This document provides non-normative guidance on how to implement Web of Things (WoT) using best practices for security and privacy. When doing security testing, use of these best practices is assumed.

Please contribute to this draft using the GitHub Issue feature of the WoT Security Best Practices /a> repository.


For a general discussion of WoT security and privacy issues, see the WoT Security and Privacy Guidelines document.

For details on the Web of Things architecture, please refer to the following:

Secure Transport

In general, the recommendation is to use the latest version of TLS and DTLS available, consistent with interoperability requirements. Currently, the latest version of TLS is 1.3 but as this is not yet widely deployed, for interoperability a system may have to be based on TLS 1.2. However, as TLS 1.3 addresses several vulnerabilities in TLS 1.2 in general a migration plan should be in place to TLS 1.3 and new implementations should target TLS 1.3 if possible.

Ideally systems would implement the following for each of the given protocols:


HTTP + TLS 1.3


CoAP + DTLS. See also:

  • IETF RFC7925: Transport Layer Security (TLS) / Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Profiles for the Internet of Things
  • IETF RFC7252: The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)


MQTT + TLS 1.3. See also:

Authentication and Access Control

The best practices for authentication and access control depend on the protocol. In most cases, authentication schemes should only be considered secure when used in combination with secure transport. We recommend the following combinations:

In addition, TDs with HTTP/nosec and CoAP/nosec should be tested and properly handled. They are useful in conjunction with proxies that layer on one of the above secure transport and authentication schemes.

"Local HTTPS" is still a topic of discussion. In addition to the above schemes, using HTTPS with psk, public, or cert schemes to share keys to be used for TLS transport is also acceptable for machine-to-machine communication. However, currently such schemes may require the user to manually install or accept keys or certificates when using a browser.

Thing Directories

Directory services are often used in WoT systems to store TDs and provide discovery services. This is especially useful for devices that need to sleep to conserve battery life. Rather than watching for and responding to discovery requests themselves, they can register their TDs with a directory service which can then respond on their behalf. Directories can either run locally on a gateway (behind a firewall, on the same local network as the devices) or in the cloud (with globally visible URLs). The security considerations and discovery mechanisms are a little different for these two cases. Unfortunately directory services have not (yet) been standardized so our recommendations here are general.

A globally accessible directory service will act much like other web services. It will be available at a "well-known" URL that will have to be configured by the user. Registration of devices will have to be associated with a particular user and use of the service will have to be protected by authentication and confidentiality mechanisms, such as HTTPS combined with one of the authentication mechanisms listed above. The directory service should avoid doing any processing for unauthenticated connection attempts in order to protect itself from DoS attacks.

Local directory services may also offer a web interface but may also advertise their availability using mDNS/Zeroconf. Authentication and confidentiality for a local service can also be secured via HTTPS although the issues of "local HTTPS" also arise for such services; in general, the user may have to "on-board" devices using some kind of pairing approach. If the local service is located on a network located behind a firewall it is possible to depend on link-layer encryption such as WPA2 although this is not as secure as transport-layer security using TLS.

Registering a device's TD with a directory service is also a suitable time to capture user consent for the distribution of the TD and the data from the device. Such consent should include appropriate limits on who can access the data and for how long it can be retained. Also, since personally-identifiable information can be inferred from TDs, TDs should themselves be treated as personally-identifiable information and suitably protected. This means that directories should generally only provide TDs via mutually-authenticated channels to users that are authorized to access those TDs.

Object Security

Object security is recommended if a CoAP or MQTT to HTTP gateway is used that translates protocols. Ideally however you would NOT translate the payload itself but use end-to-end security. It is also important to still use object security with TLS and DTLS; object security alone is generally insufficient. The main advantage of object security is that a compromised Gateway will be prevented from modifying payloads.

Example object-security standards to consider are COSE, OSCORE, and OSCOAP.

Secure Update and Post Manufacturing Provisioning

The WoT is primarily concerned with the operational phase of devices. It is assumed that devices and other components of a WoT system (gateways, for example) start the operational phase in a secure state. WoT best practices are focused on keeping devices and services in a secure state staring from this assumption. However, to enter operational state in secure fashion, additional best practices need to be followed during manufacturing, deployment and provisioning, and best practices should also be followed for secure update.

Good references for best practices for secure update and provisioning are the IIC Security Framework [[IICSF]] and the IoT Security Foundation's guidelines [[IoTSF]].


Please refer to the WoT Architecture document for terminology definitions.