable presentation=].
{ "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2", "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2" ], "type": ["VerifiablePresentation", "ExamplePresentation"], "holder": "did:example:12345678", "verifiableCredential": [{ "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2", "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleFoodPreferenceCredential"], "issuer": "did:example:12345678", "credentialSubject": { "favoriteCheese": "Gouda" }, { ... } }], "proof": [{ ... }] }
The example below shows a [=verifiable presentation=] that embeds a self-asserted [=verifiable credential=] holding [=claims=] about the [=verifiable presentation=]. It is secured using the same mechanism as the [=verifiable presentation=].
{ "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2", "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2" ], "type": ["VerifiablePresentation", "ExamplePresentation"], "id": "urn:uuid:313801ba-24b7-11ee-be02-ff560265cf9b", "holder": "did:example:12345678", "verifiableCredential": [{ "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2", "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleAssertCredential"], "issuer": "did:example:12345678", "credentialSubject": { "id": "urn:uuid:313801ba-24b7-11ee-be02-ff560265cf9b", "assertion": "This VP is submitted by the subject as evidence of a legal right to drive" }, "proof": { ... } }], "proof": { ... } }
Building on the concepts introduced in Section [[[#basic-concepts]]], this section explores more complex topics about [=verifiable credentials=].
The [=verifiable credentials=] trust model is based on the following expectations:
Where no pre-existing trust relationship exists, the [=holder=] might have some out-of-band means of determining whether the [=issuer=] is qualified to issue the [=verifiable credential=] being provided.
Note: It is not always necessary for the [=holder=] to trust the [=issuer=], since the issued [=verifiable credential=] might be an assertion about a [=subject=] who is not the [=holder=], or about no-one, and the [=holder=] might be willing to relay this information to a [=verifier=] without being held accountable for its veracity.
This trust model differentiates itself from other trust models by ensuring the following:
How [=verifiers=] decide which [=issuers=] to trust, and for what data or purposes, is out of scope for this recommendation. Some [=issuers=], such as well-known organizations, might be trusted by many [=verifiers=] simply because of their reputation. Some [=issuers=] and [=verifiers=] might be members of a community in which all members trust each other due to the rules of membership. Some [=verifiers=] might trust a specific trust-service provider whose responsibility is to vet [=issuers=] and list them in a trust list such as those specified in [[[ETSI-TRUST-LISTS]]] [[?ETSI-TRUST-LISTS]] or the Adobe Approved Trust List.
By decoupling the expectations between the [=issuer=] and the [=verifier=], a more flexible and dynamic trust model is created, such that market competition and customer choice is increased.
For more information about how this trust model interacts with various threat models studied by the Working Group, see the [[[VC-USE-CASES]]] [[VC-USE-CASES]].
The data model detailed in this specification does not imply a transitive trust model, such as that provided by more traditional Certificate Authority trust models. In the Verifiable Credentials Data Model, a [=verifier=] either directly trusts or does not trust an [=issuer=]. While it is possible to build transitive trust models using the Verifiable Credentials Data Model, implementers are urged to learn about the security weaknesses introduced by broadly delegating trust in the manner adopted by Certificate Authority systems.
One of the goals of the Verifiable Credentials Data Model is to enable permissionless innovation. To achieve this, the data model needs to be extensible in a number of different ways. The data model is required to:
This approach to data modeling is often called an open world assumption, meaning that any entity can say anything about any other entity. While this approach seems to conflict with building simple and predictable software systems, balancing extensibility with program correctness is always more challenging with an open world assumption than with closed software systems.
The rest of this section describes, through a series of examples, how both extensibility and program correctness are achieved.
Let us assume we start with the [=credential=] shown below.
{ "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2", "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2" ], "id": "http://vc.example/credentials/4643", "type": ["VerifiableCredential"], "issuer": "https://issuer.example/issuers/14", "validFrom": "2018-02-24T05:28:04Z", "credentialSubject": { "id": "did:example:abcdef1234567", "name": "Jane Doe" } }
This [=verifiable credential=] states that the [=entity=] associated with `did:example:abcdef1234567` has a `name` with a value of `Jane Doe`.
Now let us assume a developer wants to extend the [=verifiable credential=] to store two additional pieces of information: an internal corporate reference number, and Jane's favorite food.
The first thing to do is to create a JSON-LD context containing two new terms, as shown below.
{ "@context": { "referenceNumber": "https://extension.example/vocab#referenceNumber", "favoriteFood": "https://extension.example/vocab#favoriteFood" } }
After this JSON-LD context is created, the developer publishes it somewhere so it is accessible to [=verifiers=] who will be processing the [=verifiable credential=]. Assuming the above JSON-LD context is published at `https://extension.example/my-contexts/v1`, we can extend this example by including the context and adding the new [=properties=] and [=credential=] [=type=] to the [=verifiable credential=].
{ "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2", "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2", "https://extension.example/my-contexts/v1" ], "id": "http://vc.example/credentials/4643", "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "CustomExt12"], "issuer": "https://issuer.example/issuers/14", "validFrom": "2018-02-24T05:28:04Z", "referenceNumber": 83294847, "credentialSubject": { "id": "did:example:abcdef1234567", "name": "Jane Doe", "favoriteFood": "Papaya" } }
This example demonstrates extending the Verifiable Credentials Data Model in a permissionless and decentralized way. The mechanism shown also ensures that [=verifiable credentials=] created in this way provide a way to prevent namespace conflicts and semantic ambiguity.
A dynamic extensibility model such as this does increase the implementation burden. Software written for such a system has to determine whether [=verifiable credentials=] with extensions are acceptable based on the risk profile of the application. Some applications might accept only certain extensions while highly secure environments might not accept any extensions. These decisions are up to the developers of these applications and are specifically not the domain of this specification.
Extension specification authors are urged to ensure that their documents, such as JSON-LD Contexts, are highly available. Developers using these documents might use software that produces errors when these documents cannot be retrieved. Strategies for ensuring that extension JSON-LD contexts are always available include bundling these documents with implementations, content distribution networks with long caching timeframes, or using content-addressed URLs for contexts. These approaches are covered in further detail in Appendix [[[#contexts-vocabularies-types-and-credential-schemas]]].
Implementers are advised to pay close attention to the extension points in this specification, such as in Sections [[[#status]]], [[[#data-schemas]]], [[[#securing-mechanisms]]], [[[#refreshing]]], [[[#terms-of-use]]], and [[[#evidence]]]. While this specification does not define concrete implementations for those extension points, the [[[?VC-EXTENSIONS]]] document provides an unofficial, curated list of extensions that developers can use from these extension points.
When defining new terms in an application-specific vocabulary, vocabulary authors SHOULD follow the detailed checklist in [[[?LD-BP]]]. Specifically, the following guidance is of particular importance:
Furthermore, a machine-readable description (that is, a JSON-LD Context document) MUST be published at the URL specified in the `@context` [=property=] for the vocabulary. This context MUST map each term to its corresponding URL, possibly accompanied by further constraints like the type of the property value. A human-readable document describing the expected order of values for the `@context` [=property=] is also expected to be published by any implementer seeking interoperability.
When processing the active context defined by the base JSON-LD Context document defined in this specification, compliant JSON-LD-based processors produce an error when a JSON-LD context redefines any term. The only way to change the definition of existing terms is to introduce a new term that clears the active context within the scope of that new term. Authors that are interested in this feature should read about the @protected keyword in the JSON-LD 1.1 specification.
A [=conforming document=] SHOULD NOT use the `@vocab` feature in production as it can lead to JSON term clashes, resulting in semantic ambiguities with other applications. Instead, to achieve proper interoperability, a [=conforming document=] SHOULD use JSON-LD Contexts that define all terms used by their applications, as described earlier in Section [[[#extensibility]]]. If a [=conforming document=] does not use JSON-LD Contexts that define all terms used, it MUST include the `https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/undefined-terms/v2` as the last value in the `@context` property.
When including a link to an external resource in a [=verifiable credential=], it is desirable to know whether the resource has been modified since the [=verifiable credential=] was issued. This applies to cases where there is an external resource that is remotely retrieved, as well as to cases where the [=issuer=] and/or [=verifier=] might have locally cached copies of a resource. It can also be desirable to know that the contents of the JSON-LD context(s) used in the [=verifiable credential=] are the same when used by the [=verifier=] as they were when used by the [=issuer=].
To extend integrity protection to a related resource, an [=issuer=] of a [=verifiable credential=] MAY include the `relatedResource` property:
Property | Description |
---|---|
`id` | The identifier for the resource is REQUIRED and conforms to the format defined in Section [[[#identifiers]]]. The value MUST be unique among the list of related resource objects. |
`mediaType` | An OPTIONAL valid media type as listed in the IANA Media Types registry. |
`digestSRI` | One or more cryptographic digests, as defined by the `hash-expression` ABNF grammar defined in the [[[SRI]]] specification, Section 3.5: The `integrity` attribute. |
`digestMultibase` | One or more cryptographic digests, as defined by the `digestMultibase` property in the [[[VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]]] specification, Section 2.6: Resource Integrity. |
If a `mediaType` is listed, implementations that retrieve the resource identified by the `id` property using [[[?RFC9110]]] SHOULD:
Any object in the [=verifiable credential=] that contains an `id` property MAY be annotated with integrity information by adding either the `digestSRI` or `digestMultibase` property, either of which MAY be accompanied by the additionally optional `mediaType` property.
Any objects for which selective disclosure or unlinkable disclosure is desired SHOULD NOT be included as an object in the `relatedResource` array.
Specification authors that write algorithms that fetch a resource based on the `id` of an object inside a [=conforming document=] need to consider whether that resource's content is vital to the validity of that document. If it is, the specification MUST produce a validation error unless the resource matches the expected media type and cryptographic digest.
Implementers are urged to consult appropriate sources, such as the FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard and the Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 to ensure that they are choosing a current and reliable hash algorithm. At the time of this writing `sha384` SHOULD be considered the minimum strength hash algorithm for use by implementers.
An example of a related resource integrity object referencing JSON-LD contexts.
"relatedResource": [{ "id": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2", "digestSRI": "sha384-lHKDHh0msc6pRx8PhDOMkNtSI8bOfsp4giNbUrw71nXXLf13nTqNJoRp3Nx+ArVK" },{ "id": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2", "digestSRI": "sha384-zNNbQTWCSUSi0bbz7dbua+RcENv7C6FvlmYJ1Y+I727HsPOHdzwELMYO9Mz68M26" }]
"relatedResource": [{ "id": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2", "digestMultibase": "uEres1usWcWCmW7uolIW2uA0CjQ8iRV14eGaZStJL73Vz" },{ "id": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2", "digestMultibase": "uElc5P7xp1u-5ubXcnLa5iAsJRDYKv-Lq9FnJ5YzyJ518" }]
It is useful for systems to enable the manual or automatic refresh of an expired [=verifiable credential=]. For more information about validity periods for [=verifiable credentials=], see Section [[[#validity-periods]]]. This specification defines a `refreshService` [=property=], which enables an [=issuer=] to include a link to a refresh service.
The [=issuer=] can include the refresh service as an element inside the [=verifiable credential=] if it is intended for either the [=verifier=] or the [=holder=] (or both), or inside the [=verifiable presentation=] if it is intended for the [=holder=] only. In the latter case, this enables the [=holder=] to refresh the [=verifiable credential=] before creating a [=verifiable presentation=] to share with a [=verifier=]. In the former case, including the refresh service inside the [=verifiable credential=] enables either the [=holder=] or the [=verifier=] to perform future updates of the [=credential=].
The refresh service is only expected to be used when either the [=credential=] has expired or the [=issuer=] does not publish [=credential=] status information. [=Issuers=] are advised not to put the `refreshService` [=property=] in a [=verifiable credential=] that does not contain public information or whose refresh service is not protected in some way.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1",
"https://w3id.org/age/v1",
"https://w3id.org/security/suites/ed25519-2020/v1"
],
"type": ["VerifiableCredential", "AgeVerificationCredential"],
"issuer": "did:key:z6MksFxi8wnHkNq4zgEskSZF45SuWQ4HndWSAVYRRGe9qDks",
"issuanceDate": "2024-04-03T00:00:00.000Z",
"expirationDate": "2024-12-15T00:00:00.000Z",
"name": "Age Verification Credential",
"credentialSubject": {
"overAge": 21
},
"refreshService": {
"type": "VerifiableCredentialRefreshService2021",
"url": "https://registration.provider.example/flows/reissue-age-token",
"refreshToken": "z2BJYfNtmWRiouWhDrbDQmC2zicUPBxsPg"
}
}
In the example above, the [=issuer=] specifies an automatic `refreshService` that can be used by POSTing the [=verifiable credential=] to the refresh service `url`. Note that this particular verifiable credential is not intended to be shared with anyone except for the original issuer.
Placing a `refreshService` [=property=] in a [=verifiable credential=] so that it is available to [=verifiers=] can remove control and consent from the [=holder=] and allow the [=verifiable credential=] to be issued directly to the [=verifier=], thereby bypassing the [=holder=].
Terms of use can be utilized by an [=issuer=] or a [=holder=] to communicate the terms under which a [=verifiable credential=] or [=verifiable presentation=] was issued. The [=issuer=] places their terms of use inside the [=verifiable credential=]. The [=holder=] places their terms of use inside a [=verifiable presentation=]. This specification defines a `termsOfUse` [=property=] for expressing terms of use information.
The value of the `termsOfUse` [=property=] might be used to tell the [=verifier=] any or all of the following, among other things:
{
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/undefined-terms/v2"
],
"id": "urn:uuid:08e26d22-8dca-4558-9c14-6e7aa7275b9b",
"type": [
"VerifiableCredential",
"VerifiableAttestation",
"VerifiableTrustModel",
"VerifiableAuthorisationForTrustChain"
],
"issuer": "did:ebsi:zZeKyEJfUTGwajhNyNX928z",
"validFrom": "2021-11-01T00:00:00Z",
"validUntil": "2024-06-22T14:11:44Z",
"credentialSubject": {
"id": "did:ebsi:zvHWX359A3CvfJnCYaAiAde",
"reservedAttributeId": "60ae46e4fe9adffe0bc83c5e5be825aafe6b5246676398cd1ac36b8999e088a8",
"permissionFor": [{
"schemaId": "https://api-test.ebsi.eu/trusted-schemas-registry/v3/schemas/zHgbyz9ajVuSProgyMhsiwpcp8g8aVLFRNARm51yyYZp6",
"types": [
"VerifiableCredential",
"VerifiableAttestation",
"WorkCertificate"
],
"jurisdiction": "https://publications.europa.eu/resource/authority/atu/EUR"
}]
},
"termsOfUse": {
"type": "TrustFrameworkPolicy",
"trustFramework": "Employment&Life",
"policyId": "https://policy.example/policies/125",
"legalBasis": "professional qualifications directive"
},
"credentialStatus": {
"id": "https://api-test.ebsi.eu/trusted-issuers-registry/v5/issuers/did:ebsi:zvHWX359A3CvfJnCYaAiAde/attributes/60ae46e4fe9adffe0bc83c5e5be825aafe6b5246676398cd1ac36b8999e088a8",
"type": "EbsiAccreditationEntry"
},
"credentialSchema": {
"id": "https://api-test.ebsi.eu/trusted-schemas-registry/v3/schemas/zCSHSDwrkkd32eNjQsMCc1h8cnFaxyTXP5ByozyVQXZoH",
"type": "JsonSchema"
}
}
}
In the example above, the [=issuer=] is asserting that the legal basis under which the [=verifiable credential=] has been issued is the "professional qualifications directive" using the "Employment&Life" trust framework, with a specific link to the policy.
This feature is expected to be used by government-issued [=verifiable credentials=] to instruct digital wallets to limit their use to similar government organizations in an attempt to protect citizens from unexpected usage of sensitive data. Similarly, some [=verifiable credentials=] issued by private industry are expected to limit usage to within departments inside the organization, or during business hours. Implementers are urged to read more about this evolving feature in the appropriate section of the Verifiable Credentials Implementation Guidelines [[?VC-IMP-GUIDE]] document.
Evidence can be included by an [=issuer=] to provide the [=verifier=] with additional supporting information in a [=verifiable credential=]. This could be used by the [=verifier=] to establish the confidence with which it relies on the claims in the [=verifiable credential=]. For example, an [=issuer=] could check physical documentation provided by the [=subject=] or perform a set of background checks before issuing the [=credential=]. In certain scenarios, this information is useful to the [=verifier=] when determining the risk associated with relying on a given [=credential=].
This specification defines the `evidence` [=property=] for expressing evidence information.
For information about how attachments and references to [=credentials=] and non-credential data might be supported by the specification, see Section [[[#integrity-of-related-resources]]].
{ "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2", "https://purl.imsglobal.org/spec/ob/v3p0/context-3.0.3.json" ], "id": "http://1edtech.edu/credentials/3732", "type": [ "VerifiableCredential", "OpenBadgeCredential" ], "issuer": { "id": "https://1edtech.edu/issuers/565049", "type": "Profile" }, "credentialSubject": { "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21", "type": "AchievementSubject", "name": "Alice Smith", "activityEndDate": "2023-12-02T00:00:00Z", "activityStartDate": "2023-12-01T00:00:00Z", "awardedDate": "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z", "achievement": [{ "id": "urn:uuid:d46e8ef1-c647-419b-be18-5e045d1c4e64", "type": ["Achievement"], "name": "Basic Barista Training", "criteria": { "narrative": "Team members are nominated for this badge by their supervisors, after passing the Basic Barista Training course." }, "description": "This achievement certifies that the bearer is proficient in basic barista skills." }] }, "evidence": [{ // url to an externally hosted evidence file/artifact "id": "https://videos.example/training/alice-espresso.mp4", "type": ["Evidence"], "name": "Talk-aloud video of double espresso preparation", "description": "This is a talk-aloud video of Alice demonstrating preparation of a double espresso drink.", // digest hash of the mp4 video file "digestMultibase": "uELq9FnJ5YLa5iAszyJ518bXcnlc5P7xp1u-5uJRDYKvc" } ] }
In the `evidence` example above, the [=issuer=] is asserting that they have video of the [=subject=] of the [=credential=] demonstrating the achievement.
The `evidence` [=property=] provides information that is different from and information to the securing mechanism utilized. The `evidence` [=property=] is used to express supporting information, such as documentary evidence, related to the [=verifiable credential=]. In contrast, the securing mechanism is used to express machine-verifiable mathematical proofs related to the authenticity of the [=issuer=] and integrity of the [=verifiable credential=]. For more information about securing mechanisms, see Section [[[#securing-mechanisms]]].
Zero-knowledge proofs are securing mechanisms which enable a [=holder=] to prove that they hold a [=verifiable credential=] containing a value without disclosing the actual value such as being able to prove that an individual is over the age of 25 without revealing their birthday. This data model supports being secured using zero-knowledge proofs.
Some capabilities that are compatible with [=verifiable credentials=] which are made possible by zero-knowledge proof mechanisms include:
Specification authors that create securing mechanisms MUST NOT design them in such a way that they leak information that would enable the [=verifier=] to correlate a [=holder=] across multiple [=verifiable presentations=] to different [=verifiers=].
Not all capabilities are supported in all zero-knowledge proof mechanisms. Specific details about the capabilities and techniques provided by a particular zero knowledge proof mechanism, along with any normative requirements for using them with [=verifiable credentials=], would be found in a specification for securing [=verifiable credentials=] with that zero-knowledge proof mechanism. For an example of such a specification, refer to the [[[?VC-DI-BBS]]].
We note that in most instances, for the [=holder=] to make use of zero knowledge mechanisms with [=verifiable credentials=], the [=issuer=] is required to secure the [=verifiable credential=] in a manner that supports these capabilities.
The diagram below highlights how the data model might be used to issue and present [=verifiable credentials=] in zero-knowledge.
An example of a [=verifiable credential=] and a [=verifiable presentation=] using the [[[?VC-DI-BBS]]] unlinkable selective disclosure securing mechanism is shown below.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://w3id.org/citizenship/v3"
],
"type": ["VerifiableCredential", "PermanentResidentCard"],
"issuer": {
"id": "did:web:credentials.utopia.example",
"image": "...YII="
},
"identifier": "83627465",
"name": "Permanent Resident Card",
"description": "Government of Utopia Permanent Resident Card.",
"validFrom": "2024-08-01T00:00:00Z",
"validUntil": "2029-12-01T00:00:00Z",
"credentialSubject": {
"type": ["PermanentResident", "Person"],
"givenName": "JANE",
"familyName": "SMITH",
"gender": "Female",
"image": "...Jggg==",
"residentSince": "2015-01-01",
"lprCategory": "C09",
"lprNumber": "999-999-999",
"commuterClassification": "C1",
"birthCountry": "Arcadia",
"birthDate": "1978-07-17"
},
"proof": {
"type": "DataIntegrityProof",
"verificationMethod": "did:web:playground.alpha.chapi.io#zUC75LjjCLGKRxSissX1nAebRDmY4Bv4T6MAbzgaap9Q8rAGf6SEjc2Hf4nH6bUPDwky3GWoYcUjMCcEqRRQfXEiNwfeDwNYLoeqk1J1W2Ye8vCdwv4fSd8AZ1yS6UoNzcsQoPS",
"cryptosuite": "bbs-2023",
"proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
"proofValue": "u2V0ChVhQjYs9O7wUb3KRSMaIRX7jmafVHYDPYBLD4ta85_qmuXTBU_t2Ir7pNujwRE6fERsBUEZRSjJjtI-hqOqDs3VvBvH6gd3o2KeUS2V_zpuphPpYQEkapOeQgRTak9lHKSTqEQqa4j2lyHqekEeGvzPlqcHQGFccGifvLUXtP59jCuGJ86HDA9HL5kDzUT6n4Gi50HlYYIzNqhbjIxlqOuxO2IgIppSTWjQGeer34-PmKnOzKX8m_9DHPhif7TUf5uTV4OQWdhb0SxHnJ-CPu_z9FJ5ACekBQhz6YWS0_CY6j_ibucXzeVfZwLv1W47pjbt-l1Vl5VggSn2xVt69Q0GD9mPKpOhkKV_hyOL7i6haf7bq-gOKAwWDZy9pc3N1ZXJtL2lzc3VhbmNlRGF0ZW8vZXhwaXJhdGlvbkRhdGU"
}
}
The example above is a [=verifiable credential=] where the [=issuer=] has enabled a BBS-based unlinkable disclosure scheme to create a base proof that can then be used by the [=holder=] to create a derived proof that reveals only particular pieces of information from the original [=verifiable credential=].
{
@context: "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2"
type: "VerifiablePresentation",
verifiableCredential: {
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://w3id.org/citizenship/v3"
],
"type": ["VerifiableCredential", "PermanentResidentCard"],
"issuer": {
"id": "did:web:issuer.utopia.example",
"image": "...YII="
},
"name": "Permanent Resident Card",
"description": "Government of Utopia Permanent Resident Card.",
"validFrom": "2024-08-01T00:00:00Z",
"validUntil": "2029-12-01T00:00:00Z",
"credentialSubject": {
"type": ["PermanentResident", "Person"],
"birthCountry": "Arcadia"
},
"proof": {
type: "DataIntegrityProof",
verificationMethod: "did:web:issuer.utopia.example#zUC75LjjCLGKRxSissX1nAebRDmY4Bv4T6MAbzgaap9Q8rAGf6SEjc2Hf4nH6bUPDwky3GWoYcUjMCcEqRRQfXEiNwfeDwNYLoeqk1J1W2Ye8vCdwv4fSd8AZ1yS6UoNzcsQoPS",
cryptosuite: "bbs-2023",
proofPurpose: "assertionMethod",
proofValue: "u2V0DhVkCkLdnshxHtgeHJBBUGPBqcEooPp9ahgqs08RsoqW5EJFmsi70jqf2X368VcmfdJdYcYJwObPIg5dlyaoBm34N9BqcZ4RlTZvgwX79ivGnqLALC0EqKn2wOj5hRO76xUakfLGIcT4mE-G7CxA1FTs8sRCWy5p6FozelBYiZU2YlhUpJ7pBwelZ9wnlcbj4q-KyxAj5GU2iWp7-FxU-E624DmdT-yvCkAGRRrYej6lMwg7jB9uCHypOXXH2dVZ-jpf74YBaE4rMTxPFh60GN4o3S65F1fMsJbEMLdrXa8Vs6ZSlmveUcY1X7oPr1UIxo17ehVTCjOxWunYqrtLi9cVkYOD2s9XMk1oFVWBB3UY29axXQQXlZVfvTIUsfVc667mnlYbF7a-ko_SUfeY2n3s1DOAap5keeNU0v2KVPCbxA2WGz7UJy4xJv2a8olMOWPKjAEUruCx_dsbyicd-9KGwhYoUEO3HoAzmtI6qXVhMbJKxPrhtcp8hOdD9izVS5ed4CxHNaDGPSopF_MBwjxwPcpUufNNNdQwesrbtFJo0-P-1CrX_jSxKFMle2b3t24UbHRbZw7QnX4OG-SSVucem5jpMXTDFZ8PLFCqXX0zncJ_MQ-_u-liE-MwJu3ZemsXBp1JoB2twS0TqDVzSWR7bpFZKI9_07fKUAmQNSV_no9iAgYRLuPrnnsW1gQgCV-nNqzbcCOpzkHdCqro6nPSATq5Od3Einfc683gm5VGWxIldM0aBPytOymNz7PIZ6wkgcMABMe5Vw46B54ftW-TN5YZPDmCJ_kt7Mturn0OeQr9KJCu7S0I-SN14mL9KtGE1XDnIeR-C_YZhSA3vX4923v1l3vNFsKasqy9iEPHKM0hcogABAQCGAAECBAUGhAMJCgtYUnsiY2hhbGxlbmdlIjoiNGd2OFJyaERPdi1OSHByYlZNQlM1IiwiZG9tYWluIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9wbGF5Z3JvdW5kLmFscGhhLmNoYXBpLmlvIn0"
}
}
}
The [=verifiable presentation=] above includes a [=verifiable credential=] that contains an unlinkable subset of the information from the previous example and a derived proof that the [=verifier=] can use to verify that the information originated from the expected [=issuer=] and is bound to this particular exchange of information.
Implementers are urged to understand that representing and processing time values is not as straight-forward as it might seem and have a variety of idiosyncrasies that are not immediately obvious nor uniformly observed in different regions of the world. For example:
These are just a few examples that illustrate that the actual time of day, as would be seen on a clock on the wall, can exist in one region but not exist in another region. For this reason, implementers are urged to use time values that are more universal, such as values anchored to the `Z` time zone over values that are affected by Daylight Saving/Summer Time.
This specification attempts to increase the number of universally recognized combinations of dates and times, and reduce the potential for misinterpretation of time values, by utilizing the `dateTimeStamp` construction first established by the [XMLSCHEMA11-2] specification. In order to reduce misinterpretations between different time zones, all time values expressed in [=conforming documents=] SHOULD be specified in `dateTimeStamp` format, either in Universal Coordinated Time (UTC), denoted by a `Z` at the end of the value, or with a time zone offset relative to UTC. Time values that are incorrectly serialized without an offset MUST be interpreted as UTC. Examples of valid time zone offsets relative to UTC include `Z`, `+01:00`, `-08:00`, and `+14:00`. See the regular expression at the end of this section for a formal definition of all acceptable values.
Time zone definitions are occasionally changed by their governing body. When replacing or issuing new [=verifiable credentials=], implementers are advised to ensure that changes to local time zone rules do not result in unexpected gaps in validity. For example, consider the zone `America/Los_Angeles`, which has a raw offset of UTC-8 and had voted to stop observing daylight savings time in the year 2024. A given [=verifiable credential=] that had a `validUtil` value of `2024-07-12T12:00:00-07:00`, might be re-issued to have a `validFrom` value of `2024-07-12T12:00:00-08:00`, which would create a gap of an hour where the [=verifiable credential=] would not be valid.
Implementers that desire to check `dateTimeStamp` values for validity can use the regular expression provided below, which is reproduced from the [XMLSCHEMA11-2] specification for convenience. To avoid doubt, the regular expression in [[XMLSCHEMA11-2]] is the normative definition. Implementers are advised that not all `dateTimeStamp` values that pass the regular expression below are valid moments in time. For example, the regular expression below allows for 31 days in every month, which allows for leap years, and leap seconds, as well as days in places where they do not exist. That said, modern system libraries that generate `dateTimeStamp` values are often error-free in their generation of valid `dateTimeStamp` values. The regular expression shown below (minus the whitespace included here for readability), is often adequate when processing library-generated dates and times on modern systems.
-?([1-9][0-9]{3,}|0[0-9]{3}) -(0[1-9]|1[0-2]) -(0[1-9]|[12][0-9]|3[01]) T(([01][0-9]|2[0-3]):[0-5][0-9]:[0-5][0-9](\.[0-9]+)?|(24:00:00(\.0+)?)) (Z|(\+|-)((0[0-9]|1[0-3]):[0-5][0-9]|14:00))
[=Verifiable credentials=] are intended as a means of reliably identifying [=subjects=]. While it is recognized that Role Based Access Controls (RBACs) and Attribute Based Access Controls (ABACs) rely on this identification as a means of authorizing [=subjects=] to access resources, this specification does not provide a complete solution for RBAC or ABAC. Authorization is not an appropriate use for this specification without an accompanying authorization framework.
The Working Group did consider authorization use cases during the creation of this specification and is pursuing that work as an architectural layer built on top of this specification.
This specification reserves a number of [=properties=] to serve as possible extension points. While some implementers signaled interest in these properties, their inclusion in this specification was considered to be premature. It is important to note that none of these properties are defined by this specification. Consequently, implementers are cautioned that use of these properties is considered experimental.
Implementers MAY use these properties, but SHOULD expect them and/or their meanings to change during the process of normatively specifying them. Implementers SHOULD NOT use these properties without a publicly disclosed specification describing their implementation.
In order to avoid collisions regarding how the following properties are used, implementations MUST specify a `type` property in the value associated with the reserved property. For more information related to adding `type` information, see Section [[[#types]]].
Reserved Property | Description |
---|---|
`confidenceMethod` | A property used for specifying one or more methods that a verifier might use to increase their confidence that the value of a property in or of a verifiable credential or verifiable presentation is accurate. The associated vocabulary URL MUST be `https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials#confidenceMethod`. |
`renderMethod` | A property used for specifying one or more methods to render a credential into a visual, auditory, haptic, or other format. The associated vocabulary URL MUST be `https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials#renderMethod`. |
An unofficial list of specifications that are associated with the extension points defined in this specification, as well as the reserved extension points defined in this section, can be found in the [[[?VC-EXTENSIONS]]]. Items in the directory that refer to reserved extension points SHOULD be treated as experimental.
There are a number of digital credential formats that do not natively use the data model provided in this document, but are aligned with a number of concepts in this specification. At the time of publication, examples of these digital credential formats include JSON Web Tokens (JWTs), CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs), JSON Advanced Electronic Signature (JAdES), ISO-18013-5:2021 (mDLs), AnonCreds, Gordian Envelopes, and Authentic Chained Data Containers (ACDCs).
If conceptually aligned digital credential formats can be transformed into a [=conforming document=] according to the rules provided in this section, they are considered "compatible with the W3C Verifiable Credentials ecosystem". Specification authors are advised to adhere to the following rules when documenting transformations that enable compatibility with the Verifiable Credentials ecosystem. The transformation specification —
Readers are advised that a digital credential is only considered compatible with the W3C Verifiable Credentials ecosystem if it is a [=conforming document=] and it utilizes at least one securing mechanism, as described by their respective requirements in this specification. While some communities might call some digital credential formats that are not [=conforming documents=] "verifiable credentials", doing so does NOT make that digital credential compliant to this specification.
When expressing [=verifiable credentials=] (for example in a [=presentation=]), it is important to ensure that data in one [=verifiable credential=] is not mistaken to be the same data in another [=verifiable credential=]. For example, if one has two [=verifiable credentials=], each containing an object of the following form: `{"type": "Person", "name": "Jane Doe"}`, it is not possible to tell if one object is describing the same person as the other object. In other words, merging data between two [=verifiable credentials=] without confirming that they are discussing the same entities and/or properties, can lead to a corrupted data set.
To ensure that data from different [=verifiable credentials=] are not accidentally co-mingled, the concept of a verifiable credential graph is used to encapsulate each [=verifiable credential=]. For simple [=verifiable credentials=], that is, when the JSON-LD document contains a single credential with, possibly, associated proofs, this graph is the [=default graph=]. For [=presentations=], each value associated with the `verifiableCredential` property of the [=presentation=] is a separate [=named graph=] of type VerifiableCredentialGraph which contains a single [=verifiable credential=] or an enveloped verifiable credential.
Using these [=graphs=] has a concrete effect when performing JSON-LD processing, which properly separates graph node identifiers in one graph from those in another graph. Implementers that limit their inputs to application-specific JSON-LD documents will also need to keep this in mind if they merge data from one [=verifiable credential=] with data from another, such as when the `credentialSubject.id` is the same in both [=verifiable credentials=], but the object might contain objects of the "Jane Doe" form described in the previous paragraph. It is important to not merge objects that seem to have similar properties but do not contain an `id` property that uses a global identifier, such as a URL.
As described in Section [[[#securing-mechanisms]]], there are multiple strategies that an implementer can use when securing a [=conforming document=]. In order to maximize utility and interoperability, specification authors that desire to author new ways of securing [=conforming documents=] are provided with the guidance in this section.
Securing mechanism specifications MUST document normative algorithms that provide content integrity protection for [=conforming documents=]. The algorithms MAY be general in nature and MAY be used to secure data other than [=conforming documents=].
Securing mechanism specifications MUST provide a verification algorithm that returns the information in the [=conforming document=] that has been secured, in isolation, without including any securing mechanism information, such as `proof` or JOSE/COSE header parameters and signatures. Verification algorithms MAY return additional information that might be helpful (for example, during validation or for debugging purposes), such as details of the securing mechanism. A verification algorithm MUST provide an interface that receives a media type ([=string=] |inputMediaType|) and input data ([=byte sequence=] or [=map=] |inputData|). Securing mechanism specifications MAY provide algorithms and interfaces in addition to the ones specified in this document. The verification algorithm returns a verification result with at least the following [=struct/items=]:
Securing mechanism specifications SHOULD provide integrity protection for any information referenced by a URL that is critical to validation. Mechanisms that can achieve this protection are discussed in Section [[[#integrity-of-related-resources]]] and Section [[[#base-context]]].
A securing mechanism specification that creates a new type of [=embedded proof=] MUST specify a [=property=] that relates the [=verifiable credential=] or [=verifiable presentation=] to a [=proof graph=]. The requirements on the securing mechanism are as follow:
The last requirement means that the securing mechanism secures the [=default graph=] and, for [=verifiable presentations=], each [=verifiable credential=] of the presentation, together with their respective [=proof graphs=]. See also [[[#info-graph-vp]]] or [[[#info-graph-vp-mult-creds]]].
The `proof` property as defined in [[VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]] MAY be used by the embedded securing mechanism.
Securing mechanism specifications SHOULD register the securing mechanism in the Securing Mechanisms section of the [[[?VC-EXTENSIONS]]] document.
There are multiple acceptable securing mechanisms, and this specification does not mandate any particular securing mechanism for use with [=verifiable credentials=] or [=verifiable presentations=]. The Working Group that produced this specification did standardize two securing mechanism options, which are: [[[VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]]] [[VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]] and [[[VC-JOSE-COSE]]] [[VC-JOSE-COSE]]. Other securing mechanisms that are known to the community can be found in the Securing Mechanisms section of the [[[?VC-EXTENSIONS]]] document.
The data model as described in Sections [[[#core-data-model]]], [[[#basic-concepts]]], and [[[#advanced-concepts]]] is the canonical structural representation of a [=verifiable credential=] or [=verifiable presentation=]. All syntaxes are representations of that data model in a specific format. This section specifies how the data model is serialized in JSON-LD for `application/vc` and `application/vp`, the base media types for [=verifiable credentials=] and [=verifiable presentations=], respectively. Although syntactic mappings are only provided for JSON-LD, applications and services can use any other data representation syntax (such as XML, YAML, or CBOR) that is capable of being mapped back to `application/vc` or `application/vp`. As the [=verification=] and [=validation=] requirements are defined in terms of the data model, all serialization syntaxes have to be deterministically translated to the data model for processing, [=validation=], or comparison.
The expected arity of the property values in this specification, and the resulting datatype which holds those values, can vary depending on the property. If present, the following properties are represented as a single value: `id` (Section [[[#identifiers]]]), `issuer` (Section [[[#issuer]]]), and `validFrom`/`validUntil` (Section [[[#validity-period]]]). All other properties, if present, are represented as either a single value or an array of values.
This specification uses [[[JSON-LD11]]] to serialize the data model described in this specification. JSON-LD is useful because it enables the expression of the graph-based data model on which [=verifiable credentials=] are based, machine-readable semantics, and is also useful when extending the data model (see Sections [[[#core-data-model]]] and [[[#extensibility]]]).
JSON-LD is a JSON-based format used to serialize Linked Data. Linked Data is modeled using Resource Description Framework (RDF) [[?RDF11-CONCEPTS]]. RDF is a technology for modeling graphs of statements. Each statement is a single subject→property→value (also known as entity→attribute→value) relationship, which is referred to as a claim in this specification. JSON-LD is a technology that enables the expression of RDF using idiomatic JSON, enabling developers familiar with JSON to write applications that consume RDF as JSON. See Relationship of JSON-LD to RDF for more details.
In general, the data model and syntax described in this document enables developers to largely treat [=verifiable credentials=] as JSON documents, allowing them to copy and paste examples, with minor modification, into their software systems. The design goal of this approach is to provide a low barrier to entry while still ensuring global interoperability between a heterogeneous set of software systems. This section describes some of the JSON-LD features that are used to make this possible, which will likely go unnoticed by most developers, but whose details might be of interest to implementers. The most noteworthy features in [[[JSON-LD11]]] used by this specification include:
In order to increase interoperability, this specification restricts the usage of JSON-LD representations of the data model. JSON-LD compacted document form MUST be utilized for all representations of the data model using the `application/vc` or `application/vp` media type.
As elaborated upon in Section [[[#type-specific-credential-processing]]], some software applications might not perform generalized JSON-LD processing. Authors of [=conforming documents=] are advised that interoperability might be reduced if JSON-LD keywords in the `@context` value are used to globally affect values in a [=verifiable credential=] or [=verifiable presentation=], such as by setting either or both of the `@base` or `@vocab` keywords. For example, setting these values might trigger a failure in a mis-implemented JSON Schema test of the `@context` value in an implementation that is performing [=type-specific credential processing=] and not expecting the `@base` and/or `@vocab` value to be expressed in the `@context` value.
In order to increase interoperability, [=conforming document=] authors are urged to not use JSON-LD features that are not easily detected when performing [=type-specific credential processing=]. These features include:
While this specification cautions against the use of `@vocab`, there are legitimate uses of the feature, such as to ease experimentation, development, and localized deployment. If an application developer wants to use `@vocab` in production, which is advised against to reduce term collisions and leverage the benefits of semantic interoperability, they are urged to understand that any use of `@vocab` will disable reporting of "undefined term" errors, and later use(s) will override any previous `@vocab` declaration(s). Different values of `@vocab` can change the semantics of the information contained in the document, so it is important to understand whether and how these changes will affect the application being developed.
Lists, arrays, and even lists of lists, are possible when using [[[JSON-LD11]]]. We encourage those who want RDF semantics in use cases requiring lists and arrays to follow the guidance on lists in JSON-LD 1.1.
In general, a JSON array is ordered, while a JSON-LD array is not ordered unless that array uses the `@list` keyword.
While it is possible to use this data model by performing [=type-specific credential processing=], those who do so and make use of arrays need to be aware that unless the above guidance is followed, the order of items in an array are not guaranteed in JSON-LD. This might lead to unexpected behavior.
If JSON structure or ordering is important to your application, we recommend you mark such elements as `@json` via an `@context` that is specific to your use case. An example of such a declaration is shown below.
{ "@context": { "matrix": { "@id": "https://website.example/vocabulary#matrix", "@type": "@json" } } }
When the context shown above is used in the example below, by including the `https://website.example/matrix/v1` context in the `@context` property, the value in `credentialSubject.matrix` retains its JSON semantics; the exact order of all elements in the two dimensional matrix is preserved.
{ "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2", "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2", "https://website.example/matrix/v1" ], "id": "http://university.example/credentials/1872", "type": [ "VerifiableCredential", "ExampleMatrixCredential" ], "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049", "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z", "credentialSubject": { "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21", "matrix": [ [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12], [1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0], [0,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0] ] } }
Media types, as defined in [[RFC6838]], identify the syntax used to express a [=verifiable credential=] as well as other useful processing guidelines.
Syntaxes used to express the data model in this specification SHOULD be identified by a media type, and conventions outlined in this section SHOULD be followed when defining or using media types with [=verifiable credentials=].
There are two media types associated with the core data model, which are listed in the Section [[[#iana-considerations]]]: `application/vc` and `application/vp`.
The `application/vc` and `application/vp` media types do not imply any particular securing mechanism, but are intended to be used in conjunction with securing mechanisms. A securing mechanism needs to be applied to protect the integrity of these media types. Do not assume security of content regardless of the media type used to communicate it.
At times, developers or systems might use lower precision media types to convey [=verifiable credentials=] or [=verifiable presentations=]. Some of the reasons for use of lower precision media types include:
Implementers are urged to not raise errors when it is possible to determine the intended media type from a payload, provided that the media type used is acceptable in the given protocol. For example, if an application only accepts payloads that conform to the rules associated with the `application/vc` media type, but the payload is tagged with `application/json` or `application/ld+json` instead, the application might perform the following steps to determine whether the payload also conforms to the higher precision media type:
Whenever possible, implementers are advised to use the most precise (the highest precision) media type for all payloads defined by this specification. Implementers are also advised to recognize that a payload tagged with a lower precision media type does not mean that the payload does not meet the rules necessary to tag it with a higher precision type. Similarly, a payload tagged with a higher precision media type does not mean that the payload will meet the requirements associated with the media type. Receivers of payloads, regardless of their associated media type, are expected to perform appropriate checks to ensure that payloads conform with the requirements for their use in a given system.
HTTP clients and servers use media types associated with [=verifiable credentials=] and [=verifiable presentations=] in accept headers and when indicating content types. Implementers are warned that HTTP servers might ignore the accept header and return another content type, or return an error code such as `415 Unsupported Media Type`.
As JSON can be used to express different kinds of information, a consumer of
a particular JSON document can only properly interpret the author's intent if they
possess information that contextualizes and disambiguates it from other possible
expressions. Information to assist with this interpretation can either be wholly
external to the JSON document or linked from within it. Compacted JSON-LD documents
include a @context
property that internally expresses or links to
contextual information to express claims. These features
enable generalized processors to be written to convert JSON-LD documents from one
context to another, but this is not needed when consumers receive JSON-LD documents
that already use the context and shape that they expect. Authors of JSON-LD
documents, such as issuers of verifiable credentials, are required
to provide proper JSON-LD contexts and follow these rules in order to facilitate
interoperability.
The text below helps consumers understand how to ensure a JSON-LD document is expressed in a context and shape that their application already understands such that they do not need to transform it in order to consume its contents. Notably, this does not mean that consumers do not need to understand any context at all; rather, consuming applications only need to understand a chosen set of contexts and document shapes to work with and not others. Issuers can publish contexts and information about their verifiable credentials to aid consumers who do not use generalized processors, just as can be done with any other JSON-formatted data.
General JSON-LD processing is defined as a mechanism that utilizes a JSON-LD software library to process a [=conforming document=] by performing various transformations. Type-specific credential processing is defined as a lighter-weight mechanism for processing [=conforming documents=], that doesn't require a JSON-LD software library. Some consumers of [=verifiable credentials=] only need to consume credentials with specific types. These consumers can use type-specific credential processing instead of generalized processing. Scenarios where type-specific credential processing can be desirable include, but are not limited to, the following:
That is, [=type-specific credential processing=] is allowed as long as the document being consumed or produced is a [=conforming document=].
If [=type-specific credential processing=] is desired, an implementer is advised
to follow this rule:
Ensure that all values associated with a `@context` property are in the expected
order, the contents of the context files match known good cryptographic hashes
for each file, and domain experts have deemed that the contents are appropriate
for the intended use case.
Using static context files with a JSON Schema is one acceptable approach to implementing the rule above. This can ensure proper term identification, typing, and order, when performing [=type-specific credential processing=].
The rule above guarantees semantic interoperability between the two processing mechanisms for mapping literal JSON keys to URIs via the `@context` mechanism. While [=general JSON-LD processing=] can use previously unseen `@context` values provided in its algorithms to verify that all terms are correctly specified, implementations that perform [=type-specific credential processing=] only accept specific `@context` values which the implementation is engineered ahead of time to understand, resulting in the same semantics without invoking any JSON-LD APIs. In other words, the context in which the data exchange happens is explicitly stated for both processing mechanisms by using `@context` in a way that leads to the same [=conforming document=] semantics.
This section contains algorithms that can be used by implementations to perform common operations, such as [=verification=]. Conformance requirements phrased as algorithms utilize normative concepts from the [[[INFRA]]] [[INFRA]]. See the section on Algorithm Conformance in the [[[INFRA]]] for more guidance on implementation requirements.
Implementers are advised that the algorithms in this section contain the bare minimum set of checks used by implementations to test conformance to this specification. Implementations are expected to provide additional checks that report helpful warnings for developers to help debug potential issues. Similarly, implementations are likely to provide additional checks that could result in new types of errors being reported in order to stop harmful content. Any of these additional checks might be integrated into future versions of this specification.
This section contains an algorithm that [=conforming verifier implementations=] MUST run when verifying a [=verifiable credential=] or a [=verifiable presentation=]. This algorithm takes a media type ([=string=] |inputMediaType|) and secured data ([=byte sequence=] |inputData|) and returns a [=map=] that contains the following:
The verification algorithm is as follows:
The steps for verifying the state of the securing mechanism and verifying that the input document is a [=conforming document=] MAY be performed in a different order than that provided above as long as the implementation returns errors for the same invalid inputs. Implementations MAY produce different errors than described above.
When an implementation detects an anomaly while processing a document, a ProblemDetails object can be used to report the issue to other software systems. The interface for these objects follow [[RFC9457]] to encode the data. A [=ProblemDetails=] object consists of the following properties:
The following problem description types are defined by this specification:
Implementations MAY extend the [=ProblemDetails=] object by specifying additional types or properties. See the Extension Member section in [[RFC9457]] for further guidance on using this mechanism.
This section details the general privacy considerations and specific privacy implications of deploying the Verifiable Credentials Data Model into production environments.
It is important to recognize there is a spectrum of privacy ranging from pseudonymous to strongly identified. Depending on the use case, people have different comfort levels about the information they are willing to provide and the information that can be derived from it.
Privacy solutions are use case specific. For example, many people would prefer to remain anonymous when purchasing alcohol because the regulation is only to verify whether a purchaser is above a specific age. In contrast, when filling prescriptions written by a medical professional for a patient, the pharmacy is legally required to more strongly identify both the prescriber and the patient. No single approach to privacy works for all use cases.
Even those who want to remain anonymous when purchasing alcohol might need to provide photo identification to appropriately assure the merchant. The merchant might not need to know your name or any details other than that you are over a specific age, but in many cases, simple proof of age might be insufficient to meet regulations.
The Verifiable Credentials Data Model strives to support the full privacy spectrum and does not take philosophical positions on the correct level of anonymity for any specific transaction. The following sections will guide implementers who want to avoid specific scenarios that are hostile to privacy.
A variety of trust relationships exist in the ecosystem described by this specification. An individual using a web browser trusts the web browser, also known as a user agent, to preserve that trust by not uploading their personal information to a data broker; similarly, entities filling the roles in the ecosystem described by this specification trust the software that operates on behalf of each of those roles. Examples include the following:
The examples above are not exhaustive, and the users in these roles can also expect various other things from the software they use to achieve their goals. In short, the user expects the software to operate in the user's best interests; any violations of this expectation breach trust and can lead to the software's replacement with a more trustworthy alternative. Implementers are strongly encouraged to create software that preserves user trust. Additionally, they are encouraged to include auditing features that enable users or trusted third parties to verify that the software is operating in alignment with their best interests.
Readers are advised that some software, like a website providing services to a single [=verifier=] and multiple [=holders=], might operate as a user agent to both roles but might not always be able to operate simultaneously in the best interests of all parties. For example, suppose a website detects an attempt at fraudulent [=verifiable credential=] use among multiple [=holders=]. In that case, it might report such an anomaly to the [=verifier=], which might be considered not to be in all [=holders'=] best interest, but would be in the best interest of the [=verifier=] and any [=holders=] not committing such a violation. It is imperative that when software operates in this manner, it is made clear in whose best interest(s) the software is operating, through mechanisms such as a website use policy.
Data associated with [=verifiable credentials=] stored in the `credential.credentialSubject` property is susceptible to privacy violations when shared with [=verifiers=]. Personally identifying data, such as a government-issued identifier, shipping address, or full name, can be easily used to determine, track, and correlate an [=entity=]. Even information that does not seem personally identifiable, such as the combination of a birthdate and a postal code, has powerful correlation and de-anonymization capabilities.
Implementers of software used by [=holders=] are strongly advised to warn [=holders=] when they share data with these kinds of characteristics. [=Issuers=] are strongly advised to provide privacy-protecting [=verifiable credentials=] when possible — for example, by issuing `ageOver` [=verifiable credentials=] instead of `dateOfBirth` [=verifiable credentials=] for use when a [=verifier=] wants to determine whether an [=entity=] is at least 18 years of age.
Because a [=verifiable credential=] often contains personally identifiable information (PII), implementers are strongly advised to use mechanisms while storing and transporting [=verifiable credentials=] that protect the data from those who ought not have access to it. Mechanisms that could be considered include Transport Layer Security (TLS) or other means of encrypting the data while in transit, as well as encryption or access control mechanisms to protect the data in a [=verifiable credential=] when at rest.
Generally, individuals are advised to assume that a [=verifiable credential=], like most physical credentials, will leak personally identifiable information when shared. To combat such leakage, [=verifiable credentials=] and their securing mechanisms need to be carefully designed to prevent correlation. [=Verifiable credentials=] specifically designed to protect against leakage of personally identifiable information are available. Individuals and implementers are encouraged to choose these credential types over those not designed to protect personally identifiable information.
[=Verifiable credentials=] might contain long-lived identifiers that could be used to correlate individuals. These identifiers include [=subject=] identifiers, email addresses, government-issued identifiers, organization-issued identifiers, addresses, healthcare vitals, and many other long-lived identifiers. Implementers of software for [=holders=] are encouraged to detect identifiers in [=verifiable credentials=] that could be used to correlate individuals and to warn [=holders=] before they share this information. The rest of this section elaborates on guidance related to using long-lived identifiers.
[=Subjects=] of [=verifiable credentials=] are identified using the `id` property, as defined in Section [[[#identifiers]]] and used in places such as the `credentialSubject.id` property. The identifiers used to identify a [=subject=] create a greater correlation risk when the identifiers are long-lived or used across more than one web domain. Other types of identifiers that fall into this category are email addresses, government-issued identifiers, and organization-issued identifiers.
Similarly, disclosing the [=credential=] identifier (as in [[[#example-usage-of-the-id-property]]]) can lead to situations where multiple [=verifiers=], or an [=issuer=] and a [=verifier=], can collude to correlate the [=holder=].
[=Holders=] aiming to reduce correlation are encouraged to use [=verifiable credentials=] from [=issuers=] that support selectively disclosing correlating identifiers in a [=verifiable presentation=]. Such approaches expect the [=holder=] to generate the identifier and might even allow hiding the identifier from the [=issuer=] through techniques like blind signatures, while still keeping the identifier embedded and signed in the [=verifiable credential=].
[=Securing mechanism=] specification authors are advised to avoid enabling identifier-based correlation by designing their technologies to avoid the use of correlating identifiers that cannot be selectively disclosed.
If strong anti-correlation properties are required in a [=verifiable credentials=] system, it is essential that identifiers meet one or more of the following criteria:
The contents of a [=verifiable credential=] are secured using a [=securing mechanism=]. Values representing the securing mechanism pose a greater risk of correlation when they remain the same across multiple sessions or domains. Examples of these include the following values:
When strong anti-correlation properties are required, [=issuers=] are encouraged to produce [=verifiable credentials=] where signature values and metadata can be regenerated for each [=verifiable presentation=]. This can be achieved using technologies that support unlinkable disclosure, such as the [[[?VC-DI-BBS]]] specification. When possible, [=verifiers=] are encouraged to prefer [=verifiable presentations=] that use this technology in order to enhance privacy for [=holders=] and [=subjects=].
Even with unlinkable signatures, a [=verifiable credential=] might contain other information that undermines the anti-correlation properties of the cryptography used. See Sections [[[#personally-identifiable-information]]], [[[#identifier-based-correlation]]], [[[#metadata-based-correlation]]], [[[#correlation-during-validation]]], and most other subsections of Section [[[#privacy-considerations]]].
Different extension points, such as those described in Section [[[#basic-concepts]]] and Section [[[#advanced-concepts]]], can unintentionally or undesirably serve as a correlation mechanism, if relatively few [=issuers=] use a specific extension type or combination of types. For example, using certain cryptographic methods unique to particular nation-states, revocation formats specific to certain jurisdictions, or credential types employed by specific localities, can serve as mechanisms that reduce the pseudonymity a [=holder=] might expect when selectively disclosing information to a [=verifier=].
[=Issuers=] are encouraged to minimize metadata-based correlation risks when issuing [=verifiable credentials=] intended for pseudonymous use by limiting the types of extensions that could reduce the [=holder's=] pseudonymity. Credential types, extensions, and technology profiles with global adoption are most preferable, followed by those with national use; those with only local use are least preferable.
There are mechanisms external to [=verifiable credentials=] that track and correlate individuals on the Internet and the Web. These mechanisms include Internet protocol (IP) address tracking, web browser fingerprinting, evercookies, advertising network trackers, mobile network position information, and in-application Global Positioning System (GPS) APIs. Using [=verifiable credentials=] cannot prevent the use of these other tracking technologies; rather, using these technologies alongside [=verifiable credentials=] can reveal new correlatable information. For instance, a birthdate combined with a GPS position can strongly correlate an individual across multiple websites.
Privacy-respecting systems ought to aim to prevent the combination of other tracking technologies with [=verifiable credentials=]. In some instances, tracking technologies might need to be disabled on devices that transmit [=verifiable credentials=] on behalf of a [=holder=].
The Oblivious HTTP protocol [[?RFC9458]] is one mechanism implementers might consider using when fetching external resources associated with a [=verifiable credential=] or a [=verifiable presentation=]. Oblivious HTTP allows a client to make multiple requests to an origin server without that server being able to link those requests to that client or even to identify those requests as having come from a single client, while placing only limited trust in the nodes used to forward the messages. Oblivious HTTP is one privacy-preserving mechanism that can reduce the possibility of device tracking and fingerprinting. Below are some concrete examples of ways that Oblivious HTTP can benefit ecosystem participants.
[=Issuers=] are encouraged to limit the information included in a [=verifiable credential=] to the smallest set required for the intended purposes, so as to allow recipients to use them in various situations without disclosing more personally identifiable information (PII) than necessary. One way to avoid placing PII in a [=verifiable credential=] is to use an abstract [=property=] that meets the needs of [=verifiers=] without providing overly specific information about a [=subject=].
For example, this document uses the `ageOver` [=property=] instead of a specific birthdate, which would represent more sensitive PII. If retailers in a particular market commonly require purchasers to be older than a certain age, an [=issuer=] trusted in that market might choose to offer [=verifiable credentials=] that claim that [=subjects=] have met that requirement rather than offering [=verifiable credentials=] that contain [=claims=] about the customers' birthdays. This practice enables individual customers to make purchases without disclosing more PII than necessary.
Privacy violations occur when information divulged in one context leaks into another. One accepted best practice for preventing such a violation is for [=verifiers=] to limit the information requested and received, to the absolute minimum necessary for a particular transaction. Regulations in multiple jurisdictions, including the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in the United States and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union, mandate this data minimization approach.
With [=verifiable credentials=], data minimization for [=issuers=] means limiting the content of a [=verifiable credential=] to the minimum required by potential [=verifiers=] for expected use. For [=verifiers=], data minimization means restricting the scope of information requested or required for accessing services.
For example, a driver's license containing a driver's ID number, height, weight, birthday, and home address expressed as a [=verifiable credential=] contains more information than is necessary to establish that the person is above a certain age.
It is considered best practice for [=issuers=] to atomize information or use a securing mechanism that allows for [=selective disclosure=]. For example, an [=issuer=] of driver's licenses could issue a [=verifiable credential=] containing every property that appears on a driver's license, and allow the [=holder=] to disclose each property selectively. It could also issue more abstract [=verifiable credentials=] (for example, a [=verifiable credential=] containing only an `ageOver` property). One possible adaptation would be for [=issuers=] to provide secure HTTP endpoints for retrieving single-use [=bearer credentials=] that promote the pseudonymous use of [=verifiable credentials=]. Implementers that find this impractical or unsafe might consider using [=selective disclosure=] schemes that eliminate dependence on [=issuers=] at proving time and reduce the risk of temporal correlation by [=issuers=].
[=Verifiers=] are urged to only request information that is strictly necessary for a specific transaction to occur. This is important for at least two reasons:
Implementers of software used by [=holders=] are encouraged to disclose the information being requested by a [=verifier=], allowing the [=holder=] to decline to share specific information that is unnecessary for the transaction. Implementers of software used by [=holders=] are also advised to give [=holders=] access to logs of information shared with [=verifiers=], enabling the [=holders=] to provide this information to authorities if they believe that they have been subjected to information overreach or coerced to share more information than necessary for a particular transaction.
While it is possible to practice the principle of minimum disclosure, it might be impossible to avoid the strong identification of an individual for specific use cases during a single session or over multiple sessions. The authors of this document cannot stress how difficult it is to meet this principle in real-world scenarios.
A bearer credential is a privacy-enhancing piece of information, such as a concert ticket, that entitles its [=holder=] to a specific resource without requiring the [=holder=] to divulge sensitive information. In low-risk scenarios, entities often use bearer credentials where multiple [=holders=] presenting the same [=verifiable credential=] is not a concern or would not result in large economic or reputational losses.
[=Verifiable credentials=] that are [=bearer credentials=] are made possible by not specifying the [=subject=] identifier, expressed using the `id` [=property=], which is nested in the `credentialSubject` [=property=]. For example, the following [=verifiable credential=] is a [=bearer credential=]:
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"id": "http://university.example/credentials/temporary/28934792387492384",
"type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ExampleDegreeCredential"],
"issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/14",
"validFrom": "2017-10-22T12:23:48Z",
"credentialSubject": {
// note that the 'id' property is not specified for bearer credentials
"degree": {
"type": "ExampleBachelorDegree",
"name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
}
}
}
While [=bearer credentials=] are privacy-enhancing, [=issuers=] still need to take care in their design to avoid unintentionally divulging more information than the [=holder=] of the [=bearer credential=] expects. For example, repeated use of the same [=bearer credential=] across multiple sites can enable these sites to collude in illicitly tracking or correlating the [=holder=]. Similarly, information that might seem non-identifying, such as a birthdate and postal code, can be used together to statistically identify an individual when used in the same [=bearer credential=] or session.
[=Issuers=] of [=bearer credentials=] should ensure that the [=bearer credentials=] provide privacy-enhancing benefits that:
[=Holders=] ought to be warned by their software if it detects that [=bearer credentials=] containing sensitive information have been issued or requested, or that a correlation risk is posed by the combination of two or more [=bearer credentials=] across one or more sessions. While detecting all correlation risks might be impossible, some might certainly be detectable.
[=Verifiers=] ought not request [=bearer credentials=] known to carry information which can be used to illicitly correlate the [=holder=].
When processing [=verifiable credentials=], [=verifiers=] evaluate relevant [=claims=] before relying upon them. This evaluation might be done in any manner desired as long as it satisfies the requirements of the [=verifier=] doing the validation. Many verifiers will perform the checks listed in Appendix [[[#validation]]] as well as a variety of specific business process checks such as:
The process of performing these checks might result in information leakage that leads to a privacy violation of the [=holder=]. For example, a simple operation, such as checking an improperly configured revocation list, can notify the [=issuer=] that a specific business is likely interacting with the [=holder=]. This could enable [=issuers=] to collude to correlate individuals without their knowledge.
[=Issuers=] are urged to not use mechanisms, such as [=credential=] revocation lists that are unique per [=credential=], during the [=verification=] process, which could lead to privacy violations. Organizations providing software to [=holders=] ought to warn when [=credentials=] include information that could lead to privacy violations during the verification process. [=Verifiers=] are urged to consider rejecting [=credentials=] that produce privacy violations or that enable substandard privacy practices.
When a [=holder=] receives a [=verifiable credential=] from an [=issuer=], the [=verifiable credential=] needs to be stored somewhere (for example, in a [=credential repository=]). [=Holders=] need to be aware that the information in a [=verifiable credential=] can be sensitive and highly individualized, making it a prime target for data mining. Services offering "free of charge" storage of [=verifiable credentials=] might mine personal data and sell it to organizations interesting in building individualized profiles on people and organizations.
[=Holders=] need to be aware of the terms of service for their [=credential repository=], specifically the correlation and data mining protections in place for those who store their [=verifiable credentials=] with the service provider.
Some effective mitigations for data mining and profiling include using:
In addition to the mitigations above, civil society and regulatory participation in vendor analysis and auditing can help ensure that legal protections are enacted and enforced for individuals affected by practices that are not aligned with their best interests.
Having two pieces of information about the same [=subject=] often reveals more about the [=subject=] than the combination of those two pieces, even when the pieces are delivered through different channels. Aggregating [=verifiable credentials=] poses a privacy risk, and all participants in the ecosystem need to be aware of the risks of data aggregation.
For example, suppose two [=bearer credentials=], one for an email address and one stating the [=holder=] is over 21, are provided to the same [=verifier=] across multiple sessions. The [=verifier=] of the information now has a unique identifier (the email address) along with age-related ("over 21") information for that individual. It is now easy to create a profile for the [=holder=], building it by adding more and more information as it leaks over time. Aggregation of such [=credentials=] can also be performed by multiple sites in collusion with each other, leading to privacy violations.
From a technological perspective, preventing information aggregation is a challenging privacy problem. While new cryptographic techniques, such as zero-knowledge proofs, are being proposed as solutions to aggregation and correlation issues, the existence of long-lived identifiers and browser-tracking techniques defeats even the most modern cryptographic techniques.
The solution to the privacy implications of correlation or aggregation tends not to be technological in nature, but policy-driven instead. Therefore, if a [=holder=] wishes to avoid the aggregation of their information, they need to express this in the [=verifiable presentations=] they transmit, and by the [=holders=] and [=verifiers=] to whom they transmit their [=verifiable presentations=].
Despite best efforts by all involved to assure privacy, using [=verifiable credentials=] can potentially lead to de-anonymization and a loss of privacy. This correlation can occur when any of the following occurs:
In part, it is possible to mitigate this de-anonymization and loss of privacy by:
Unfortunately, these mitigation techniques are only sometimes practical or even compatible with necessary use. Sometimes, correlation is a requirement.
For example, in some prescription drug monitoring programs, usage monitoring is a requirement. Enforcement entities need to be able to confirm that individuals are not cheating the system to get multiple prescriptions for controlled substances. This statutory or regulatory need to correlate usage overrides individual privacy concerns.
[=Verifiable credentials=] will also be used to intentionally correlate individuals across services. For example, when using a common persona to log in to multiple services, all activity on each of those services is intentionally linked to the same individual. This is not a privacy issue as long as each of those services uses the correlation in the expected manner.
Privacy violations of [=verifiable credential=] usage occur when unintended or unexpected correlation arises from the presentation of those [=verifiable credentials=].
Legal processes can compel [=issuers=], [=holders=], and [=verifiers=] to disclose private information to authorities, such as law enforcement. It is also possible for the same private information to be accidentally disclosed to an unauthorized party through a software bug or security failure. Authors of legal processes and compliance regimes are advised to draft guidelines that require notifying the [=subjects=] involved when their private information is intentionally or accidentally disclosed to a third party. Providers of software services are advised to be transparent about known circumstances that might cause such private information to be shared with a third party, as well as the identity of any such third party.
When a [=holder=] chooses to share information with a [=verifier=], it might be the case that the [=verifier=] is acting in bad faith and requests information that could harm the [=holder=]. For example, a [=verifier=] might ask for a bank account number, which could then be used with other information to defraud the [=holder=] or the bank.
[=Issuers=] ought to strive to tokenize as much information as possible so that if a [=holder=] accidentally transmits [=credentials=] to the wrong [=verifier=], the situation is not catastrophic.
For example, instead of including a bank account number to check an individual's bank balance, provide a token that enables the [=verifier=] to check if the balance is above a certain amount. In this case, the bank could issue a [=verifiable credential=] containing a balance checking token to a [=holder=]. The [=holder=] would then include the [=verifiable credential=] in a [=verifiable presentation=] and bind the token to a credit checking agency using a digital signature. The [=verifier=] could then wrap the [=verifiable presentation=] in their digital signature and hand it back to the issuer to check the account balance dynamically.
Using this approach, even if a [=holder=] shares the account balance token with the wrong party, an attacker cannot discover the bank account number or the exact value of the account. Also, given the validity period of the counter-signature, the attacker gains access to the token for only a few minutes.
The data expressed in [=verifiable credentials=] and [=verifiable presentations=] are valuable since they contain authentic statements made by trusted third parties (such as [=issuers=]) or individuals (such as [=holders=] or [=subjects=]). The storage and accessibility of this data can inadvertently create honeypots of sensitive data for malicious actors. These adversaries often seek to exploit such reservoirs of sensitive information, aiming to acquire and exchange that data for financial gain.
[=Issuers=] are advised to retain the minimum amount of data necessary to issue [=verifiable credentials=] to [=holders=] and to manage the status and revocation of those credentials. Similarly, [=issuers=] are advised to avoid creating publicly accessible credentials that include personally identifiable information (PII) or other sensitive data. Software implementers are advised to safeguard [=verifiable credentials=] using robust consent and access control measures, ensuring that they remain inaccessible to unauthorized entities.
[=Holders=] are advised to use implementations that appropriately encrypt their data in transit and at rest and protect sensitive material (such as cryptographic secrets) in ways that cannot be easily extracted from hardware or other devices. It is further suggested that [=holders=] store and manipulate their data only on devices they control, away from centralized systems, to reduce the likelihood of an attack on their data or inclusion in a large-scale theft if an attack is successful. Furthermore, [=holders=] are encouraged to rigorously control access to their credentials and presentations, allowing access only to those with explicit authorization.
[=Verifiers=] are advised to ask only for data necessary for a particular transaction and to retain no data beyond the needs of any particular transaction.
Regulators are advised to reconsider existing audit requirements such that mechanisms that better preserve privacy can be used to achieve similar enforcement and audit capabilities. For example, audit-focused regulations that insist on the collection and long-term retention of personally identifiable information can cause harm to individuals and organizations if that same information is later compromised and accessed by an attacker. The technologies described by this specification enable [=holders=] to prove properties about themselves and others more readily, reducing the need for long-term data retention by [=verifiers=]. Alternatives include keeping logs that the information was collected and checked, as well as random tests to ensure that compliance regimes are operating as expected.
As detailed in Section [[[#patterns-of-use]]], patterns of use can be correlated with certain types of behavior. This correlation is partially mitigated when a [=holder=] uses a [=verifiable credential=] without the knowledge of the [=issuer=]. [=Issuers=] can defeat this protection however, by making their [=verifiable credentials=] short lived and renewal automatic.
For example, an `ageOver` [=verifiable credential=] is helpful in gaining access to a bar. If an [=issuer=] issues such a [=verifiable credential=] with a very short validity period and an automatic renewal mechanism, then the [=issuer=] could correlate the [=holder's=] behavior in a way that negatively impacts the [=holder=].
Organizations providing software to [=holders=] ought to warn them if they repeatedly use [=credentials=] with short lifespans, which could result in behavior correlation. [=Issuers=] ought to avoid issuing [=credentials=] that enable them to correlate patterns of use.
An ideal privacy-respecting system would require only the information necessary for interaction with the [=verifier=] to be disclosed by the [=holder=]. The [=verifier=] then records that the disclosure requirement has been met and discards any sensitive information disclosed. In many cases, competing priorities, such as regulatory burden, prevent this ideal system from being employed. In other instances, long-lived identifiers prevent single use. The designer of any [=verifiable credentials=] ecosystem ought to strive to make it as privacy-respecting as possible by preferring single-use [=verifiable credentials=] whenever possible.
Using single-use [=verifiable credentials=] provides several benefits. The first benefit is to [=verifiers=] who can be sure that the data in a [=verifiable credential=] is fresh. The second benefit is to [=holders=], who know that if there are no long-lived identifiers in the [=verifiable credential=], the [=verifiable credential=] itself cannot be used to track or correlate them online. Finally, there is nothing for attackers to steal, making the entire ecosystem safer to operate within.
In an ideal private browsing scenario, no PII will be revealed. Because many [=credentials=] include PII, organizations providing software to [=holders=] ought to warn them about the possibility of this information being revealed if they use [=credentials=] and [=presentations=] while in private browsing mode. As each browser vendor handles private browsing differently, and some browsers might not have this feature, it is important that implementers not depend on private browsing mode to provide any privacy protections. Instead, implementers are advised to rely on tooling that directly usable by their software to provide privacy guarantees.
[=Verifiable credentials=] rely on a high degree of trust in [=issuers=]. The degree to which a [=holder=] might take advantage of possible privacy protections often depends strongly on the support an [=issuer=] provides for such features. In many cases, privacy protections which make use of zero-knowledge proofs, data minimization techniques, bearer credentials, abstract claims, and protections against signature-based correlation require active support by the [=issuer=], who need to incorporate those capabilities into the [=verifiable credentials=] they issue.
It is crucial to note that [=holders=] not only depend on [=issuer=] participation to provide [=verifiable credential=] capabilities that help preserve [=holder=] and [=subject=] privacy, but also rely on [=issuers=] to not deliberately subvert these privacy protections. For example, an [=issuer=] might sign [=verifiable credentials=] using a signature scheme that protects against signature-based correlation. This would protect the [=holder=] from being correlated by the signature value as it is shared among [=verifiers=]. However, if the [=issuer=] creates a unique key for each issued [=credential=], it might be possible for the [=issuer=] to track [=presentations=] of the [=credential=], regardless of a [=verifier's=] inability to do so.
In addition to previously described privacy protections an [=issuer=] might offer, [=issuers=] need to be aware of data they leak that is associated with identifiers and claim types they use when issuing [=credentials=]. One example of this would be an [=issuer=] issuing driver's licenses which reveal both the location(s) in which they have jurisdiction and the location of the [=subject's=] residence. [=Verifiers=] might take advantage of this by requesting a [=credential=] to check that the [=subject=] is licensed to drive when, in fact, they are interested in metadata about the credential, such as which [=issuer=] issued the credential, and tangential information that might have been leaked by the [=issuer=], such as the [=subject's=] home address. To mitigate such leakage, [=issuers=] might use common identifiers to mask specific location information or other sensitive metadata; for example, a shared [=issuer=] identifier at a state or national level instead of at the level of a county, city, town, or other smaller municipality. Further, [=verifiers=] can use [=holder=] attestation mechanisms to preserve privacy, by providing proof that an [=issuer=] exists in a set of trusted entities without needing to disclose the exact [=issuer=].
[=Issuers=], [=holders=], and [=verifiers=] should be aware of a number of security considerations when processing data described by this specification. Ignoring or not understanding the implications of this section can result in security vulnerabilities.
While this section highlights a broad set of security considerations, it is a partial list. Implementers of mission-critical systems using the technology described in this specification are strongly encouraged to consult security and cryptography professionals for comprehensive guidance.
Cryptography can protect some aspects of the data model described in this specification. It is important for implementers to understand the cryptography suites and libraries used to create and process [=credentials=] and [=presentations=]. Implementing and auditing cryptography systems generally requires substantial experience. Effective red teaming can also help remove bias from security reviews.
Cryptography suites and libraries have a shelf life and eventually succumb to new attacks and technological advances. Production quality systems need to take this into account and ensure mechanisms exist to easily and proactively upgrade expired or broken cryptography suites and libraries, and to invalidate and replace existing [=credentials=]. Regular monitoring is important to ensure the long term viability of systems processing [=credentials=].
The security of most digital signature algorithms, used to secure [=verifiable credentials=] and [=verifiable presentations=], depends on the quality and protection of their private signing keys. The management of cryptographic keys encompasses a vast and complex field. For comprehensive recommendations and in-depth discussion, readers are directed to [[NIST-SP-800-57-Part-1]]. As strongly recommended in both [[FIPS-186-5]] and [[NIST-SP-800-57-Part-1]], a private signing key is not to be used for multiple purposes; for example, a private signing key is not to be used for encryption as well as signing.
[[NIST-SP-800-57-Part-1]] strongly advises that private signing keys and public verification keys have limited cryptoperiods, where a cryptoperiod is "the time span during which a specific key is authorized for use by legitimate entities or the keys for a given system will remain in effect." [[NIST-SP-800-57-Part-1]] gives extensive guidance on cryptoperiods for different key types under various conditions and recommends a one to three year cryptoperiod for a private signing key.
To deal with potential private key compromises, [[NIST-SP-800-57-Part-1]] provides recommendations for protective measures, harm reduction, and revocation. Although this section focuses primarily on the security of the private signing key, [[NIST-SP-800-57-Part-1]] also highly recommends confirmation of the validity of all [=verification material=] before using it.
[=Verifiable credentials=] often contain URLs to data that resides outside the [=verifiable credential=]. Linked content that exists outside a [=verifiable credential=] — such as images, JSON-LD extension contexts, JSON Schemas, and other machine-readable data — is not protected against tampering because the data resides outside of the protection of the securing mechanism on the [=verifiable credential=].
Section [[[#integrity-of-related-resources]]] of this specification provides an optional mechanism for ensuring content integrity of external resources. This mechanism is not necessary for external resources that do not impact the [=verifiable credential=]'s security. However, its implementation is crucial for external resources where content changes could potentially introduce security vulnerabilities.
Implementers need to recognize the potential security risks associated with unprotected URLs of external machine-readable content. Such vulnerabilities could lead to successful attacks on their applications. Where changes to external resources might compromise security, implementers will benefit by employing the content integrity protection mechanism outlined in this specification.
This specification enables the creation of [=credentials=] without signatures or proofs. These [=credential=] classes are often useful for intermediate storage or self-asserted information, analogous to filling out a form on a web page. Implementers ought to be aware that these [=credential=] types are not [=verifiable=] because the authorship either is unknown or cannot be trusted.
The data model does not inherently prevent Man-in-the-Middle (MITM), replay, and spoofing attacks. Both online and offline use cases might be susceptible to these attacks, where an adversary intercepts, modifies, re-uses, and/or replicates the [=verifiable credential=] data during transmission or storage.
A [=verifier=] might need to ensure it is the intended recipient of a [=verifiable presentation=] and not the target of a man-in-the-middle attack. Some securing mechanisms, like [[[VC-JOSE-COSE]]] [[VC-JOSE-COSE]] and [[[VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]]] [[VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]], provide an option to specify a [=presentation=]'s intended audience or domain, which can help reduce this risk.
Other approaches, such as token binding [[RFC8471]], which ties the request for a [=verifiable presentation=] to the response, can help secure the protocol. Any unsecured protocol is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks.
A [=verifier=] might wish to limit the number of times that [=verifiable presentation=] can be used. For example, multiple individuals presenting the same [=verifiable credential=] representing an event ticket might be granted entry to the event, undermining the purpose of the ticket from the perspective of its [=issuer=]. To prevent such replay attacks, [=verifiers=] require [=holders=] to include additional security measures in their [=verifiable presentations=]. Examples include the following:
[=Verifiers=] might have a vested interest in knowing that a [=holder=] is authorized to present the [=claims=] inside of a [=verifiable presentation=]. While the data model outlines the structure and data elements necessary for a [=verifiable credential=], it does not include a mechanism to ascertain the authorization of presented [=credentials=]. To address this concern, implementers might need to explore supplementary methods, such as binding [=verifiable credentials=] to strong authentication mechanisms or using additional properties in [=verifiable presentations=] to enable proof of control.
It is considered best practice for [=issuers=] to atomize information in a [=credential=] or use a signature scheme that allows for selective disclosure. When atomizing information, if it is not done securely by the [=issuers=], the [=holders=] might bundle together [=claims=] from different [=credentials=] in ways that the [=issuers=] did not intend.
Consider a university issuing two [=verifiable credentials=] to an individual. Each [=credential=] contains two properties that, when combined, indicate the person's "role" in a specific "department." For instance, one [=credential=] pair might designate "Staff Member" in the "Department of Computing," while another could signify "Post Graduate Student" in the "Department of Economics." Atomizing these [=verifiable credentials=] results in the university issuing four separate [=credentials=] to the individual. Each [=credential=] contains a single designation: "Staff Member", "Post Graduate Student", "Department of Computing", or "Department of Economics". The [=holder=] might then present the "Staff Member" and "Department of Economics" [=verifiable credentials=] to a [=verifier=], which, together, would comprise a false [=claim=].
When [=verifiable credentials=] contain highly dynamic information, careful consideration of validity periods becomes crucial. Issuing [=verifiable credentials=] with validity periods that extend beyond their intended use creates potential security vulnerabilities that malicious actors could exploit. Validity periods shorter than the timeframe where the information expressed by the [=verifiable credential=] is expected to be used creates a burden on [=holders=] and [=verifiers=]. It is, therefore, important to set validity periods for [=verifiable credentials=] appropriate to the use case and the expected lifetime of the information contained in the [=verifiable credential=].
Storing [=verifiable credentials=] on a device poses risks if the device is lost or stolen. An attacker gaining possession of such a device potentially acquires unauthorized access to systems using the victim's [=verifiable credentials=]. Ways to mitigate this type of attack include:
Furthermore, instances of impersonation can manifest in various forms, including situations where an [=entity=] attempts to disavow its actions. Elevating trust and security within the realm of [=verifiable credentials=] entails more than averting impersonation; it also involves implementing non-repudiation mechanisms. These mechanisms solidify an [=entity's=] responsibility for its actions or transactions, reinforcing accountability and deterring malicious behavior. Attainment of non-repudiation is a multifaceted endeavor, encompassing an array of techniques including securing mechanisms, proofs of possession, and authentication schemes in various protocols designed to foster trust and reliability.
Ensuring alignment between an [=entity's=] actions — such as [=presentation=], and the intended purpose of those actions — is essential. It involves having the authorization to use [=verifiable credentials=] and using [=credentials=] in a manner that adheres to their designated scope(s) and objective(s). Two critical aspects in this context are Unauthorized Use and Inappropriate Use.
Entities using [=verifiable credentials=] and [=verifiable presentations=] beyond their intended purpose are engaging in unauthorized activity. One class of unauthorized use is a confidentiality violation. Consider a [=holder=] that shares a [=verifiable presentation=] with a [=verifier=] to establish their age and residency status. If the [=verifier=] then proceeds to employ the [=holder's=] data without proper consent, such as by selling the data to a data broker, that would constitute an unauthorized use of the data, violating an expectation of privacy that the [=holder=] might have in the transaction.
Similarly, an [=issuer=] can employ a termsOfUse property to specify how and when a [=holder=] might be permitted and expected to use a [=credential=]. A [=holder=] using [=credentials=] outside of the scope(s) defined in the `termsOfUse` would be considered to be unauthorized.
Further study is required to determine how a [=holder=] can assert and enforce authorized use of their data after [=presentation=].
While valid cryptographic signatures and successful status checks signify the reliability of [=credentials=], they do not signify that all [=credentials=] are interchangeable for all contexts. It is crucial that [=verifiers=] also validate any relevant [=claims=], considering the source and nature of the [=claim=] alongside the purpose for which the [=holder=] presents the [=credential=].
For instance, in scenarios where a certified medical diagnosis is required, a self-asserted [=credential=] carrying the necessary data might not suffice because it lacks validity from an authoritative medical source. To ensure proper [=credential=] use, stakeholders need to assess the credential's relevance and authority within the specific context of their intended application.
Data in [=verifiable credentials=] can include injectable code or code from scripting languages. Authors of [=verifiable credentials=] benefit from avoiding such inclusions unless necessary and only after mitigating associated risks to the fullest extent possible.
For example, a single natural language string containing multiple languages or annotations often requires additional structure or markup for correct presentation. Markup languages, such as HTML, can label text spans in different languages or supply string-internal markup needed to display [=bidirectional text=] properly. It is also possible to use the `rdf:HTML` datatype to encode such values accurately in JSON-LD.
Despite the ability to encode information as HTML, implementers are strongly discouraged from doing so for the following reasons:
If implementers feel they need to use HTML, or other markup languages capable of containing executable scripts, to address a specific use case, they are advised to analyze how an attacker could use the markup to mount injection attacks against a consumer of the markup. This analysis should be followed by the proactive deployment of mitigations against the identified attacks, such as running the HTML rendering engine in a sandbox with no ability to access the network.
There are a number of accessibility considerations implementers should be aware of when processing data described in this specification. As with implementation of any web standard or protocol, ignoring accessibility issues makes this information unusable by a large subset of the population. It is important to follow accessibility guidelines and standards, such as [[WCAG21]], to ensure that all people, regardless of ability, can make use of this data. This is especially important when establishing systems utilizing cryptography, which have historically created problems for assistive technologies.
This section details the general accessibility considerations to take into account when utilizing this data model.
Many physical [=credentials=] in use today, such as government identification cards, have poor accessibility characteristics, including, but not limited to, small print, reliance on small and high-resolution images, and no affordances for people with vision impairments.
When utilizing this data model to create [=verifiable credentials=], it is suggested that data model designers use a data first approach. For example, given the choice of using data or a graphical image to depict a [=credential=], designers should express every element of the image, such as the name of an institution or the professional [=credential=], in a machine-readable way instead of relying on a viewer's interpretation of the image to convey this information. Using a data first approach is preferred because it provides the foundational elements of building different interfaces for people with varying abilities.
Implementers are advised to be aware of a number of internationalization considerations when publishing data described in this specification. As with any web standards or protocols implementation, ignoring internationalization makes it difficult for data to be produced and consumed across a disparate set of languages and societies, which limits the applicability of the specification and significantly diminishes its value as a standard.
Implementers are strongly advised to read the Strings on the Web: Language and Direction Metadata document [[STRING-META]], published by the W3C Internationalization Activity, which elaborates on the need to provide reliable metadata about text to support internationalization. For the latest information on internationalization considerations, implementers are also urged to read the Verifiable Credentials Implementation Guidelines [[VC-IMP-GUIDE]] document.
This section outlines general internationalization considerations to take into account when utilizing this data model and is intended to highlight specific parts of the Strings on the Web: Language and Direction Metadata document [[STRING-META]] that implementers might be interested in reading.
Data publishers are strongly encouraged to read the section on Cross-Syntax Expression in the Strings on the Web: Language and Direction Metadata document [[STRING-META]] to ensure that expressing language and base direction information is possible across multiple expression syntaxes, such as [[JSON-LD11]], [[JSON]], and CBOR [[?RFC7049]].
The general design pattern is to use the following markup template when expressing a text string that is tagged with a language and, optionally, a specific base direction.
"myProperty": {
"@value": "The string value",
"@language": "LANGUAGE"
"@direction": "DIRECTION"
}
When the language value object is used in place of a string value, the object MUST contain a `@value` property whose value is a string, and SHOULD contain a `@language` property whose value is a string containing a well-formed `Language-Tag` as defined by [[BCP47]], and MAY contain a `@direction` property whose value is a [=base direction=] string defined by the `@direction` property in [[JSON-LD11]]. The language value object MUST NOT include any other keys beyond `@value`, `@language`, and `@direction`.
Using the design pattern above, the following example expresses the title of a book in the English language without specifying a text direction.
"title": {
"@value": "HTML and CSS: Designing and Creating Websites",
"@language": "en"
}
The next example uses a similar title expressed in the Arabic language with a base direction of right-to-left.
"title": {
"@value": "HTML و CSS: تصميم و إنشاء مواقع الويب",
"@language": "ar",
"@direction": "rtl"
}
The text above would most likely be rendered incorrectly as left-to-right without the explicit expression of language and direction because many systems use the first character of a text string to determine its [=base direction=].
Multiple language value objects MAY be provided as an array value for the property:
"title": [ { "@value": "HTML and CSS: Designing and Creating Websites", "@language": "en" }, { "@value": "HTML و CSS: تصميم و إنشاء مواقع الويب", "@language": "ar", "@direction": "rtl" } ]
{ "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2", "https://achievement.example/multilingual/v2" ], "type": [ "VerifiableCredential", "ExampleAchievementCredential" ], "issuer": { "id": "did:example:2g55q912ec3476eba2l9812ecbfe", "type": "Profile" }, "validFrom": "2024-03-14T22:32:52Z", "validUntil": "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z", "credentialSubject": { "type": [ "AchievementSubject" ], "achievement": { "id": "urn:uuid:9a652678-4616-475d-af12-aca21cfbe06d", "type": [ "Achievement" ], "name": { "en": "Successful installation of the Example application", "es": "Instalación exitosa de la aplicación Example" }, "criteria": { "narrative": { "es": "Instaló exitosamente de la aplicación Example.", "en": "Successfully installed the Example application." } } } } }
The language and base direction of each natural language string property value SHOULD be provided, either via the language value structure for each property value, or via a default language and base direction for all values in the entire credential. Using the per-value language value structure is preferred, because using document defaults can result in a requirement that downstream processors perform JSON-LD expansion-based transformation which is otherwise optional. See the String Internationalization section of the [[JSON-LD11]] specification for more information. Natural language string values that do not have a language associated with them SHOULD be treated as if the language value is `undefined` (language tag "`und`"). Natural language string values that do not have a base direction associated with them SHOULD be treated as if the direction value is "`auto`".
While this specification does not provide conformance criteria for the process of the [=validation=] of [=verifiable credentials=] or [=verifiable presentations=], readers might be curious about how the information in this data model is expected to be utilized by [=verifiers=] during the process of [=validation=]. This section captures a selection of conversations held by the Working Group related to the expected usage of the properties in this specification by [=verifiers=].
When a [=verifier=] requests one or more [=verifiable credentials=] from a [=holder=], they can specify the type of credential(s) that they would like to receive. Credential types, as well as validation schemas for each type and each of their [=claims=], are defined by specification authors and are published in places like the [[[VC-EXTENSIONS]]].
The type of a credential is expressed via the type property. A [=verifiable credential=] of a specific type contains specific [=properties=] (which might be deeply nested) that can be used to determine whether or not the [=presentation=] satisfies a set of processing rules that the [=verifier=] executes. By requesting [=verifiable credentials=] of a particular `type`, the [=verifier=] is able to gather specific information from the [=holder=], which originated with the [=issuer=] of each [=verifiable credential=], that will enable the [=verifier=] to determine the next stage of an interaction with a [=holder=].
When a [=verifier=] requests a [=verifiable credential=] of a specific type, there will be a set of mandatory and optional [=claims=] that are associated with that type. A [=verifier's=] validation of a [=verifiable credential=] will fail when mandatory [=claims=] are not included, and any [=claim=] that is not associated with the specific type will be ignored. In other words, a [=verifier=] will perform input validation on the [=verifiable credential=] it receives and will reject malformed input based on the credential type specification.
In the [=verifiable credentials=] presented by a [=holder=], the value associated with the `id` [=property=] for each `credentialSubject` identifies a [=subject=] to the [=verifier=]. If the [=holder=] is also the [=subject=], then the [=verifier=] could authenticate the [=holder=] if they have [=verification=] metadata related to the [=holder=]. The [=verifier=] could then authenticate the [=holder=] using a signature generated by the [=holder=] contained in the [=verifiable presentation=]. The `id` [=property=] is optional. [=Verifiers=] could use other [=properties=] in a [=verifiable credential=] to uniquely identify a [=subject=].
For information on how authentication and WebAuthn might work with [=verifiable credentials=], see the [[[VC-IMP-GUIDE]]] document.
The value associated with the `issuer` [=property=] identifies an [=issuer=] to the [=verifier=].
Metadata related to the `issuer` [=property=] is available to the [=verifier=] through the verification algorithm as defined in Section [[[#verification]]]. This metadata includes identification of the verified controller of the verification method used by the securing mechanism to secure each [=verifiable credential=] or [=verifiable presentation=], of which the controller is typically the respective `issuer` or `holder`.
Some ecosystems might have more complex relationships between [=issuers=] and controllers of verification methods and might use lists of verified issuers in addition to, or instead of, the mapping described above.
The value associated with the `holder` [=property=] is used to identify the [=holder=] to the [=verifier=].
Often relevant metadata about the [=holder=], as identified by the value of the `holder` [=property=], is available to, or retrievable by, the [=verifier=]. For example, a [=holder=] can publish information containing the [=verification material=] used to secure [=verifiable presentations=]. This metadata is used when checking proofs on [=verifiable presentations=]. Some cryptographic identifiers contain all necessary metadata in the identifier itself. In those cases, no additional metadata is required. Other identifiers use verifiable data registries where such metadata is automatically published for use by [=verifiers=], without any additional action by the [=holder=].
See the and for additional examples related to [=subject=] and [=holder=].
Validation is the process by which verifiers apply business rules to evaluate the propriety of a particular use of a [=verifiable credential=].
A [=verifier=] might need to validate a given [=verifiable presentation=] against complex business rules; for example, the verifier might need confidence that the [=holder=] is the same entity as a [=subject=] of a [=verifiable credential=]. In such a situation, the following factors can provide a [=verifier=] with reasonable confidence that the claims expressed regarding that identifier, in included [=verifiable credentials=], are, in fact, about the current presenter:
The `validFrom` is expected to be within an expected range for the [=verifier=]. For example, a [=verifier=] can check that the start of the validity period for a [=verifiable credential=] is not in the future.
The securing mechanism used to prove that the information in a [=verifiable credential=] or [=verifiable presentation=] was not tampered with is called a cryptographic proof. There are many types of cryptographic proofs including, but not limited to, digital signatures and zero-knowledge proofs. In general, when verifying cryptographic proofs, implementations are expected to ensure:
In general, when verifying digital signatures, implementations are expected to ensure:
The [=verifier=] expects that the `validFrom` and `validUntil` properties will be within a certain range. For example, a [=verifier=] can check that the end of the validity period of a [=verifiable credential=] is not in the past. Because some credentials can be useful for secondary purposes even if their original validity period has expired, validity period, as expressed using the `validFrom` and `validUntil` properties, is always considered a component of validation, which is performed after verification.
If the `credentialStatus` property is available, the status of a [=verifiable credential=] is expected to be evaluated by the [=verifier=] according to the `credentialStatus` [=type=] definition for the [=verifiable credential=] and the [=verifier's=] own status evaluation criteria. For example, a [=verifier=] can ensure the status of the [=verifiable credential=] is not "withdrawn for cause by the [=issuer=]".
If the `credentialSchema` property is available, the schema of a [=verifiable credential=] is expected to be evaluated by the [=verifier=] according to the `credentialSchema` [=type=] definition for the [=verifiable credential=] and the [=verifier's=] own schema evaluation criteria. For example, if the `credentialSchema`'s `type` value is [[?VC-JSON-SCHEMA]], then a [=verifier=] can ensure a credential's data is valid against the given JSON Schema.
Fitness for purpose is about whether the custom [=properties=] in the [=verifiable credential=] are appropriate for the [=verifier's=] purpose. For example, if a [=verifier=] needs to determine whether a [=subject=] is older than 21 years of age, they might rely on a specific `birthdate` [=property=], or on more abstract [=properties=], such as `ageOver`.
The [=issuer=] is trusted by the [=verifier=] to make the [=claims=] at hand. For example, a franchised fast food restaurant location trusts the discount coupon [=claims=] made by the corporate headquarters of the franchise. Policy information expressed by the [=issuer=] in the [=verifiable credential=] should be respected by [=holders=] and [=verifiers=] unless they accept the liability of ignoring the policy.
Systems using what is today commonly referred to as "artificial intelligence" and/or "machine learning" might be capable of performing complex tasks at a level that meets or exceeds human performance. This might include tasks such as the acquisition and use of [=verifiable credentials=]. Using such tasks to distinguish between human and automated "bot" activity, as is commonly done today with a CAPTCHA, for instance, might thereby cease to provide adequate or acceptable protection.
Implementers of security architectures that use [=verifiable credentials=] and/or perform validation on their content are urged to consider the existence of machine-based actors, such as those which are today commonly referred to as "artificial intelligence", that might legitimately hold [=verifiable credentials=] for use in interactions with other systems. Implementers might also consider how threat actors could couple such "artificial intelligence" systems with [=verifiable credentials=] to pose as humans when interacting with their systems. Such systems might include, but not be limited to, global infrastructure such as social media, election, energy distribution, supply chain, and autonomous vehicle systems.
This section lists cryptographic hash values that might change during the
Candidate Recommendation phase based on implementer feedback that requires
the referenced files to be modified.
The Working Group is expecting all of the terms and URLs supplied in the
JSON-LD Context to be either stabilized, or removed, before the publication of
this specification as a Proposed Recommendation. While that means that this
specification could be delayed if dependencies such as [[?VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]],
[[?VC-JOSE-COSE]], SD-JWT, [[?VC-JSON-SCHEMA]], or status list
do not enter the Proposed Recommendation phase around the same time frame, the
Working Group is prepared to remove the dependencies if an undue burden is
placed on transitioning to the Recommendation phase. This is a calculated
risk that the Working Group is taking and has a mitigation strategy in place
to ensure the timely transition of this specification to a Recommendation.
Implementations MUST treat the base context value, located at
`https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2`, as already retrieved;
the following value is the hexadecimal encoded SHA2-256 digest value of the base
context file: . It is possible to confirm
the cryptographic digest above by running the following command from a modern
Unix command interface line:
`curl -s https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2 | openssl dgst -sha256`.
It is strongly advised that all JSON-LD Context URLs used by an application utilize the same mechanism, or a functionally equivalent mechanism, to ensure end-to-end security. Implementations are expected to throw errors if a cryptographic hash value for a resource does not match the expected hash value.
Implementations that apply the base context above, as well as other contexts and values in any `@context` property, during operations such as JSON-LD Expansion or transformation to RDF, are expected to do so without experiencing any errors. If such operations are performed and result in an error, the [=verifiable credential=] or [=verifiable presentation=] MUST result in a verification failure.
It is extremely unlikely that the files that have associated cryptographic hash values in this specification will change. However, if critical errata are found in the specification and corrections are required to ensure ecosystem stability, the cryptographic hash values might change. As such, the HTTP cache times for the files are not set to infinity and implementers are advised to check for errata if a cryptographic hash value change is detected.
This section serves as a reminder of the importance of ensuring that, when verifying [=verifiable credentials=] and [=verifiable presentations=], the [=verifier=] has information that is consistent with what the [=issuer=] or [=holder=] had when securing the [=credential=] or [=presentation=]. This information might include at least:
[=Verifiers=] are warned that other data that is referenced from within a [=credential=], such as resources that are linked to via URLs, are not cryptographically protected by default. It is considered a best practice to ensure that the same sorts of protections are provided for any URL that is critical to the security of the [=verifiable credential=] through the use of permanently cached files and/or cryptographic hashes. Ultimately, knowing the cryptographic digest of any linked external content enables a [=verifier=] to confirm that the content is the same as what the [=issuer=] or [=holder=] intended.
This section lists URL values that might change during the Candidate Recommendation phase based on migration of documents to time-stamped locations, migration of documents to the W3C Technical Reports namespace, and/or implementer feedback that requires the referenced URLs to be modified.
Implementations that depend on RDF vocabulary processing MUST ensure that the following vocabulary URLs used in the base context ultimately resolve to the following files when loading the JSON-LD serializations, which are normative. Other semantically equivalent serializations of the vocabulary files MAY be used by implementations. A cryptographic hash is provided for each JSON-LD document to ensure that developers can verify that the content of each file is correct.
JSON-LD Documents and Hashes |
---|
URL: https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials# Resolved Document: https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/index.jsonld SHA2-256 Digest:
|
URL: https://w3id.org/security# Resolved Document: https://w3c.github.io/vc-data-integrity/vocab/security/vocabulary.jsonld SHA2-256 Digest:
|
It is possible to confirm the cryptographic digests listed above by running a command like the following, replacing `<DOCUMENT_URL>` with the appropriate value, through a modern UNIX-like OS command line interface: `curl -sL -H "Accept: application/ld+json" <DOCUMENT_URL> | openssl dgst -sha256`
Implementers and document authors might note that cryptographic digests for `schema.org` are not provided. This is because the `schema.org` vocabulary undergoes regular changes; any digest provided would be out of date within weeks of publication. The Working Group discussed this concern and concluded that the vocabulary terms from `schema.org`, that are used by this specification, have been stable for years and are highly unlikely to change in their semantic meaning.
The following base classes are defined in this specification for processors and other specifications that benefit from such definitions:
Base Class | Purpose |
---|---|
`CredentialEvidence` | Serves as a superclass for specific evidence types that are placed into the evidence property. |
`CredentialSchema` | Serves as a superclass for specific schema types that are placed into the credentialSchema property. |
`CredentialStatus` | Serves as a superclass for specific credential status types that are placed into the credentialStatus property. |
`ConfidenceMethod` | Serves as a superclass for specific confidence method types that are placed into the `confidenceMethod` property. |
`RefreshService` | Serves as a superclass for specific refresh service types that are placed into the credentialRefresh property. |
`RenderMethod` | Serves as a superclass for specific render method types that are placed into the `renderMethod` property. |
`TermsOfUse` | Serves as a superclass for specific terms of use types that are placed into the termsOfUse property. |
This section defines datatypes that are used by this specification.
The `sriString` datatype is associated with a value to provide the integrity information for a resource using the method specified in the [[[SRI]]] specification. The `sriString` datatype is defined as follows:
The [=verifiable credential=] and [=verifiable presentation=] data models leverage a variety of underlying technologies including [[JSON-LD11]] and [[?VC-JSON-SCHEMA]]. This section will provide a comparison of the `@context`, `type`, and `credentialSchema` properties, and cover some of the more specific use cases where it is possible to use these features of the data model.
The `type` property is used to uniquely identify the type of the [=verifiable credential=] in which it appears, that is, to indicate which set of claims the [=verifiable credential=] contains. This property, and the value `VerifiableCredential` within the set of its values, are mandatory. Whilst it is good practice to include one additional value depicting the unique subtype of this [=verifiable credential=], it is permitted to either omit or include additional type values in the array. Many verifiers will request a [=verifiable credential=] of a specific subtype, then omitting the subtype value could make it more difficult for verifiers to inform the holder which [=verifiable credential=] they require. When a [=verifiable credential=] has multiple subtypes, listing all of them in the `type` property is sensible. The usage of the `type` property in a [[JSON-LD11]] representation of a [=verifiable credential=] enables to enforce the semantics of the [=verifiable credential=] because the machine is able to check the semantics. With [[JSON-LD11]], the technology is not only describing the categorization of the set of claims, the technology is also conveying the structure and semantics of the sub-graph of the properties in the graph. In [[JSON-LD11]], this represents the type of the node in the graph which is why some [[JSON-LD11]] representations of a [=verifiable credential=] will use the `type` property on many objects in the [=verifiable credential=].
The primary purpose of the `@context` property, from a [[JSON-LD11]] perspective, is to convey the meaning of the data and term definitions of the data in a [=verifiable credential=], in a machine-readable way. The `@context` property is used to map the globally unique URLs for properties in [=verifiable credentials=] and [=verifiable presentations=] into short-form alias names, making [[JSON-LD11]] representations more human-friendly to read. From a [[JSON-LD11]] perspective, this mapping also allows the data in a [=credential=] to be modeled in a network of machine-readable data, by enhancing how the data in the [=verifiable credential=] or [=verifiable presentation=] relates to a larger machine-readable data graph. This is useful for telling machines how to relate the meaning of data to other data in an ecosystem where parties are unable to coordinate. This property, with the first value in the set being `https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2`, is mandatory.
Since the `@context` property is used to map data to a graph data model, and the `type` property in [[JSON-LD11]] is used to describe nodes within the graph, the `type` property becomes even more important when using the two properties in combination. For example, if the `type` property is not included within the resolved `@context` resource using [[JSON-LD11]], it could lead to claims being dropped and/or their integrity no longer being protected during production and consumption of the [=verifiable credential=]. Alternatively, it could lead to errors being raised during production or consumption of a [=verifiable credential=]. This will depend on the design choices of the implementation and both paths are used in implementations today, so it's important to pay attention to these properties when using a [[JSON-LD11]] representation of a [=verifiable credential=] or [=verifiable presentation=].
The primary purpose of the `credentialSchema` property is to define the structure of the [=verifiable credential=], and the datatypes for the values of each property that appears. A `credentialSchema` is useful for defining the contents and structure of a set of claims in a [=verifiable credential=], whereas [[JSON-LD11]] and a `@context` in a [=verifiable credential=] are best used only for conveying the semantics and term definitions of the data, and can be used to define the structure of the [=verifiable credential=] as well.
While it is possible to use some [[JSON-LD11]] features to allude to the contents of the [=verifiable credential=], it's not generally suggested to use `@context` to constrain the data types of the data model. For example, `"@type": "@json"` is useful for leaving the semantics open-ended and not strictly defined. This can be dangerous if the implementer is looking to constrain the data type of the claims in the [=credential=], and is expected not to be used.
When the `credentialSchema` and `@context` properties are used in combination, both producers and consumers can be more confident about the expected contents and data types of the [=verifiable credential=] and [=verifiable presentation=].
This section will be submitted to the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) for review, approval, and registration with IANA.
This specification registers the `application/vc` media type specifically for identifying documents conforming to the [=verifiable credentials=] format.
Type name: | application |
Subtype name: | vc |
Required parameters: | None |
Encoding considerations: | Resources that use the `application/vc` media type are required to conform to all of the requirements for the `application/ld+json` media type and are therefore subject to the same encoding considerations specified in Section 11 of [[[RFC7159]]]. |
Security considerations: | As defined in the [[[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]]]. |
Contact: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
Note that while the [=verifiable credentials=] format uses JSON-LD conventions, there are a number of constraints and additional requirements for [=verifiable credential=] implementations that justify the use of a specific media type.
This media type can be used in an [=enveloping proof=] to denote the enveloped payload.
The credential is expected to be a valid JSON-LD document. [=Verifiable credentials=] served with the `application/vc` media type are expected to have all [[[JSON-LD11]]] context information, including references to external contexts, within the body of the document. Contexts linked via a `http://www.w3.org/ns/json-ld#context` HTTP Link Header (see Section 6.1 of [[[JSON-LD11]]]) are ignored.
This specification registers the `application/vp` media type specifically for identifying documents conforming to the [=verifiable presentations=] format.
Type name: | application |
Subtype name: | vp |
Required parameters: | None |
Encoding considerations: | Resources that use the `application/vp` media type are required to conform to all of the requirements for the `application/ld+json` media type and are therefore subject to the same encoding considerations specified in Section 11 of [[[RFC7159]]]. |
Security considerations: | As defined in [[[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]]]. |
Contact: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
Note that while the [=verifiable presentations=] format uses JSON-LD conventions, there are a number of constraints and additional requirements for [=verifiable presentation=] implementations that justify the use of a specific media type.
This media type can be used in an [=enveloping proof=] to denote the enveloped payload.
The presentation is expected to be a valid JSON-LD document. [=Verifiable presentations=] served with the `application/vp` media type are expected to have all [[[JSON-LD11]]] context information, including references to external contexts, within the body of the document. Contexts linked via a `http://www.w3.org/ns/json-ld#context` HTTP Link Header (see Section 6.1 of [[JSON-LD11]]) are ignored.
[[[#info-graph-vp-mult-creds]]] below is a variant of [[[#info-graph-vp]]]: a [=verifiable presentation=] referring to two [=verifiable credentials=], and using [=embedded proofs=] based on [[?VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]]. Each [=verifiable credential graph=] is connected to its own separate [=proof graph=]; the `verifiableCredential` property is used to connect the [=verifiable presentation=] to the [=verifiable credential graphs=]. The [=presentation=] [=proof graph=] represents the digital signature of the [=verifiable presentation graph=], both [=verifiable credential graphs=], and the [=proof graphs=] linked from the [=verifiable credential graphs=]. The complete [=verifiable presentation=] consists, in this case, of six information [=graphs=].
[[[#info-graph-vp-jwt-mult-creds]]] below shows the same [=verifiable presentation=] as [[[#info-graph-vp-mult-creds]]], but using an [=enveloping proof=] based on [[?VC-JOSE-COSE]]. Each [=verifiable credential graph=] contains a single `EnvelopedVerifiableCredential` instance, referring, via a `data:` URL [[RFC2397]], to a verifiable credential secured via an [=enveloping proof=].
This section contains the substantive changes that have been made to this specification over time.
Changes since the v1.1 Recommendation:
Changes since the v1.0 Recommendation:
The Working Group thanks the following individuals not only for their contributions toward the content of this document, but also for yeoman's work in this standards community that drove changes, discussion, and consensus among a sea of varied opinions: Matt Stone, Gregg Kellogg, Ted Thibodeau Jr, Oliver Terbu, Joe Andrieu, David I. Lehn, Matthew Collier, and Adrian Gropper.
Work on this specification has been supported by the Rebooting the Web of Trust community facilitated by Christopher Allen, Shannon Appelcline, Kiara Robles, Brian Weller, Betty Dhamers, Kaliya Young, Manu Sporny, Drummond Reed, Joe Andrieu, Heather Vescent, Kim Hamilton Duffy, Samantha Chase, and Andrew Hughes. The participants in the Internet Identity Workshop, facilitated by Phil Windley, Kaliya Young, Doc Searls, and Heidi Nobantu Saul, also supported the refinement of this work through numerous working sessions designed to educate about, debate on, and improve this specification.
The Working Group also thanks our Chairs, Dan Burnett, Matt Stone, Brent Zundel, Wayne Chang, and Kristina Yasuda as well as our W3C Staff Contacts, Kazuyuki Ashimura and Ivan Herman, for their expert management and steady guidance of the group through the W3C standardization process.
Portions of the work on this specification have been funded by the United States Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate under contract HSHQDC-17-C-00019. The content of this specification does not necessarily reflect the position or the policy of the U.S. Government and no official endorsement should be inferred.
The Working Group would like to thank the following individuals for reviewing and providing feedback on the specification (in alphabetical order):
Christopher Allen, David Ammouial, Joe Andrieu, Bohdan Andriyiv, Ganesh Annan, Kazuyuki Ashimura, Tim Bouma, Pelle Braendgaard, Dan Brickley, Allen Brown, Jeff Burdges, Daniel Burnett, ckennedy422, David Chadwick, Chaoxinhu, Kim (Hamilton) Duffy, Lautaro Dragan, enuoCM, Ken Ebert, Eric Elliott, William Entriken, David Ezell, Nathan George, Reto Gmür, Ryan Grant, glauserr, Adrian Gropper, Joel Gustafson, Amy Guy, Lovesh Harchandani, Daniel Hardman, Dominique Hazael-Massieux, Jonathan Holt, David Hyland-Wood, Iso5786, Renato Iannella, Richard Ishida, Ian Jacobs, Anil John, Tom Jones, Rieks Joosten, Gregg Kellogg, Kevin, Eric Korb, David I. Lehn, Michael Lodder, Dave Longley, Christian Lundkvist, Jim Masloski, Pat McBennett, Adam C. Migus, Liam Missin, Alexander Mühle, Anthony Nadalin, Clare Nelson, Mircea Nistor, Grant Noble, Darrell O'Donnell, Nate Otto, Matt Peterson, Addison Phillips, Eric Prud'hommeaux, Liam Quin, Rajesh Rathnam, Drummond Reed, Yancy Ribbens, Justin Richer, Evstifeev Roman, RorschachRev, Steven Rowat, Pete Rowley, Markus Sabadello, Kristijan Sedlak, Tzviya Seigman, Reza Soltani, Manu Sporny, Orie Steele, Matt Stone, Oliver Terbu, Ted Thibodeau Jr, John Tibbetts, Mike Varley, Richard Varn, Heather Vescent, Christopher Lemmer Webber, Benjamin Young, Kaliya Young, Dmitri Zagidulin, and Brent Zundel.