This specification defines how to secure credentials and presentations conforming to the Verifiable Credential data model [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]] with JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE), Selective Disclosure for JWTs [[SD-JWT]], and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [[RFC9052]]. This enables the Verifiable Credential data model [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]] to be implemented with standards for signing and encryption that are widely adopted.
The Working Group is actively seeking implementation feedback for this specification. In order to exit the Candidate Recommendation phase, the Working Group has set the requirement of at least two independent implementations for each mandatory feature in the specification. For details on the conformance testing process, see the test suite listed in the implementation report.
This specification defines how to secure media types expressing Verifiable Credentials and Verifiable Presentations as described in [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]] using approaches defined by the JOSE, OAuth, and COSE working groups at the IETF. This includes JSON Web Signature (JWS) [[RFC7515]], Selective Disclosure for JWTs [[SD-JWT]], and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [[RFC9052]]. It uses content types [[RFC6838]] and structured suffixes [[MULTIPLE-SUFFIXES]] to distinguish between the data types of unsecured documents conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]] and the data types of secured documents conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].
JSON Web Signature (JWS) [[RFC7515]] defines a standard means of digitally signing documents, including JSON documents, using JSON-based data structures. It provides a means to ensure the integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation of the information contained in the document. Selective Disclosure for JWTs (SD-JWT) [[SD-JWT]] builds on JWS by also providing a mechanism enabling selective disclosure of document elements. These properties make JWS and SD-JWT especially well suited to securing documents conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].
CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [[RFC9052]] defines a standard means of representing digitally signed data structures using Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [[RFC8949]]. Like JWS, COSE provides a standardized way to secure the integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality of information. It offers a flexible and extensible set of cryptographic options, allowing for a wide range of algorithms to be used for signing and encryption.
COSE supports two main operations: signing and encryption. For signing, COSE allows the creation of digital signatures over CBOR data using various algorithms such as RSA, ECDSA, and EdDSA. These signatures provide assurance of data integrity and authenticity. COSE also supports encryption, enabling the confidentiality of CBOR data by encrypting it with symmetric or asymmetric encryption algorithms.
This section outlines how to secure documents conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]] using JOSE, SD-JWT, and COSE.
Documents conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]], and their associated media types, rely on JSON-LD, which is an extensible format for describing linked data; see JSON-LD Relationship to RDF.
A benefit to this approach is that payloads can be made to conform directly to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]] without any mappings or transformation, while at the same time supporting registered header parameters and claims that are understood in the context of JOSE, SD-JWT, and COSE.
It is RECOMMENDED that media types be used to distinguish verifiable credentials and verifiable presentations from other kinds of secured JSON or CBOR.
The most specific media type (or subtype) available SHOULD be used, instead of
more generic media types (or supertypes). For example, rather than the general
application/sd-jwt, application/vc+ld+json+sd-jwt
SHOULD be used, unless there is a more specific media type that would even
better identify the secured envelope format.
If implementations do not know which media type to use, media types defined in this specification MUST be used.
This section details how to use JOSE to secure verifiable credentials conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].
A [=conforming JWS issuer implementation=] MUST use [[RFC7515]] to secure this media type. The unsecured verifiable credential is the unencoded JWS payload.
The typ header parameter SHOULD be vc+ld+json+jwt.
When present, the cty header parameter SHOULD be vc+ld+json.
See Registered Header Parameter Names
for additional details regarding usage of typ and
cty.
A [=conforming JWS verifier implementation=] MUST use [[RFC7515]] to verify [=conforming JWS documents=] that use this media type.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"id": "http://university.example/credentials/1872",
"type": [
"VerifiableCredential",
"ExampleAlumniCredential"
],
"issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
"validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
"credentialSchema": {
"id": "https://example.org/examples/degree.json",
"type": "JsonSchema"
},
"credentialSubject": {
"id": "did:example:123",
"degree": {
"type": "BachelorDegree",
"name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
}
}
}
This section details how to use JOSE to secure verifiable presentations conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].
A [=conforming JWS issuer implementation=] MUST use [[RFC7515]] to secure this media type. The unsecured verifiable presentation is the unencoded JWS payload.
The typ header parameter SHOULD be vp+ld+json+jwt.
When present, the cty header parameter SHOULD be vp+ld+json.
See Registered Header Parameter Names
for additional details regarding usage of typ and
cty.
A [=conforming JWS verifier implementation=] MUST use [[RFC7515]] to verify [=conforming JWS documents=] that use this media type.
Credentials in verifiable presentations MUST use the Enveloped Verifiable Credential type defined by the [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].
Credentials in verifiable presentations MUST be secured. These credentials are secured using JWS in this case.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"type": "VerifiablePresentation",
"verifiableCredential": [{
"@context": ["https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2"],
"type": ["EnvelopedVerifiableCredential"],
"id": "data:application/vc+ld+json+jwt;eyJraWQiOiJFeEhrQk1XOWZtYmt2VjI2Nm1ScHVQMnNVWV9OX0VXSU4xbGFwVXpPOHJvIiwiYWxnIjoiRVMzODQifQ.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.d2k4O3FytQJf83kLh-HsXuPvh6yeOlhJELVo5TF71gu7elslQyOf2ZItAXrtbXF4Kz9WivNdztOayz4VUQ0Mwa8yCDZkP9B2pH-9S_tcAFxeoeJ6Z4XnFuL_DOfkR1fP"
}]
}
See for more details regarding this example.
Implementations MUST support the JWS compact serialization. Use of the JWS JSON serialization is NOT RECOMMENDED.
When present in the JOSE Header or the JWT Claims Set, members registered in the IANA JSON Web Token Claims registry or the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry are to be interpreted as defined by the specifications referenced in the registries.
The normative statements in Registered Header Parameter Names, JOSE Header, and Replicating Claims as Header Parameters apply to securing credentials and presentations.
The unencoded JOSE Header is JSON (`application/json`), not JSON-LD (`application/ld+json`).
It is RECOMMENDED to use the IANA
JSON Web Token Claims
registry and the IANA
JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters
registry to identify any claims and header parameters that might be confused
with members defined by [[[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]]] [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]]. These include but are not limited
to: iss, kid, alg, iat,
exp, and cnf.
When the iat and/or exp JWT claims are present, they
represent the issuance and expiration time of the signature, respectively. Note
that these are different from the validFrom and
validUntil properties defined in
Validity Period, which
represent the validity of the data that is being secured.
The claims and security provided by this specification are independent of the data secured and semantics provided by the [[[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]]] [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]]. This means that while the security features of this specification ensure data integrity and authenticity, they do not dictate the interpretation of claim data.
Implementers SHOULD avoid setting JWT claims to values that conflict with the values of verifiable credential properties when a claim and property pair refer to the same conceptual entity, especially with pairs such as `iss` and `issuer`, `jti` and `id`, and `sub` and `credentialSubject.id`. For example, JWK claim `iss` should not be set to a value which conflicts with the value of verifiable credential property `issuer`.
The JWT Claim Names vc and vp MUST NOT be present.
Additional members may be present as header parameters and claims. If they are not understood, they MUST be ignored.
This section details how to use JOSE to secure verifiable credentials conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].
A [=conforming SD-JWT issuer implementation=] MUST use [[[SD-JWT]]] [[SD-JWT]] to secure this media type. The unsecured [=verifiable credential=] is the input JSON claim set. The Issuer then converts the input JSON claim set (i.e., the unsecured [=verifiable credential=]) into an SD-JWT payload according to SD-JWT issuance instructions.
The typ header parameter SHOULD be vc+ld+json+sd-jwt.
When present, the cty header parameter SHOULD be vc+ld+json.
See Registered Header Parameter Names
for additional details regarding usage of typ and
cty.
A [=conforming SD-JWT verifier implementation=] MUST use [[SD-JWT]] to verify [=conforming JWS documents=] that use this media type.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"id": "http://university.example/credentials/1872",
"type": [
"VerifiableCredential",
"ExampleAlumniCredential"
],
"issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
"validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
"credentialSchema": {
"id": "https://example.org/examples/degree.json",
"type": "JsonSchema"
},
"credentialSubject": {
"id": "did:example:123",
"degree": {
"type": "BachelorDegree",
"name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
}
}
}
This section details how to use SD-JWT to secure verifiable presentations conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].
A [=conforming SD-JWT issuer implementation=] MUST use [[SD-JWT]] to secure this media type. The unsecured verifiable presentation is the unencoded SD-JWT payload.
The typ header parameter SHOULD be vp+ld+json+sd-jwt.
When present, the cty header parameter SHOULD be vp+ld+json.
See Registered Header Parameter Names
for additional details regarding usage of typ and
cty.
A [=conforming SD-JWT verifier implementation=] MUST use [[SD-JWT]] to verify [=conforming JWS documents=] that use this media type.
Credentials in verifiable presentations MUST use the Enveloped Verifiable Credential type defined by the [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].
Credentials in verifiable presentations MUST be secured. These credentials are secured using SD-JWT in this case.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"type": "VerifiablePresentation",
"verifiableCredential": [{
"@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"type": "EnvelopedVerifiableCredential",
"id": "data:application/vc+ld+json+sd-jwt;eyJhbGciOiJFUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6IlVRTV9fblE0UzZCTzhuUTRuT05YeHB4aHRob3lOeGI1M0xZZ1l6LTJBQnMiLCJ0eXAiOiJ2cCtsZCtqc29uK3NkLWp3dCIsImN0eSI6InZwK2xkK2pzb24ifQ.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.kYD63YtBNYnLUTw6Szf1vs_Ug3UBXhPwCyqpNmPnPDa3rXZQhQLdB1BgaoO8zgQ-c3B41fxaXMnLHYV9-B20uboSpJP0B-2Vre917eQt1cSDswDGA_Ytvn4BSqYVBB2J~WyJFMkFsRzhsY2p0QVFrcllIbjlIbnVRIiwgInR5cGUiLCAiVmVyaWZpYWJsZVByZXNlbnRhdGlvbiJd~WyI5NldYMDRneno4cVZzOVZLU2wwYTVnIiwgImlkIiwgImh0dHA6Ly91bml2ZXJzaXR5LmV4YW1wbGUvY3JlZGVudGlhbHMvMTg3MiJd~WyJaekU2VFVaamtHMW1DWXBKMEhnc0l3IiwgInR5cGUiLCBbIlZlcmlmaWFibGVDcmVkZW50aWFsIiwgIkV4YW1wbGVBbHVtbmlDcmVkZW50aWFsIl1d~WyItQ3NsS25GZGFYb2JiQWsyU0JBVGR3IiwgImlkIiwgImRpZDpleGFtcGxlOmViZmViMWY3MTJlYmM2ZjFjMjc2ZTEyZWMyMSJd~WyJuRm1OWl9IczB3WWNoOFdkeTdnQUNRIiwgImlkIiwgImRpZDpleGFtcGxlOmMyNzZlMTJlYzIxZWJmZWIxZjcxMmViYzZmMSJd"
}]
}
See for more details regarding this example.
Implementations MUST support the compact serialization (application/sd-jwt)
and MAY support the JSON serialization (application/sd-jwt+json).
If the JSON serialization is used, it is RECOMMENDED that a profile be defined
to ensure any additional JSON members are understood consistently.
COSE [[RFC9052]] is a common approach to encoding and securing information using CBOR [[RFC8949]]. Verifiable credentials MAY be secured using COSE [[RFC9052]] and SHOULD be identified through use of content types as outlined in this section.
This section details how to secure data with the type
application/vc+ld+json
with COSE.
A [=conforming COSE issuer implementation=] MUST use COSE_Sign1 as specified in [[RFC9052]] to secure this media type. The unsecured verifiable credential is the unencoded COSE_Sign1 payload.
The typ header parameter SHOULD be application/vc+ld+json+cose.
See I-D.ietf-cose-typ-header-parameter
for the COSE "typ" (type) header parameter.
When present, the content type (3) header parameter
SHOULD be application/vc+ld+json.
See Common COSE Header Parameters for additional details.
A [=conforming COSE verifier implementation=] MUST use COSE_Sign1 as specified in [[RFC9052]] to verify [=conforming COSE documents=] that use this media type.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"id": "http://university.example/credentials/1872",
"type": [
"VerifiableCredential",
"ExampleAlumniCredential"
],
"issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
"validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
"credentialSchema": {
"id": "https://example.org/examples/degree.json",
"type": "JsonSchema"
},
"credentialSubject": {
"id": "did:example:123",
"degree": {
"type": "BachelorDegree",
"name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
}
}
}
This section details how to use COSE to secure verifiable presentations conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].
A [=conforming COSE issuer implementation=] MUST use COSE_Sign1 as specified in [[RFC9052]] to secure this media type. The unsecured verifiable presentation is the unencoded COSE_Sign1 payload.
The typ header parameter SHOULD be application/vp+ld+json+cose.
When present, the cty header parameter SHOULD be application/vp+ld+json.
See Common COSE Header Parameters for additional details.
A [=conforming COSE verifier implementation=] MUST use COSE_Sign1 as specified in [[RFC9052]] to verify [=conforming COSE documents=] that use this media type.
Credentials in verifiable presentations MUST use the Enveloped Verifiable Credential type defined by the [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].
Credentials in verifiable presentations MUST be secured. These credentials are secured using COSE in this case.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"type": "VerifiablePresentation",
"verifiableCredential": [{
"@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"type": "EnvelopedVerifiableCredential",
"id": "data:application/vc+ld+json+sd-jwt;eyJhbGciOiJFUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6IlVRTV9fblE0UzZCTzhuUTRuT05YeHB4aHRob3lOeGI1M0xZZ1l6LTJBQnMiLCJ0eXAiOiJ2cCtsZCtqc29uK3NkLWp3dCIsImN0eSI6InZwK2xkK2pzb24ifQ.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.kYD63YtBNYnLUTw6Szf1vs_Ug3UBXhPwCyqpNmPnPDa3rXZQhQLdB1BgaoO8zgQ-c3B41fxaXMnLHYV9-B20uboSpJP0B-2Vre917eQt1cSDswDGA_Ytvn4BSqYVBB2J~WyJFMkFsRzhsY2p0QVFrcllIbjlIbnVRIiwgInR5cGUiLCAiVmVyaWZpYWJsZVByZXNlbnRhdGlvbiJd~WyI5NldYMDRneno4cVZzOVZLU2wwYTVnIiwgImlkIiwgImh0dHA6Ly91bml2ZXJzaXR5LmV4YW1wbGUvY3JlZGVudGlhbHMvMTg3MiJd~WyJaekU2VFVaamtHMW1DWXBKMEhnc0l3IiwgInR5cGUiLCBbIlZlcmlmaWFibGVDcmVkZW50aWFsIiwgIkV4YW1wbGVBbHVtbmlDcmVkZW50aWFsIl1d~WyItQ3NsS25GZGFYb2JiQWsyU0JBVGR3IiwgImlkIiwgImRpZDpleGFtcGxlOmViZmViMWY3MTJlYmM2ZjFjMjc2ZTEyZWMyMSJd~WyJuRm1OWl9IczB3WWNoOFdkeTdnQUNRIiwgImlkIiwgImRpZDpleGFtcGxlOmMyNzZlMTJlYzIxZWJmZWIxZjcxMmViYzZmMSJd"
}]
}
When present in the COSE Header or as CWT Claims, members registered in the IANA CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims registry or the IANA COSE Header Parameters registry are to be interpreted as defined by the specifications referenced in those registries. CBOR Web Token (CWT) [[?RFC8392]] Claims MAY be included in a COSE header parameter, as specified in I-D.ietf-cose-cwt-claims-in-headers.
The normative statements in Header Parameters, Claims, and CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims in COSE Headers apply to securing credentials and presentations.
It is RECOMMENDED to use the IANA
CBOR Web Token Claims
registry and the IANA
COSE Header Parameters
registry to identify any claims and header parameters that might be confused
with members defined by [[[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]]] [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]]. These include but are not limited
to: iss, kid, alg, iat,
exp, and cnf.
When the iat and/or exp CWT claims are present, they
represent the issuance and expiration time of the signature, respectively. Note
that these are different from the validFrom and
validUntil properties defined in
Validity Period, which
represent the validity of the data that is being secured.
Additional members may be present as header parameters and claims. If they are not understood, they MUST be ignored.
The working group is still discussing how to close many related issues.
When iss is absent and the issuer is identified as a DID Subject, the kid MUST be an absolute DID URL.
{
"issuer": "did:example:123"
// ...
}
{
"alg": "ES384",
"kid": "did:example:123#key-456
}
When iss is absent, and the holder is identified as a DID Subject, the kid MUST be an absolute DID URL.
{
"holder": "did:example:abc"
// ...
}
{
"alg": "ES384",
"kid": "did:example:abc#key-456
}
When iss is absent, and the issuer is identified as a [[URL]], the kid MUST be an absolute [[URL]] to a verification method listed in a controller document.
{
"issuer": {
"id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049"
}
// ...
}
{
"alg": "ES384",
"kid": "https://university.example/issuers/565049#key-123
}
When the holder is identified as a [[URL]], and iss is absent, the kid MUST be an absolute [[URL]] to a verification method listed in a controller document.
{
"holder": {
"id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049"
}
// ...
}
{
"alg": "ES384",
"kid": "https://university.example/issuers/565049#key-123
}
When iss is present and is a [[URL]], the kid MUST match a key discovered via a JWT Issuer Metadata Request, as described in [[SD-JWT-VC]].
This normative statement depends on the IETF OAuth working group draft [[SD-JWT-VC]]. This feature is at risk and will be removed from the specification if at least two independent, interoperable implementations are not demonstrated.
To complete the verification process, a verifier needs to obtain the cryptographic keys used to secure the credential.
There are several different ways to discover the verification keys of the issuers and holders.
These JOSE header parameters and JWT claims can be used by verifiers to discover verification keys.
If kid is present in the JOSE Header
or the COSE Header,
a verifier can use this parameter
as a hint indicating which key was used to secure the verifiable credential, when performing a
verification process as defined in RFC7515.
kid MUST be present when the key of the issuer
or subject is expressed as a DID URL.
If iss is present in the JOSE Header,
the JWT Claims,
or the COSE Header,
a verifier can use this parameter
to obtain a JSON Web Key to use in the
verification process.
The value of the issuer property can be either a string or an object.
When issuer value is a string, iss value, if present, MUST match issuer value.
When issuer value is an object with an id value,
iss value, if present, MUST match issuer.id value.
If kid is also present in the
JOSE Header, it is used to
distinguish the specific key used.
If cnf is present in the JOSE Header,
the JWT Claims,
or the COSE Header,
a verifier MAY use this parameter
to identify a proof-of-possession key in the manner described in [[RFC7800]]
or [[RFC8747]] for use in the
verification process.
Use of a proof-of-possession key provided by the Holder to the Issuer to establish a cryptographic binding to the Holder in the Verifiable Credential that is verifiable by the Verifier in the Verifiable Presentation is RECOMMENDED.
The working group is currently exploring how Defining Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) could be leveraged to assist a verifier in discovering verification keys for issuers and holders.
When the issuer value is a URL using the HTTPS scheme, issuer metadata including the issuer's public keys can be retrieved using the mechanism defined in [[SD-JWT-VC]].
This normative statement depends on the IETF OAuth working group draft [[SD-JWT-VC]]. This feature is at risk and will be removed from the specification if at least two independent, interoperable implementations are not demonstrated.
A controller document is a set of data that specifies one or more relationships between a controller and a set of data, such as a set of public cryptographic keys. The controller document SHOULD contain verification relationships that explicitly permit the use of certain verification methods for specific purposes.
A controller document can express verification methods, such as cryptographic public keys, which can be used to authenticate or authorize interactions with the controller or associated parties. For example, a cryptographic public key can be used as a verification method with respect to a digital signature; in such usage, it verifies that the signer could use the associated cryptographic private key. Verification methods might take many parameters. An example of this is a set of five cryptographic keys from which any three are required to contribute to a cryptographic threshold signature.
The `verificationMethod` property is OPTIONAL. If present, its value MUST be a set of verification methods, where each verification method is expressed using a map. The verification method map MUST include the `id`, `type`, `controller`, and specific verification material properties that are determined by the value of `type` and are defined in . A verification method MAY include additional properties.
The value of the `id` property for a verification method MUST be a string that conforms to the [[URL]] syntax.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://w3id.org/security/jwk/v1"
]
"id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi",
...
"verificationMethod": [{
"id": ...,
"type": ...,
"controller": ...,
"publicKeyJwk": ...
}]
}
The semantics of the `controller` property are the same when the subject of the relationship is the controller document as when the subject of the relationship is a verification method, such as a cryptographic public key. Since a key can't control itself, and the key controller cannot be inferred from the controller document, it is necessary to explicitly express the identity of the controller of the key. The difference is that the value of `controller` for a verification method is not necessarily a controller. Controllers are expressed using the `controller` property at the highest level of the controller document.
Verification material MUST be expressed in the publicKeyJwk property
of a JsonWebKey. This key material is retrieved based on hints in the
JOSE or COSE message envelopes, such as kid or iss. At
the time of writing, there is no standard way to retrieve a public key in JWK format
from a DID URL or controller document.
A verification method MUST NOT contain multiple verification material properties for the same material. For example, expressing key material in a verification method using both `publicKeyJwk` and another representation is prohibited.
Implementations MAY convert keys between formats as desired for operational purposes or to interface with cryptographic libraries. As an internal implementation detail, such conversion MUST NOT affect the external representation of key material.
An example of a controller document containing verification methods using both properties above is shown below.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://w3id.org/security/jwk/v1"
]
"id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi",
...
"verificationMethod": [
{
"id": "did:example:123#_Qq0UL2Fq651Q0Fjd6TvnYE-faHiOpRlPVQcY_-tA4A",
"type": "JsonWebKey", // external (property value)
"controller": "did:example:123",
"publicKeyJwk": {
"crv": "Ed25519", // external (property name)
"x": "VCpo2LMLhn6iWku8MKvSLg2ZAoC-nlOyPVQaO3FxVeQ", // external (property name)
"kty": "OKP", // external (property name)
"kid": "_Qq0UL2Fq651Q0Fjd6TvnYE-faHiOpRlPVQcY_-tA4A" // external (property name)
}
}
],
...
}
The JSON Web Key (JWK) is a specific type of verification method that uses the JWK specification [[RFC7517]] to encode key types into a set of parameters.
When specifying a `JsonWebKey`, the object takes the following form:
The `publicKeyJwk` property is REQUIRED, and its value MUST be a JSON Web Key that conforms to [[RFC7517]]. It is RECOMMENDED that verification methods that use JWKs [[RFC7517]] to represent their public keys use the value of `kid` as their fragment identifier. It is RECOMMENDED that JWK `kid` values be set to the public key fingerprint [[RFC7638]]. See the first key in the example below for an instance of a public key with a compound key identifier.
As specified in Section 4.4 of the JWK specification, the OPTIONAL `alg` property identifies the algorithm intended for use with the public key, and SHOULD be included to prevent security issues that can arise when using the same key with multiple algorithms. As specified in Section 6.2.1.1 of the JWA specification, describing a key using an elliptic curve, the REQUIRED `crv` property is used to identify the particular curve type of the public key. As specified in Section 4.1.4 of the JWS specification, the OPTIONAL `kid` property is a hint used to help discover the key; if present, the `kid` value SHOULD match, or be included in, the `id` property of the encapsulating `JsonWebKey` object, as part of the path, query, or fragment of the URL.
An example of an object that conforms to `JsonWebKey` is provided below:
{
"id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#key-1",
"type": "JsonWebKey",
"controller": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi",
"publicKeyJwk": {
"kid": "key-1",
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-384",
"alg": "ES384",
"x": "1F14JSzKbwxO-Heqew5HzEt-0NZXAjCu8w-RiuV8_9tMiXrSZdjsWqi4y86OFb5d",
"y": "dnd8yoq-NOJcBuEYgdVVMmSxonXg-DU90d7C4uPWb_Lkd4WIQQEH0DyeC2KUDMIU"
}
}
In the example above, the `publicKeyJwk` value contains the JSON Web Key. The `kty` property encodes the key type of "OKP", which means "Octet string key pairs". The `alg` property identifies the algorithm intended for use with the public key, which in this case is `ES384`. The `crv` property identifies the particular curve type of the public key, `P-384`. The `x` property specifies the point on the P-384 curve that is associated with the public key.
The `publicKeyJwk` property MUST NOT contain any property marked as "Private" or "Secret" in any registry contained in the JOSE Registries [[JOSE-REGISTRIES]], including "d".
JSON Web Key is also capable of encoding secret keys, sometimes referred to as private keys.
{
"id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi#key-1",
"type": "JsonWebKey",
"controller": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi",
"secretKeyJwk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-384",
"alg": "ES384",
"d": "fGwges0SX1mj4eZamUCL4qtZijy9uT15fI4gKTuRvre4Kkoju2SHM4rlFOeKVraH",
"x": "1F14JSzKbwxO-Heqew5HzEt-0NZXAjCu8w-RiuV8_9tMiXrSZdjsWqi4y86OFb5d",
"y": "dnd8yoq-NOJcBuEYgdVVMmSxonXg-DU90d7C4uPWb_Lkd4WIQQEH0DyeC2KUDMIU"
}
}
The private key example above is almost identical to the previous example of the public key, except that the information is stored in the `secretKeyJwk` property (rather than the `publicKeyJwk`), and the private key value is encoded in the `d` property thereof (alongside the `x` property, which still specifies the point on the secp384r1 curve that is associated with the public key).
Verification methods can be referenced from properties associated with various verification relationships as described in . Referencing verification methods allows them to be used by more than one verification relationship.
If the value of a verification method property is a URL string, the verification method has been included by reference and its properties will need to be retrieved from elsewhere in the controller document or from another controller document. This is done by dereferencing the URL and searching the resulting resource for a verification method map with an `id` property whose value matches the URL.
{
...
"authentication": [
// this key is referenced and might be used by
// more than one verification relationship
"did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-1",
],
...
}
A verification relationship expresses the relationship between the controller and a verification method.
Different verification relationships enable the associated verification methods to be used for different purposes. It is up to a verifier to ascertain the validity of a verification attempt by checking that the verification method used is contained in the appropriate verification relationship property of the controller document.
The verification relationship between the controller and the verification method is explicit in the controller document. Verification methods that are not associated with a particular verification relationship cannot be used for that verification relationship.
The controller document does not express revoked keys using a verification relationship. If a referenced verification method is not in the latest controller document used to dereference it, then that verification method is considered invalid or revoked.
The following sections define several useful verification relationships. A controller document MAY include any of these, or other properties, to express a specific verification relationship. To maximize global interoperability, any such properties used SHOULD be registered in the VC Specifications Directory.
The `authentication` verification relationship is used to specify how the controller is expected to be authenticated, for purposes such as logging into a website or engaging in any sort of challenge-response protocol.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2"
],
"id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi",
...
"authentication": [
// this method can be used to authenticate as did:...fghi
"did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-1",
...
}
If authentication is established, it is up to the application to decide what to do with that information.
This is useful to any authentication verifier that needs to check to see whether an entity that is attempting to authenticate is, in fact, presenting a valid proof of authentication. When a verifier receives some data (in some protocol-specific format) that contains a proof that was made for the purpose of "authentication", and that says that an entity is identified by the `id`, then that verifier checks to ensure that the proof can be verified using a verification method (e.g., public key) listed under `authentication` in the controller document.
Note that the verification method indicated by the `authentication` property of a controller document can only be used to authenticate the controller. To authenticate a different controller, the entity associated with the value of `controller` needs to authenticate with its own controller document and associated `authentication` verification relationship.
The `assertionMethod` verification relationship is used to specify how the controller is expected to express claims, such as for the purposes of issuing a Verifiable Credential [[?VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].
This property is useful, for example, during the processing of a verifiable credential by a verifier.
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2"
],
"id": "did:example:123456789abcdefghi",
...
"assertionMethod": [
// this method can be used to assert statements as did:...fghi
"did:example:123456789abcdefghi#keys-1",
...
}
A conforming JWS document is one that conforms to all of the "MUST" statements in Section .
A conforming JWS issuer implementation produces [=conforming JWS documents=] and MUST secure them as described in Section .
A conforming JWS verifier implementation verifies [=conforming JWS documents=] as described in Section .
A conforming SD-JWT document is one that conforms to all of the "MUST" statements in Section .
A conforming SD-JWT issuer implementation produces [=conforming SD-JWT documents=] and MUST secure them as described in Section .
A conforming SD-JWT verifier implementation verifies [=conforming SD-JWT documents=] as described in Section .
A conforming COSE document is one that conforms to all of the "MUST" statements in Section .
A conforming COSE issuer implementation produces [=conforming COSE documents=] and MUST secure them as described in Section .
A conforming COSE verifier implementation verifies [=conforming COSE documents=] as described in Section .
The describes
the approach taken by JSON Web Tokens to secure JWT Claims Sets as applying an
external proof.
The normative statements in Securing
Mechanisms apply to securing
application/vc+ld+json and
application/vp+ld+json,
application/vc+ld+json+sd-jwt and
application/vp+ld+json+sd-jwt,
as well as
application/vc+ld+json+cose and
application/vp+ld+json+cose.
JSON Web Token implementers are advised to review Implementation Requirements.
Accordingly, Issuers, Holders, and Verifiers MUST understand the
JSON Web Token header parameter
"alg": "none" when securing [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]]
with JSON Web Tokens.
When content types from [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]] are secured using
JSON Web Tokens, the header parameter "alg": "none",
MUST be used to communicate that a JWT Claims Set (a
Verifiable Credential or a Verifiable Presentation) has no
integrity protection.
When a JWT Claims Set (a Verifiable Credential or a
Verifiable Presentation) contains
proof, and the JSON Web Token header contains
"alg": "none", the JWT Claims Set MUST be considered to
have no integrity protection.
Verifiable Credentials and Verifiable Presentations are not
required to be secured or integrity protected or to contain a
proof member.
Issuers, Holders, and Verifiers MUST ignore all JWT Claims Sets that have no integrity protection.
The JWT Claim Names vc and vp
MUST NOT be present in any JWT Claims Set.
application/vc+ld+json+jwt
This specification registers the
application/vc+ld+json+jwt Media Type specifically for
identifying a
with a payload
conforming to the Verifiable Credential Data Model.
| Type name: | `application` |
| Subtype name: | `vc+ld+json+jwt` |
| Required parameters: | None |
| Encoding considerations: | binary; `application/jwt` values are a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.'). |
| Security considerations: |
As defined in this specification. See also the security considerations in . |
| Contact: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
application/vp+ld+json+jwt
This specification registers the
application/vp+ld+json+jwt Media Type specifically for
identifying a
with a payload
conforming to Verifiable Presentations.
| Type name: | application |
| Subtype name: | vp+ld+json+jwt |
| Required parameters: | None |
| Encoding considerations: | binary; `application/jwt` values are a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.'). |
| Security considerations: |
As defined in this specification. See also the security considerations in . |
| Contact: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
application/vc+ld+json+sd-jwt
This specification registers the
application/vc+ld+json+sd-jwt Media Type specifically for
identifying a
with a payload
conforming to the Verifiable Credential Data Model.
| Type name: | `application` |
| Subtype name: | `vc+ld+json+sd-jwt` |
| Required parameters: | None |
| Encoding considerations: | binary; `application/sd-jwt` values are a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.') or tilde ('~') characters. |
| Security considerations: |
As defined in this specification. See also the security considerations in . |
| Contact: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
application/vp+ld+json+sd-jwt
This specification registers the
application/vp+ld+json+sd-jwt Media Type specifically for
identifying a
with a payload
conforming to Verifiable Presentations.
| Type name: | application |
| Subtype name: | vp+ld+json+sd-jwt |
| Required parameters: | None |
| Encoding considerations: | binary; `application/sd-jwt` values are a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.') or tilde ('~') characters. |
| Security considerations: |
As defined in this specification. See also the security considerations in . |
| Contact: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
application/vc+ld+json+cose
This specification registers the
application/vc+ld+json+cose Media Type specifically for
identifying a COSE object [[RFC9052]]
with a payload
conforming to the Verifiable Credential Data Model.
| Type name: | `application` |
| Subtype name: | `vc+ld+json+cose` |
| Required parameters: | None |
| Encoding considerations: | binary (CBOR) |
| Security considerations: |
As defined in this specification. See also the security considerations in [[RFC9052]]. |
| Contact: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
application/vp+ld+json+cose
This specification registers the
application/vp+ld+json+cose Media Type specifically for
identifying a COSE object [[RFC9052]]
with a payload
conforming to Verifiable Presentations.
| Type name: | `application` |
| Subtype name: | `vp+ld+json+cose` |
| Required parameters: | None |
| Encoding considerations: | binary (CBOR) |
| Security considerations: |
As defined in this specification. See also the security considerations in [[RFC9052]]. |
| Contact: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
+ld+json+jwt
This specification registers the
+ld+json+jwt Structured Suffix
in the IANA "Structured Syntax Suffixes" registry [[IANA-STRUCTURED-SUFFIX]]
for indicating that the media type is encoded as
a
with a JSON-LD payload.
| Name: | `ld+json+jwt` |
| +suffix: | `+ld+json+jwt` |
| References: | this specification |
| Encoding considerations: | binary; `jwt` values are a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.'). |
| Security considerations: |
As defined in this specification. See also the security considerations in and [[json-ld11]]. |
| Contact: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
| Author/Change Controller: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
+json+jwt
This specification registers the
+json+jwt Structured Suffix
in the IANA "Structured Syntax Suffixes" registry [[IANA-STRUCTURED-SUFFIX]]
for indicating that the media type is encoded as
a
with a JSON payload.
| Name: | json+jwt |
| +suffix: | `+json+jwt` |
| References: | this specification |
| Encoding considerations: | binary; `jwt` values are a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.'). |
| Security considerations: |
As defined in this specification. See also the security considerations in . |
| Contact: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
| Author/Change Controller: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
+ld+json+sd-jwt
This specification registers the
+ld+json+sd-jwt Structured Suffix
in the IANA "Structured Syntax Suffixes" registry [[IANA-STRUCTURED-SUFFIX]]
for indicating that the media type is encoded as
an
with a JSON-LD payload.
| Name: | `ld+json+sd-jwt` |
| +suffix: | `+ld+json+sd-jwt` |
| References: | this specification |
| Encoding considerations: | binary; `sd-jwt` values are a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.') or tilde ('~') characters. |
| Security considerations: |
As defined in this specification. See also the security considerations in . |
| Contact: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
| Author/Change Controller: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
+json+sd-jwt
This specification registers the
+json+sd-jwt Structured Suffix
in the IANA "Structured Syntax Suffixes" registry [[IANA-STRUCTURED-SUFFIX]]
for indicating that the media type is encoded as
an
with a JSON payload.
| Name: | json+sd-jwt |
| +suffix: | `+json+sd-jwt` |
| References: | this specification |
| Encoding considerations: | binary; `sd-jwt` values are a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.') or tilde ('~') characters. |
| Security considerations: |
As defined in this specification. See also the security considerations in . |
| Contact: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
| Author/Change Controller: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
+ld+json+cose
This specification registers the
+ld+json+cose Structured Suffix
in the IANA "Structured Syntax Suffixes" registry [[IANA-STRUCTURED-SUFFIX]]
for indicating that the media type is encoded as
a COSE object [[RFC9052]]
with a JSON-LD payload.
| Name: | `ld+json+cose` |
| +suffix: | `+ld+json+cose` |
| References: | this specification |
| Encoding considerations: | binary (CBOR) |
| Security considerations: |
As defined in this specification. See also the security considerations in [[RFC9052]] and [[json-ld11]]. |
| Contact: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
| Author/Change Controller: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
+json+cose
This specification registers the
+json+cose Structured Suffix
in the IANA "Structured Syntax Suffixes" registry [[IANA-STRUCTURED-SUFFIX]]
for indicating that the media type is encoded as
a COSE object [[RFC9052]]
with a JSON payload.
| Name: | json+cose |
| +suffix: | `+json+cose` |
| References: | this specification |
| Encoding considerations: | binary (CBOR) |
| Security considerations: |
As defined in this specification. See also the security considerations in [[RFC9052]]. |
| Contact: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
| Author/Change Controller: | W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group public-vc-wg@w3.org |
Verifiable Credentials often contain sensitive information that needs to be protected to ensure the privacy and security of organizations and individuals. This section outlines some privacy considerations relevant to implementers and users.
Implementers are advised to note and abide by all privacy considerations called out in [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].
Implementers are additionally advised to reference the Privacy Consideration section of the JWT specification for privacy guidance.
In addition to the privacy recommendations in the [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]], the following considerations are given:
Minimization of data: It is considered best practice for Verifiable Credentials to only contain the minimum amount of data necessary to achieve their intended purpose. This helps to limit the amount of sensitive information that is shared or stored unnecessarily.
Informed consent: It is considered best practice that individuals be fully informed about how their data will be used and provide the ability to consent to or decline the use of their data. This helps to ensure that individuals maintain control over their own personal information.
Data protection: It is considered best practice to protect Verifiable Credentials using strong encryption and other security measures to prevent unauthorized access, modification, or disclosure.
These considerations are not exhaustive, and implementers and users are advised to consult additional privacy resources and best practices to ensure the privacy and security of Verifiable Credentials implemented using this specification.
This section outlines security considerations for implementers and users of this specification. It is important to carefully consider these factors to ensure the security and integrity of Verifiable Credentials when implemented using JOSE or COSE.
When implementing this specification, it is essential to address all security issues relevant to broad cryptographic applications. This especially includes protecting the user's asymmetric private and symmetric secret keys, as well as employing countermeasures against various attacks. Failure to adequately address these issues could compromise the security and integrity of Verifiable Credentials, potentially leading to unauthorized access, modification, or disclosure of sensitive information.
Implementers are advised to follow best practices and established cryptographic standards to ensure the secure handling of keys and other sensitive data. Additionally, conduct regular security assessments and audits to identify and address any vulnerabilities or threats.
Follow all security considerations outlined in [[RFC7515]] and [[RFC7519]].
When utilizing JSON-LD, take special care around remote retrieval of contexts and follow the additional security considerations noted in [[json-ld11]].
As noted in [[RFC7515]] when utilizing JSON [[RFC7159]], strict validation is a security requirement. If malformed JSON is received, it may be impossible to reliably interpret the producer's intent, potentially leading to ambiguous or exploitable situations. To prevent these risks, it is essential to use a JSON parser that strictly validates the syntax of all input data. It is essential that any JSON inputs that do not conform to the JSON-text syntax defined in [[RFC7159]] be rejected in their entirety by JSON parsers. Failure to reject invalid input could compromise the security and integrity of Verifiable Credentials.
When implementing this specification, it is crucial for technical implementers to consider various accessibility factors. Ignoring accessibility concerns renders the information unusable for a significant portion of the population. To ensure equal access for all individuals, regardless of their abilities, it is vital to adhere to accessibility guidelines and standards, such as the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 2.1) [[WCAG21]]. This becomes even more critical when establishing systems that involve cryptography, as they have historically posed challenges for assistive technologies.
Implementers are advised to note and abide by all accessibility considerations called out in [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].
{
"id": "https://vendor.example",
}
{
"id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
"verificationMethod": [{
"id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049#key-123",
"type": "JsonWebKey",
"controller": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
"publicKeyJwk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-384",
"alg": "ES384",
"x": "PxgAmVYOQvSNcMYL2tOzoLwSWn4Ta3tIMPEUKR8pxeb-gmR11-DyKHBoIiY-2LhM",
"y": "BZEBTkImVdpwvxR9THIRw16eblnj5-tZa7m-ww5uVd4kyPJNRoWUn2aT9ZuarAe-"
}
}]
}
{
"id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
"verificationMethod": [{
"id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049#key-123",
"type": "JsonWebKey",
"controller": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
"publicKeyJwk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-384",
"alg": "ES384",
"x": "PxgAmVYOQvSNcMYL2tOzoLwSWn4Ta3tIMPEUKR8pxeb-gmR11-DyKHBoIiY-2LhM",
"y": "BZEBTkImVdpwvxR9THIRw16eblnj5-tZa7m-ww5uVd4kyPJNRoWUn2aT9ZuarAe-"
}
}],
"authentication": ["https://university.example/issuers/565049#key-123"],
"assertionMethod": ["https://university.example/issuers/565049#key-123"]
}
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1",
"https://w3id.org/security/jwk/v1",
{
"@vocab": "https://vendor.example#"
}
],
"id": "did:web:vendor.example",
"alsoKnownAs": ["https://vendor.example",
"did:jwk:eyJraWQiOiJ1cm46aWV0ZjpwYXJhbXM6b2F1dGg6andrLXRodW1icHJpbnQ6c2hhLTI1NjpGZk1iek9qTW1RNGVmVDZrdndUSUpqZWxUcWpsMHhqRUlXUTJxb2JzUk1NIiwia3R5IjoiT0tQIiwiY3J2IjoiRWQyNTUxOSIsImFsZyI6IkVkRFNBIiwieCI6IkFOUmpIX3p4Y0tCeHNqUlBVdHpSYnA3RlNWTEtKWFE5QVBYOU1QMWo3azQifQ"
],
"verificationMethod": [{
"id": "#urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:NzbLsXh8uDCcd-6MNwXF4W_7noWXFZAfHkxZsRGC9Xs",
"type": "JsonWebKey",
"controller": "did:web:vendor.example",
"publicKeyJwk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-521",
"alg": "ES512",
"x": "AFTyMw-fIYJNg6fBVJvOPOsLxmnNj8HgqMChyRL0swLaefVAc7wrWZ8okQJqMmvv03JRUp277meQZM3JcvXFkH1v",
"y": "ALn96CrD88b4TClmkl1sk0xk2FgAIda97ZF8TUOjbeWSzbKnN2KB6pqlpbuJ2xIRXvsn5BWQVlAT2JGpGwDNMyV1"
}
}, {
"id": "#z6MkhEdpG12jyQegrr62ACRmNY8gc531W2j9Xo39cHphuCEH",
"type": "JsonWebKey2020",
"controller": "https://vendor.example",
"publicKeyJwk": {
"kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:FfMbzOjMmQ4efT6kvwTIJjelTqjl0xjEIWQ2qobsRMM",
"kty": "OKP",
"crv": "Ed25519",
"alg": "EdDSA",
"x": "ANRjH_zxcKBxsjRPUtzRbp7FSVLKJXQ9APX9MP1j7k4"
}
}, {
"id": "#subject-authentication",
"type": "JsonWebKey",
"controller": "did:web:vendor.example",
"publicKeyJwk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-384",
"alg": "ES384",
"x": "PxgAmVYOQvSNcMYL2tOzoLwSWn4Ta3tIMPEUKR8pxeb-gmR11-DyKHBoIiY-2LhM",
"y": "BZEBTkImVdpwvxR9THIRw16eblnj5-tZa7m-ww5uVd4kyPJNRoWUn2aT9ZuarAe-"
}
}, {
"id": "#credential-issuance",
"type": "JsonWebKey",
"controller": "did:web:vendor.example",
"publicKeyJwk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"alg": "ES256",
"x": "MYvnaI87pfrn3FpTqW-yNiFcF1K7fedJiqapm20_q7c",
"y": "9YEbT6Tyuc7xp9yRvhOUVKK_NIHkn5HpK9ZMgvK5pVw"
}
}, {
"id": "#key-agreement",
"type": "JsonWebKey",
"controller": "did:web:vendor.example",
"publicKeyJwk": {
"kty": "OKP",
"crv": "X25519",
"alg": "ECDH-ES+A128KW",
"x": "qLZkSTbstvMWPTivmiQglEFWG2Ff7gNDVoVisdZTr1I"
}
}],
"authentication": ["#subject-authentication"],
"assertionMethod": ["#credential-issuance"]
}
{
"@context": ["https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"id": "https://contoso.example/credentials/23894672394",
"type": ["VerifiableCredential", "K9UnitCredential"],
"issuer": {
"id": "https://contoso.example"
},
"validFrom": "2015-04-16T05:11:32.432Z",
"credentialStatus": {
"id": "https://contoso.example/credentials/status/4#273762",
"type": "StatusList2021Entry",
"statusPurpose": "revocation",
"statusListIndex": "273762",
"statusListCredential": "https://contoso.example/credentials/status/4"
},
"credentialSubject": [{
"id": "did:example:1312387641",
"type": "Person"
}, {
"id": "did:example:63888231",
"type": "Dog"
}]
}
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"id": "https://contoso.example/credentials/35327255",
"type": ["VerifiableCredential", "KYCExample"],
"issuer": "did:web:contoso.example",
"validFrom": "2019-05-25T03:10:16.992Z",
"validUntil": "2027-05-25T03:10:16.992Z",
"credentialSchema": {
"id": "https://contoso.example/bafybeigdyr...lqabf3oclgtqy55fbzdi",
"type": "JsonSchema"
},
"credentialSubject": {
"id": "did:example:1231588",
"type": "Person"
}
}
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"type": "VerifiablePresentation",
"verifiableCredential": [
{
"@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"id": "data:application/vc+ld+json+cose;base64url,QzVjV...RMjU",
"type": "EnvelopedVerifiableCredential"
},
{
"@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"id": "data:application/vc+ld+json+jwt;eyVjV...RMjU",
"type": "EnvelopedVerifiableCredential"
},
{
"@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"id": "data:application/vc+ld+json+sd-jwt;eyVjV...RMjU",
"type": "EnvelopedVerifiableCredential"
}
]
}
data:application/vc+ld+json+sd-jwt;eyJhbGciOiJFUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6IlNJM1JITm91aDhvODFOT09OUFFVQUw3RWdaLWtJNl94ajlvUkV2WDF4T3ciLCJ0eXAiOiJ2YytsZCtqc29uK3NkLWp3dCIsImN0eSI6InZjK2xkK2pzb24ifQ.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.rYzbxb6j1dwop8_s491iArVVJNm6A6C3b742gOm_qYO3zdkyQU4_VxxOSJ8ECcmWj2r5KyiCNC1ojfO4Yms-zBsjt7PoMYpYWBplsqXpiIvnehmM7D0eOLi40uHXki0X~WyJSWTg1YTZNMmEwX3VDWlFTVGZmTFdRIiwgImlkIiwgImh0dHA6Ly91bml2ZXJzaXR5LmV4YW1wbGUvY3JlZGVudGlhbHMvMTg3MiJd~WyJMeG5GYTBXVm8wRUluVy1QdS1fd1dRIiwgInR5cGUiLCBbIlZlcmlmaWFibGVDcmVkZW50aWFsIiwgIkV4YW1wbGVBbHVtbmlDcmVkZW50aWFsIl1d~WyJUQVdrakpCaVpxdC1rVU54X1EweUJBIiwgImlkIiwgImh0dHBzOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5vcmcvZXhhbXBsZXMvZGVncmVlLmpzb24iXQ~WyJTd2xuZFpPZzZEZ1ZERFp5X0RvYVFBIiwgInR5cGUiLCAiSnNvblNjaGVtYSJd~WyJuSnJlU3E1Nzg3RGZMSDJCbU03cXFRIiwgImlkIiwgImRpZDpleGFtcGxlOjEyMyJd~WyIxMjNNd3hNcHRiek02YUk2aW03ME1RIiwgInR5cGUiLCAiQmFjaGVsb3JEZWdyZWUiXQ
data:application/vp+ld+json+sd-jwt;eyJhbGciOiJFUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6IlNJM1JITm91aDhvODFOT09OUFFVQUw3RWdaLWtJNl94ajlvUkV2WDF4T3ciLCJ0eXAiOiJ2YytsZCtqc29uK3NkLWp3dCIsImN0eSI6InZjK2xkK2pzb24ifQ.eyJAY29udGV4dCI6WyJodHRwczovL3d3dy53My5vcmcvbnMvY3JlZGVudGlhbHMvdjIiLCJodHRwczovL3d3dy53My5vcmcvbnMvY3JlZGVudGlhbHMvZXhhbXBsZXMvdjIiXSwiaXNzdWVyIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly91bml2ZXJzaXR5LmV4YW1wbGUvaXNzdWVycy81NjUwNDkiLCJ2YWxpZEZyb20iOiIyMDEwLTAxLTAxVDE5OjIzOjI0WiIsImNyZWRlbnRpYWxTY2hlbWEiOnsiX3NkIjpbIkU3dU1sSWFyS29iYXJTdEZGRjctZm5qaV9sQVdnM3BGMkV5dVc4dWFYakUiLCJYelRaSVgyNGdDSWxSQVFHclFoNU5FRm1XWkQtZ3Z3dkIybzB5Y0FwNFZzIl19LCJjcmVkZW50aWFsU3ViamVjdCI6eyJkZWdyZWUiOnsibmFtZSI6IkJhY2hlbG9yIG9mIFNjaWVuY2UgYW5kIEFydHMiLCJfc2QiOlsiT3oxUEZIMG0tWk9TdEhwUVZyeGlmVlpKRzhvNmlQQmNnLVZ2SXQwd2plcyJdfSwiX3NkIjpbIkVZQ1daMTZZMHB5X1VNNzRHU3NVYU9zT19mdDExTlVSaFFUTS1TT1lFTVEiXX0sIl9zZCI6WyJqT055NnZUbGNvVlAzM25oSTdERGN3ekVka3d2R3VVRXlLUjdrWEVLd3VVIiwid21BdHpwc0dRbDJveS1PY2JrSEVZcE8xb3BoX3VYcWVWVTRKekF0aFFibyJdLCJfc2RfYWxnIjoic2hhLTI1NiIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vdW5pdmVyc2l0eS5leGFtcGxlL2lzc3VlcnMvNTY1MDQ5IiwiaWF0IjoxNjk3Mjg5OTk2LCJleHAiOjE3Mjg5MTIzOTYsImNuZiI6eyJqd2siOnsia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTM4NCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMzg0IiwieCI6InZFdV84WGxZT0ZFU2hTcVRpZ2JSYWduZ0ZGM1p5U0xrclNHekh3azFBT1loanhlazVhV21HY2UwZU05S0pWOEIiLCJ5IjoiRUpNY2czWXBzUTB3M2RLNHlVa25QczE1Z0lsY2Yyay03dzFKLTNlYlBiOERENmQtUkhBeGUwMDkzSWpfdTRCOSJ9fX0.rYzbxb6j1dwop8_s491iArVVJNm6A6C3b742gOm_qYO3zdkyQU4_VxxOSJ8ECcmWj2r5KyiCNC1ojfO4Yms-zBsjt7PoMYpYWBplsqXpiIvnehmM7D0eOLi40uHXki0X~WyJTd2xuZFpPZzZEZ1ZERFp5X0RvYVFBIiwgInR5cGUiLCAiSnNvblNjaGVtYSJd~WyIxMjNNd3hNcHRiek02YUk2aW03ME1RIiwgInR5cGUiLCAiQmFjaGVsb3JEZWdyZWUiXQ~WyJMeG5GYTBXVm8wRUluVy1QdS1fd1dRIiwgInR5cGUiLCBbIlZlcmlmaWFibGVDcmVkZW50aWFsIiwgIkV4YW1wbGVBbHVtbmlDcmVkZW50aWFsIl1d~WyJSWTg1YTZNMmEwX3VDWlFTVGZmTFdRIiwgImlkIiwgImh0dHA6Ly91bml2ZXJzaXR5LmV4YW1wbGUvY3JlZGVudGlhbHMvMTg3MiJd~eyJhbGciOiJFUzM4NCIsInR5cCI6ImtiK2p3dCJ9.eyJub25jZSI6IkVmeTROTFJPX3ZvSkszdDIzcUNfQlEiLCJhdWQiOiJodHRwczovL3ZlcmlmaWVyLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJpYXQiOjE2OTcyODk5OTZ9.6G-1nVcrDKFzR6BdbcFHcbtassEb8NZ7ZavTYz3SJ-e4pXleXs0tNcCkUCwMI70gsuOY0AXzeDPbHjp5GKyLDVuNWgWCt3Wo2VSaCwUkyfLyvhkCsmkF9kvFhMIOhp1i
These examples rely on CBOR Diagnostic Notation. Remember that all actual interchange always happens in the binary format.
{ / Protected /
1: -35, / Algorithm /
3: application/vc+ld+json, / Content type /
4: h'177f12cb...1933d554', / Key identifier /
15: { / CWT Claims /
1: urn:example:123, / Issuer /
2: urn:example:456, / Subject /
},
}
{ / Protected /
1: -35, / Algorithm /
3: application/vp+ld+json, / Content type /
4: h'177f12cb...1933d554', / Key identifier /
15: { / CWT Claims /
1: urn:example:123, / Issuer /
2: urn:example:456, / Subject /
},
}
18( / COSE Sign 1 /
[
h'a4013822...3a343536', / Protected Header /
{} / Unprotected Header /
h'0fbe22a0...3a009118', / Attached payload /
h'09772c7f...5c4e736f' / Signature /
]
)
18( / COSE Sign 1 /
[
h'a4013822...3a343536', / Protected Header /
{} / Unprotected Header /
nil, / Detached payload /
h'09772c7f...5c4e736f' / Signature /
]
)
The payload can be either a credential or presentation as described in Securing Mechanisms.
This specification might be used with many different key discovery protocols. Therefore, discovery of verification keys is described in , and is assumed to have succeeded prior to beginning the verification process.
As a general rule, verifiers SHOULD strive to minimize the processing of untrusted data. This includes minimizing any processing of the protected header, unprotected header, or payload as part of the key discovery procedures.
After verification has succeeded, additional validation checks SHOULD be performed as described in Section
The outputs for the following algorithms are:
status: a boolean indicating the result of verification,
true for success and false for failure.
document: a document conforming to the [[[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]]] [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]]
mediaType: vc+ld+json or vp+ld+json
The inputs for this algorithm are:
inputMediaType: vc+ld+json+jwt or
vp+ld+json+jwt
inputDocument: the verifiable credential secured as a JWT [[RFC7519]]
Upon receipt of the verifiable credential or presentation secured as a JWT [[RFC7519]], the holder or verifier follows this algorithm:
status to true
mediaType to vc+ld+json or vp+json+ld
document to the decoded JWS payload.
status to false
document to null
mediaType to null
The inputs for this algorithm are:
inputMediaType: vc+ld+json+sd-jwt
inputDocument: the verifiable credential secured with [[SD-JWT]]
Upon receipt of the verifiable credential or presentation secured with [[SD-JWT]], the holder or verifier follows this algorithm:
status to true
mediaType to vc+ld+json
document to the JSON claim set.
(For examples of the transition from JSON claim set to SD-JWT payload, please
see SD-JWT examples).
status to false
document to null
mediaType to null
The inputs for this algorithm are:
inputMediaType: vc+ld+json+cose or
vp+ld+json+cose
inputDocument: the verifiable credential or verifiable presentation
secured with [[[RFC9052]]]
Upon receipt of the verifiable credential or presentation secured with [[RFC9052]], the holder or verifier follows this algorithm:
status to true
mediaType to vc+ld+json or vp+ld+json
document to the decoded COSE_Sign1 payload.
status to false
document to null
mediaType to null
All claims expected for the typ MUST be present.
All claims that are understood MUST be evaluated according the verifier's validation policies.
All claims that are not understood MUST be ignored.
The verified document returned from verification MUST be a
well-formed compact JSON-LD document, as described in
Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2.0.
Schema extension mechanisms such as credentialSchema SHOULD be checked.
If the extension mechanism type is not understood, this property
MUST be ignored.
Status extension mechanisms such as credentialStatus SHOULD be checked.
If the extension mechanism type is not understood, this property
MUST be ignored.
Based on the validation policy of the verifier, the type of credentials, and the type of securing mechanism, additional validation checks MAY be applied. For example, dependencies between multiple credentials, ordering or timing information associated with multiple credentials, and/or multiple presentations could cause an otherwise valid credential or presentation to be considered invalid.